

WORLD SAVVY

MONITOR



Pakistan



Letter from the Editor

As this goes to press, the situation in Pakistan is volatile. The past 18 months have seen this critical Western ally vacillate between civilian and military rule as the country is wracked by constitutional crises, assassinations, and both rigged and legitimate elections amidst general domestic instability. In addition, a growing Islamic militant insurgency in tribal areas of the country not only threatens Pakistan's security, but also jeopardizes Western efforts to secure Afghanistan and address terrorism globally. These developments should be viewed against a backdrop of crushing poverty, corruption, and widespread lack of basic social welfare and educational institutions; these factors give Pakistan the unfortunate distinction of providing the lowest quality of life outside Sub-Saharan Africa.

Sixty years after its founding from the tatters of the British colonial empire, Pakistan has yet to resolve what experts agree are its most basic identity crises. Is it a state for Muslims or an Islamic state? Will it remain an oligarchy of (often corrupt) feudal, religious, and military leaders or does it aspire to become a modern, progressive democracy? Is it an integrated partner in the international community, or is it simply a means to an end for competing Western and Middle Eastern interests globally? Perhaps the most vivid analysis I came across in researching this briefing was from noted Brookings Institution scholar Stephen Cohen. He wrote in 2004 that Pakistan often negotiates with its allies and enemies alike with a "gun to its own head." This notion of a "suicide gambit" illustrates how Pakistan relates to the world, aware of its own geostrategic importance, but certain

of little else. The country's historic pattern of receiving Western aid only in times of regional crisis has created perverse incentives that continue to haunt Pakistani-US relations today.

The ramifications of President Pervez Musharraf's resignation on August 18th continue to unfold as global actors reevaluate their relationships to this geostrategically vital country. Pakistan is considered by most experts to be at a crossroad, and its trajectory forward is being closely watched from the streets of the Muslim world to Wall Street. This trajectory matters perhaps more than ever before, as competing interests race to fill the spiritual, political, social, and economic vacuum that is Pakistan in 2008.

Ironically, we began this edition of the Monitor back in late 2007 to cover the turbulent year that culminated in Benazir Bhutto's assassination in December. In the end, we opted to first cover the unfolding events and critical developments occurring in Sudan (May), provide readers with context for the Olympics in China (June), and review the state of democracy in advance of important elections around the world (August). When we revisited the Pakistan Edition the summer of 2008, it couldn't have been timelier. This month, we present the issues as they are playing out in real-time; global media outlets are awash in stories following President Musharraf's resignation and the ongoing debate over US policies in the Global War on Terror.

What happens politically in Pakistan has the potential to affect Americans as much as the outcome of the 2008 US Presidential Elections. The security and development

issues in both countries transcend borders, as do issues of leadership and identity. There are enormous implications for the global community in a post-Musharraf and post-Bush world. We encourage you to follow this fascinating narrative as it comes to you daily, and hope that the context we provide here helps to inspire informed conversation around these important issues.

Sincerely,
Cate Biggs
Editor, World Savvy Monitor

World Savvy

World Savvy staff edit and produce the World Savvy Monitor. Our mission is to educate and engage youth in community and world affairs by providing educational programs and services. World Savvy's vision for the future is one in which all members of society are well informed about contemporary global affairs and act as responsible global citizens. We believe that change will occur if the public has an enhanced understanding of international affairs and is given the tools to think critically about such issues.

Cate Biggs

Cate is the primary author of the World Savvy Monitor. She is a graduate of Yale University, has a Masters from the University of California, Berkeley, and has taught high school American and World History. She has also worked extensively in the non-profit and foundation world. She is currently a consultant for Global Education curriculum and professional development, and a writer living in Northern California with her husband and three daughters.

Table of Contents

Issue in Focus

Did you Know	9
Understanding the Headlines	10
Breaking News	14
Map of Pakistan	16
Annotated Timeline: Pakistan, Greater South Asia, International Community	17
Internal Players	
• Pakistani Leaders at a Glance	38
• Pakistan's Main Political Parties	41
• Pakistan's Political System	43
• Demography and Provincial Dynamics	49
• The Economy	52
• The Military	55
• The Education System	58
• Islamists	62
• Pakistan's Nuclear Program	64
External Players	
• India	68
• Afghanistan	75
• The United States	79
• Bangladesh	88
• Global Terror Networks	90
• Other External Players	94
Sources	
• Referenced Resources	97
• Visual Sources	102
• Key Foundation Documents	103

Classroom Companion	105
----------------------------	-----

World Savvy Salon Guide	119
--------------------------------	-----

Update: China	129
----------------------	-----

WORLD SAVVY

MONITOR



Issue In Focus

Did You Know?

- Upon its 1947 independence from Britain and partition with India, Pakistan was made up of West and East Pakistan separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory. East Pakistan ultimately seceded and became the independent country of Bangladesh.
- Pakistan occupies a highly geostrategic land mass in Central Asia less than twice the size of California with 172 million people. With high fertility rates, it is the world's second-largest Muslim country, and expected to soon become the 5th most populous country in the world. †It suffers from lack of water and natural resources.
- Pakistan is a developing country with three-quarters of its population living on less than \$2/day. Great inequalities of wealth exist between ordinary citizens and feudal landowners/industrial elites. Only 1.5% of Pakistanis pay any taxes, and foreign aid makes up a large percent of the country's budget.
- On the Human Development Index (HDI), a UN measure evaluating quality of life, Pakistan is ranked 136 out of 177 countries. It is the lowest ranked country outside of Sub-Saharan Africa.
- The overall literacy rate is 50%, and for females is just 36%.
- According to an analysis conducted by Brookings Institution expert Stephen Cohen, there are only 100,000 Pakistanis enrolled in higher education out of a population of 172 million. By comparison, Bangladesh, with approximately the same size population, has nearly 900,000 students enrolled in higher education, and India, whose population is about seven times the size of Pakistan, has 90 times more students enrolled in higher education.
- Pakistan became the first Muslim nation to elect a woman (Benazir Bhutto) to the office of Prime Minister in 1988.
- Pakistan's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan are considered a major front in the Global War on Terror, playing host to jihadists from around the world, including Taliban insurgents fighting against US-NATO forces in Afghanistan. Many of these groups have their roots in the US-financed Mujahideen from the Cold War days.
- Ever since Partition, India and Pakistan have been engaged in a cold, and episodically hot, rivalry that includes competition for regional influence and contested territory in Kashmir.
- Pakistan is one of only seven acknowledged nuclear powers in the world.
- Pakistan is home to the famous peak K2, the second highest mountain in the world.



Understanding the Headlines

What are the biggest problems facing Pakistan today?

Perhaps Pakistan's greatest asset, and liability, is its **geographic location**. As the gateway to Central Asia, it borders Iran, China, India, and perpetually unstable Afghanistan, for which it has twice served as a critical staging ground for Western military offensives. Like many former colonies, Pakistan's boundaries were drawn in an often illogical manner that separated and combined different ethnic, cultural, and language groups. This haunts the nation today in the form of separatist, sectarian, and inter-state conflict. Pakistan is the second largest Muslim country in the world, and poised to soon become the fifth most populous nation on the planet. It lacks significant mineral resources, but serves as an important conduit for the movement of those resources between the Middle East and Asia.

Economic development is a critical issue in Pakistan. On quality of life indicators, Pakistan already ranks the lowest of any country outside Sub-Saharan Africa; widespread poverty, extreme inequalities of wealth, a weak industrial base, poor infrastructure, and a rapidly growing population characterize the country. It currently faces stagnating growth, rising inflation, crushing foreign debt, and growing unemployment. It has few tapped or untapped significant mineral reserves, and suffers from a chronic shortage of water for crop irrigation and human consumption. It is highly dependent on foreign aid, most notably from the

United States and Saudi Arabia. It raises almost no money in taxes from its citizens.

The state lacks quality durable institutions, instead historically relying on **autocratic personality-driven leadership**. The military and intelligence services, as well as feudal landlords, have always wielded disproportionate influence. The education and social welfare sectors are underdeveloped and political parties are generally weak. President Pervez Musharraf recently resigned after a year of constitutional crises, violence, and the defeat of his party in Parliamentary elections. The future of Pakistan's leadership is uncertain as his two opponents, themselves rivals, sought to build a governing coalition that fell apart soon after Musharraf's resignation. The political leadership's task is to now restore confidence in Islamabad's ability to address Pakistan's myriad challenges.

Pakistan's crises in these last months have created a **leadership and institutional vacuum**, which is being filled with clan and tribal networks, underground economies, and religious extremist groups. Ethnic and sectarian fragmentation creates instability, separatism, and even violence. Corruption impedes economic growth and breeds alienation among the population.

Pakistan's **tribal areas are particularly chaotic and lawless**. These areas have largely fallen under the influence of warlords and are home to militant Islamic groups from around the world. These groups wreak havoc on Western interests in Afghanistan and beyond and have even turned their attention inward to Pakistan. They are thought to be

behind a dramatic rise in suicide bombings in major cities throughout the country.

The country **lacks a significant middle class**, a critical agent of potential democratic reform. A shallow economy and poor education system only compound this deficit and diminish the population's democratic capacities. Many believe that true democratic reform is an essential step toward addressing the many challenges that Pakistan faces.

Pakistanis share a collective memory of embattlement, borne from both decades of rivalry with neighboring India and their position in the cross hairs of larger geostrategic issues. In a globalized world where connections are so important, Pakistan's **strained diplomatic and economic ties with its neighbors and the international community** have significantly hindered its growth and endangered its security.

2) Why is Pakistan so important to the West's interests in the region?

Pakistan played a crucial role in the defeat of Russian troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, by serving as the primary conduit for converting American aid to Afghan Freedom Fighters (Mujahideen).

Pakistan's ties to these radical militant groups extended beyond the Soviet campaign and American Cold War engagement in the region. When the US abandoned the area in the 1990s, Pakistan went on to support the Taliban conquest of Afghanistan. It continued to provide funds, weapons, and training to Islamic militant groups along the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan again became an ally of the United States after suffering from a decade of sanctions related to its nuclear program, lack of democracy, and support of radical militant groups. President Musharraf abandoned cultural and religious loyalties to the Taliban and al Qaeda and was given a great deal of American aid to help in the campaign to defeat the Islamist groups in Afghanistan and in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Despite quick initial success against the Taliban in 2001, US and NATO troops have yet to fully secure Afghanistan and are currently facing an emboldened Taliban and al Qaeda insurgency largely operating from Pakistani territory. Over

\$10 billion in US aid has been provided to Pakistan to root out insurgents and global jihadist terrorist networks; this has yet to produce the desired results. As such, the region is becoming more dangerous and hostile to US and Western security interests.

The West's security concerns for the region go beyond Afghanistan and Islamic militants. Pakistan's cold and hot rivalry with India, particularly over the area of Kashmir, remains a threat to both countries. Each is a nuclear power and consequently, any conflict has the potential to destroy much of the region. Moreover, the Kashmiri conflict is related to the issue of Islamic militancy because Pakistan depends heavily on Islamic insurgents to fight Indian troops in this disputed area. These insurgents often train alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda – the very groups Pakistan has been tasked by the US to eradicate.

3) Why is Pakistan important to the West's interests globally?

Peace and economic development on the Indian subcontinent and in Central Asia are indivisible from the West's global interests, particularly in preventing both the rise of Islamic militancy and the specter of nuclear war. In an increasingly interconnected world, neither of these phenomena is likely to remain contained within the region.

Global jihadist networks have used Pakistan's tribal areas as a staging ground for attacks throughout the world. Most experts agree that attacks on Madrid, London, and elsewhere can be traced back to this terrorist sanctuary. In addition to radical Islamic groups from the Middle East, separatist groups such as those in Chechnya have connections to these networks in Pakistan. Combating global terrorism requires dealing with Pakistan's hinterlands and the support and protection that is offered to such groups.

Likewise, the threat of nuclear war is not confined to the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Pakistan has, over the years, been a major actor in nuclear proliferation, primarily through the notorious A. Q. Kahn's networks, which are thought to have supplied nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Preventing Pakistan from sharing its nuclear capacities with other states or with terrorist groups is a major concern of global security promotion.

Finally, Pakistan is important because of what it has the potential to represent for the rest of the world. It could serve as a model for the triumph of moderate Islam - a symbol of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence between the West and the Muslim world and a bulwark of Islamic democracy. Alternatively, it could become a violent and disheartening symbol of what Samuel Huntington has called the “clash of civilizations.”

4) What does the resignation of President Musharraf in August 2008 portend for the future of Pakistan and its relation with the West?

At this point, in policy circles locally and globally, nobody knows with any certainty the results of Musharraf’s resignation. On one hand, his departure is a blow to US-Pakistani relations as a result of the time, money, and energy that were expended cultivating him as a US ally. In this vein, Jane Perlez of the New York Times recently wrote that he has long served as a “convenient, one-stop shopping window” for US interests in the region. Now, with the diffusion of power (a trend that has been growing since the defeat of his party in Parliament in February), the US must penetrate deeper and more widely into Pakistani power structures to pursue its myriad goals in the region. It has long been said that the US has never really had a Pakistan policy, but instead has had a Zia or Bhutto or Sharif or Musharraf policy. Going forward, if the US seeks to maintain its alliance, it must stretch itself diplomatically to build support across Pakistan’s institutions .

On the other hand, Musharraf has been called an unreliable ally in recent years. His increasingly weak political position put him at the mercy of Islamist extremists whom he could not afford to alienate. Many feel that this diminished his ability to combat the Islamic militants in tribal areas that have been wreaking havoc on US-NATO-Karzai military operations in Afghanistan. Some have even accused him of blatant double-dealing on this front. Further, his record on brokering peace with India has been mixed and on his watch, the situation in Kashmir has deteriorated over the past months. His democratic record has also been less than stellar. Pakistan experienced a dramatic roll-back in liberal freedoms during Emergency Rule last year, including attacks on the Supreme Court, media, and civil society.

Musharraf has been accused of exacerbating Pakistan’s culture of impunity, leaving corruption and cronyism largely unaddressed, taxes uncollected, and everything from electricity to votes susceptible to theft..

The US must look to other Pakistani leaders now, namely Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) and Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Unfortunately, observers will note that the one thing that united these age-old rivals was their opposition to Musharraf; his resignation removed this commonality and the alliance has subsequently collapsed. The two parties are bitterly divided over the issue of reinstating the Supreme Court judges dismissed by Musharraf and both are compromised by reputations for corruption and ineptitude in past administrations. It remains to be seen if they can put their differences aside to reform Pakistan’s institutions and heal divisions among different ethnic, sectarian, and interest groups. Everyone will be watching to see how they will deal with two of Pakistan’s central dilemmas: the place of Islam and the influence of the military in society. In turn, how the Islamists and military-intelligence complex react to their leadership will be of great importance.

5) What can the US and West do to strengthen Pakistan domestically and internationally as an ally in the Global War on Terror?

Nearly all experts agree that the international community must widen its focus in Pakistan, from narrowly interpreted security interests to more general nation-building. Economic aid is considered to be as critical as military aid. Experts agree that the key to diminishing the appeal of Islamic extremism is developing Pakistan’s ability to meet the needs of its domestic population. This involves improving the education and welfare of Pakistani citizens to help build a reliable, progressive, and moderate Muslim bulwark in a troubled region. There is currently much talk of the need for a Central Asian Marshall Plan.

Democracy often flows from nation-building, another US and Western aim for the region. In promoting democracy, however, the international community is cautioned to proceed with cultural sensitivity, allowing institutions to develop in ways that serve Pakistan’s unique demography, culture, and political realities. If democracy does flourish in this critical nation, the effects would be expected to

reverberate throughout the Muslim Middle East and beyond.

Most experts also call for creative and far-reaching exchanges between Pakistan and the West in an effort to integrate this critical country into the international community. These range from cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges to a more comprehensive approach to diplomacy. Many feel that anti-Western, anti-modern, and anti-American sentiment must be addressed by coupling hard power with soft power.

Finally, consistency and a long time horizon are seen as antidotes to the troubles of the relationship between the West and Pakistan. For much of its history, the US and West have dispensed focused, short-term attention on Pakistan – from lavish overt and covert military aid to complete isolation and pariah-status. Experts across the spectrum believe that Pakistan needs sustained, thoughtful attention on a variety of fronts, and that this will build the trust needed in its relationship with the West. There are musings that a perverse incentive is developing, given that Pakistan has generally received the most US aid in times of great instability and conflict in the region. Many believe it has come to serve Pakistan's interests to keep the pot boiling – in the tribal areas, in Afghanistan, in Kashmir, at home. Moreover, Pakistan's leaders have often felt that they needed to keep a foot in different camps, maintaining relations with US enemies in case the US precipitously pulled out of the region as they did in the 1990s. Many therefore believe that a long-term, consistent, and broad-based strategy for Pakistan must be developed to address these debilitating dynamics.

Breaking News

The current situation in Pakistan is extremely volatile, with developments impacting stability in the region daily. The following are key events that have transpired between the writing and publication of this edition of the Monitor.

- **The dissolution of the PPP – PML-N coalition:** On August 25, the tenuous coalition between Asif Ali Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) collapsed. Coming just a week after Pervez Musharraf's resignation from the Presidency, the coalition's breakdown was primarily due to disagreement over the reinstatement of judges (who were fired by Musharraf in 2007) and Zardari's decision to pursue the Presidency. The party leaders had previously agreed to reinstate all judges and to nominate a politically neutral candidate for the Presidency if Musharraf was removed from power.
- **Asif Ali Zardari's election to the Pakistani Presidency:** Asif Ali Zardari, the widow of recently assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was elected to the Presidency of Pakistan on September 6. Zardari, who co-chairs the PPP, won 481 out of 702 votes in what many have called a sweeping victory. Zardari has the tacit approval of the United States, which expects him to be an important ally in the fight against terrorism, and Zardari has already pledged to step up the battle against Islamist extremists in Pakistan. See the 'Pakistani Leaders' section in Internal Players for more information on Zardari's background.
- **Reinstatement of deposed judges:** On August 28, eight judges were reinstated, and on September 5, three more previously fired judges were reappointed to the judiciary. The reinstatement of 60 judges who were fired by Musharraf after challenging his 2007 reelection has been a major point of contention between Nawaz Sharif's PML-N and newly elected President Asif Ali Zardari's PPP. Sharif supports the return of all judges, while many believe that Zardari is wary of their full reinstatement because former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry could potentially pursue corruption charges that have been levied against Zardari.
- **US launches unilateral air strike against militants in Pakistan border region:** US missiles hit a compound purported to be home to Taliban leader Jalaludin Haqqani on September 8. The strike was the third in a week to be carried out within Pakistan's borders. It comes after the US has expressed increasing frustration that the Pakistani military is not doing enough to combat Taliban and al Qaeda sanctuaries in the region. Some experts worry that such strikes could both benefit the Taliban, by increasing animosity toward the US, and further destabilize Pakistan, by undermining its military.
- **Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai pledge to fight terrorists together:** Afghan President Hamid Karzai was present for Asif Ali Zardari's presidential inauguration ceremony. The two later held a joint press conference in which they vowed to work together in the fight against terrorism. Karzai noted

that Pakistan and Afghanistan are like “twins joined,” saying, “They are inseparable,” and suffer “the same problems, the same evils.” In the past Karzai has been critical of Pakistani efforts to prevent militants from crossing the Afghan-Pakistani border to launch attacks within Afghanistan.

Map of Pakistan



Pakistan Timeline

Date	Pakistan - Greater South Asia	International Community
1757	British colonialism in South Asia launched under the auspices of the British East India Company. Over the next 200 years, the British empire in South Asia would extend its influence in what is now India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives.	Loss of American colonies increases value of British South Asian colonies and protectorates.
Mid-1800's	British power checked in Afghanistan in first of Anglo-Afghan wars. Sepoy Mutiny in India poses a major challenge to British East India Company rule and the British monarchy subsequently takes control of the colonies.	Britain and Russia begin "The Great Game," a battle for influence in non-aligned Afghanistan.
1860's	Suez Canal opens up a more convenient route from England; spurs development of South Asian colonies. British leaders with only marginal control of Afghan territories draw The Durand Line, officially demarcating the boundary between Afghanistan and British India; line drawn through Pashtun mountain communities who do not recognize its legality.	Britain grants Canada dominion status in 1867.

Date	Pakistan - Greater South Asia	International Community
1885	Indian National Congress (INC) formed, seeks greater autonomy for India (which at this time includes Pakistan).	European nations convene the Berlin Conference, regulating European colonization and trade in Africa and formalizing the 'Scramble for Africa.'
1906	All-India Muslim League formed as Islamic counterweight to growing power of Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress.	From 1900-1910, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and South Africa are all granted dominion status.
1915-1920	Mohandas Gandhi active in Indian nationalism; advocates nonviolent resistance and the empowerment of the rural masses. Third Anglo-Afghan war brings official independence for Afghan monarchy from Britain.	WWI disrupts trade and development in Europe and in the colonies.
1937	INC given functioning autonomy to rule Indian colonies with British consent; Muslim League protests.	The Great Depression of the 1930s hits the United States, impacting much of the rest of the world. In 1931, British Dominions are granted full autonomy.
1940	Future founder of Pakistan Mohammed Ali Jinnah leads Muslim League in adopting the Lahore Resolution calling for a partition of India upon independence into Hindu and Muslim separate states.	
1940's	WWII forces Britain to plan for independence for the colonies; increased tensions between Hindu (now led by Jawaharlal Nehru) and Muslim factions (led by Jinnah) in India.	WWII dominates the international community as major participants, in a state of 'total war,' place their complete economic, industrial, and scientific capabilities at the service of the war effort. With the exception of African colonies and largely as a result of WWII, a rapid period of decolonization takes place among the holdings of European colonial powers; often, divisions occur along ethnic and religious lines in the newly independent territories.

Date	Pakistan - Greater South Asia	International Community
1947	<p>Independence granted in a “Two Nation” solution: Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan maps quickly and arbitrarily drawn; as millions of civilians are displaced, violence accompanies the scramble of the population to end up in the correct nation. Ethnic groups and communities along the border are artificially divided and consolidated. Pakistan officially divided into East and West Pakistan with 1000 miles of Indian territory separating them. Kashmir’s status left unresolved.</p>	<p>United Nations formed on the principle of sovereignty for nation-states.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1947-1949	<p>East and West Pakistan ruled by Jinnah with Prime Minister Ali Khan. Tensions emerge as to the nature of the state and the place of Islam, as well as to the balance of power among the ethnically diverse regions.</p> <p>First war with India over Kashmir.</p> <p>Jinnah dies on September 11, 1948.</p>	<p>Pakistani-backed Muslim groups in Kashmir rebel, causing Kashmir’s Hindu Maharaja to seek protection by acceding to India. Pakistan invades the disputed area, starting the first Indo-Pakistani war.</p>	<p>UN intervenes in Indo-Pakistani war. Establishes cease-fire and Line of Control (LOC) dividing the region into three areas of influence among India, Pakistan, and China.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1950's	<p>Bengali residents of East Pakistan protest their marginalization by West Pakistan; secessionist movement begins. Disputes over the official language of Pakistan as the Muslim League begins to splinter.</p> <p>1956: Pakistan Constitution formally establishes an Islamic Republic based on a federal system of government with rights for non-Islamic minorities.</p> <p>1958: Military Coup by General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Authoritarian rule established, economic development proceeds but unevenly – corruption and inequality grow.</p> <p>Capital moves from Karachi to Islamabad.</p>	<p>Pakistan and Afghanistan in conflict over disputed Pashtun areas along their border. Pakistan cuts of oil transports to Afghanistan, prompting Afghan alignment with the USSR for trade and security.</p> <p>Tensions grow within the royal family in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan appointed by King Mohammed Zahir Shah and takes an extreme pro-Pashtun, anti-Pakistan, pro-USSR position.</p> <p>India, under Nehru, develops a secular Constitution based on that of the UK and US. Begins expansion of economy along socialist lines.</p>	<p>Cold War tensions feed international concern in the West over Afghan kingdom's relations with USSR; Pakistan becomes an important Cold War ally of the United States because of its strategic geographic position.</p> <p>Wave of independence for former African colonies in the latter half of the decade.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1960's	<p>Discontent grows over economic inequalities; Pakistan goes to war with India over Kashmir again in 1965.</p> <p>Military support for Ayub Kahn deteriorates in wake of Pakistani defeat in Kashmir.</p> <p>Pakistan Peoples Part (PPP) founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.</p> <p>Commander in Chief of Pakistan military Agha Muhammed Yahya replaced by Ayub Kahn who promises end of martial law and calls for Pakistan's first elections to be held in 1970.</p> <p>Bengali protests and secessionist movement grow in East Pakistan. Awami League formed under leadership of Bengali leader Mujibur Rhaman.</p> <p>US continues support of Pakistan in a Cold War hedge against non-aligned India.</p>	<p>In Afghanistan, King Zahir dismisses Prime Minister Daoud.</p> <p>Discontent and a severe drought threaten popular support for the Afghan Kingdom.</p> <p>India and Pakistan at war again over Kashmir.</p> <p>Nehru dies and his daughter Indira Gandhi becomes Prime Minister of India.</p>	<p>UN intervenes again in second Indo-Pakistani War over Kashmir; re-establishes cease-fire and LOC.</p> <p>Cold War tensions accelerate.</p> <p>Vietnam War begins, becoming a prominent example of a 'hot war' within the Cold War.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1970's	<p>The 1970 election unleashes a power struggle between West Pakistani leader Zulfikar Bhutto and East Pakistani leader Rahman and delays the return to civilian rule.</p> <p>Rahman proclaims an independent East Pakistan (Bangladesh) with a government in exile in Calcutta.</p> <p>Civil war breaks out in 1971 between East and West Pakistan over political power, the influence of Islam, the official language of the country, the position of the military in the government, and inequalities in development. India supports Bengali factions. West Pakistan defeated in 2 weeks, 10 million people displaced.</p> <p>East Pakistan gains formal independence under the name Bangladesh. Balochistan province of Pakistan develops similar secessionist movements.</p> <p>Civilian rule returns to Pakistan with Bhutto's installment as Prime Minister.</p>	<p>Green Revolution in India introduces new crops and irrigation methods; vastly increases food output.</p> <p>Pakistani Civil War refugees ignite tensions between India and Pakistan in Kashmir; war breaks out again. India prevails at LOC. Pakistan and India later sign an irrigation treaty that takes water out of the equation in the Kashmir controversy.</p> <p>India conducts first nuclear test, purportedly for peaceful purposes.</p> <p>Bhutto and Gandhi sign the Simla Agreement, agreeing to future negotiations in Kashmir.</p> <p>Protests in India against Indira Gandhi's presidency over corruption charges; economy declines. Gandhi declares emergency rule until elections in 1977 unseat her.</p> <p>Newly independent Bangladesh destabilized by protested elections, coups, and assassinations.</p>	<p>United States and West become increasingly concerned by regional instability as Cold War tensions accelerate on the world stage.</p> <p>US and West enter into negotiations to support Afghan religious freedom fighters, the Mujahideen, in their battle against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reach agreement with Zia in Pakistan to smuggle arms and money through Pakistan to the Mujahideen across the Northwest border. Western aid and munitions flow to the region, funneled through Zia.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1970's	<p>Bhutto proclaims the beginning of Pakistan's nuclear program.</p> <p>Army Chief of Staff Muhammad Zia ul-Haq deposes Bhutto in a military coup; imprisons and later hangs Bhutto, severing ties between the influential Sindh Bhutto family and the military forever.</p> <p>Under authoritarian, military rule, Zia proclaims Pakistan to be an Islamist state governed in part by Sharia Law and supported by a mosque-military alliance. Consolidates power in the Presidency and increases the power of the military in the government.</p> <p>Zia enters into deal with US, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China to support the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Zia regime and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) arms and funds Mujahideen freedom fighters over his Northwest border</p>	<p>Daoud coup deposes King Zahir in Afghanistan; Daoud in turn deposed in a Communist coup. Communist government quickly deteriorates and runs afoul of religious leaders in Afghanistan.</p> <p>USSR invades in 1979 to shore up Communist regime. Religious Afghan Freedom Fighters (Mujahideen) mobilize against Soviets with Western and US aid.</p> <p>Osama Bin Laden active in the fight against the USSR and technically an ally of the US.</p>	

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1980's	<p>Zia continues his authoritarian rule, rolling back civil liberties and continuing the Islamization of Pakistan until he is killed in a plane crash in 1988.</p> <p>Executed Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto's daughter returns to Pakistan to take control of the PPP.</p> <p>Civilian rule returns to Pakistan in 1988 under President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Benazir Bhutto becomes Prime Minister and consolidates power in the PPP. She is the first democratically elected female leader of an Islamic country.</p> <p>Pakistani ISI continues support for Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan.</p>	<p>Indira Gandhi voted back in as Prime Minister in India. Ethnic tensions between Punjab and Sikh groups increase; Gandhi assassinated in 1984 by her own Sikh bodyguards. Son Rajiv Gandhi assumes power of the INC and becomes Prime Minister; commits Indian troops to support Sri Lankan government against Tamil Tiger separatists.</p> <p>Bangladesh continues to be destabilized by coups, rigged elections, and power struggles.</p> <p>Overpopulation and poverty threaten the livelihoods of Bangladeshi citizens.</p> <p>War continues in Afghanistan, supported by Pakistan and the US and Western allies.</p> <p>Islamic insurgency begins in Kashmir that continues to the present day.</p>	<p>US and West continue to support Mujahideen against the USSR in what is becoming a protracted war.</p> <p>Gorbachev comes to power in the Soviet Union, tries to extract the country from Afghanistan, but to no avail.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1990's	<p>US support for Pakistan halted upon the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. All aid suspended under Pressler Amendment sanctions related to Pakistan's nuclear program.</p> <p>Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is dismissed by President Kahn in 1993 on corruption charges leveled against Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari.</p>	<p>War in Afghanistan ends with a UN treaty in 1988, and Soviet troops evacuate in 1989. Afghanistan is destroyed by the 9-year war – infrastructure and agriculture are decimated; 1 million Afghans have been killed, and 6 million flee the country. Many take refuge in Pakistan, bringing with them radical Islamist ideologies, discontent with the abrupt disappearance of Western aid, and guerilla army training. Many orphaned and former child soldiers end up becoming further radicalized in Pakistan's madaris (religious schools).</p>	

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1990's	<p>Nawaz Sharif of the Muslim League Party is elected Prime Minister, pursues an economic agenda built on privatization of state-owned industries.</p> <p>Sharif is then dismissed by President Kahn in 1993, also on corruption charges, appeals to the Supreme Court, is briefly reinstated, but then is pressured by the military to resign.</p> <p>Benazir Bhutto again elected Prime Minister in 1993. Sharif organizes a country-wide strike in protest. Bhutto's estranged brother is murdered in 1996. Suspicion falls on Bhutto's husband. Bhutto is forced to resign again on corruption charges in 1996 by President Farooq Leghari. Her husband is jailed in Pakistan; she goes into exile.</p> <p>Pakistan is one of three countries to officially recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan (with Saudi Arabia and the UAE) the political turmoil of the Bhutto-Sharif era.</p>	<p>Mujahideen in Afghanistan come under rule of Burhanuddin Rabbani who is quickly challenged by ultra-radical Islamist Taliban movement-followers who begin a civil war to assume control of the country. With Pakistan's support, the Taliban take the capital of Kabul in 1996 and establish a violent and conservative theocracy. War continues through the end of the decade when the Taliban control 90% of the country. Poverty and Sharia law reign; the Opium trade increases; and Osama Bin Laden is given safe refuge and access to training camps.</p> <p>Indira Gandhi is assassinated in India in 1991 by Tamil Tiger separatists in retaliation for India's support of the government in Sri Lanka. INC retains power for several years until unseated by opposition party the BJP in 1996.</p> <p>1998: Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan bring Western and US sanctions.</p> <p>Tensions flare in Kashmir along with the specter of Indo-Pakistani nuclear war as Pakistan violates the LOC, and then quickly pulls back.</p> <p>Bangladesh makes a difficult transition to democracy.</p>	<p>UN brokers peace deal that ends the war in Afghanistan and removes Soviet troops. US and Western aid to the Mujahideen is abruptly discontinued and no assistance is pledged to rebuild the devastated country.</p> <p>Berlin Wall falls and the Soviet Union collapses along with their Eastern European satellite dictatorships.</p> <p>Although alarmed by the rise of radical ultra-conservative Taliban clerics in Afghanistan, US and West, relieved at the demise of the Soviet Union, do little to help rebuild the country and diminish the appeal of the Taliban for the impoverished and radicalized population. Minimal support is given to the embattled Taliban opposition, the Northern Alliance.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
1990's	<p>Sharif is elected again and begins to consolidate power in his position and his party the ML-N. Begins development of nuclear program.</p> <p>General Pervez Musharaff is appointed Army Chief of Staff after making his way up the hierarchy amidst</p> <p>1998: Nuclear weapon tests bring Western and US sanctions.</p> <p>Tensions flare in Kashmir along with the specter of Indo-Pakistani nuclear war as the Pakistan military violates the LOC. Sharif orders Army Chief Pervez Musharraf to withdraw, making a powerful enemy of the military.</p> <p>1999: Army Chief Pervez Musharraf deposes the government in a "bloodless" military coup. Takes control of an impoverished country threatened by religious extremism. Pakistan still under international sanctions for its nuclear program and its recognition of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Now falls under third layer of sanctions for the coup.</p>		<p>Osama Bin Laden returns to Afghanistan after being expelled from Sudan where he had been running mujahideen training camps. The Taliban provide support and safe haven for him while he plans the 1998 attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.</p> <p>Trade relationships between former Soviet countries and the West are opened, NAFTA is implemented, and China undergoes large-scale privatization; this leads to a period of world economics dominated by free trade and increasing globalization.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2000	<p>Nawaz Sharif is sentenced to life imprisonment on hijacking and terrorism charges and goes into exile. Sharif and Benazir Bhutto are both banned from engaging in Pakistani politics from their places of exile.</p> <p>Martial law under Musharraf continues. Supreme Court orders him to hold elections by 2002. Pakistan Constitution forbids him from running for the Presidency while he heads the military.</p> <p>Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Kahn reportedly meets with Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, including Bin Laden and Omar.</p>	<p>Taliban in firm control of Afghanistan, in opposition to the international community. Pakistan continues its support of the regime.</p> <p>Osama Bin Laden and his associates in the final stages of planning the 2001 attack on the United States, and continue to receive safe haven and support from the Taliban while being sought for their responsibility in previous international terrorist acts.</p>	

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2001	<p>Following the attacks on NY and DC, Musharraf is persuaded by the United States to break all ties with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and to become an ally in the “Global War on Terror.” International aid and military support flow in to this previously pariah state from the US and West. Most sanctions for Pakistan’s nuclear program are lifted. Pakistan receives \$650 million in emergency aid, up to \$10 billion in overt aid, and up to \$5 billion in covert aid over the next six years.</p>	<p>The US leads a coalition force in an invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban government for providing support to Bin Laden and al Qaeda. Helped by the Northern Alliance, the US-led forces defeat the Taliban in two months and bring exiled Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai back to head an interim government. The decision is made not to annihilate Taliban fighters, but rather to allow their escape to the semi-autonomous Afghan-Pakistan border areas where they are allowed to re-group.</p> <p>Islamic militants attack the Indian Parliament building; the Indian government blames Pakistan and tensions consequently increase in Kashmir.</p> <p>Indian political parties begin to splinter, necessitating coalition governments with enhanced democratic legitimacy. India quickly ramping up to take advantage of globalization, growing their economy and training their workers to take advantage of outsourcing from the West. A large middle class develops and life improves for many Indians, although poverty, disease, water issues, and environmental degradation persist.</p>	<p>Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, general international sentiment is in support of the United States.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2002 - 2006	<p>Referendum is held to extend Musharraf's term as President by five years, postponing the need to resolve the Constitutional issue of his candidacy in an election while in military uniform. Martial law officially continues; US aid pours in despite concerns about human rights abuses and the legitimacy of the referendum vote.</p> <p>Islamic militant groups united under the Muttahida Majilis-e-Amal party (MMA) umbrella take seats in the national and provincial governments, winning a majority of seats in the NWFP and Balochistan.</p> <p>Musharraf survives several assassination attempts blamed on Islamic militants, upon whom he cracks down.</p> <p>US Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is kidnapped and murdered in Pakistan.</p> <p>Bombings on US and international targets in Karachi and Islamabad.</p>	<p>The exiled King Shah returns to Afghanistan to endorse Karzai in subsequent elections. In 2004, a new Constitution is adopted giving Karzai a 5-year term. Taliban militants receive sanctuary among Islamist Afghan and Pakistani communities along the border and Osama Bin Laden remains at large.</p> <p>Karzai government and Northern Alliance fail to bring security and stability to the country; Taliban resurgence develops; warlords rule the country outside the capital; the Opium trade explodes and provides the only economic activity outside foreign aid. US coalition and NATO forces continue to fight to hold the Taliban at bay. Taliban forces continue to receive sanctuary and support in Pakistan's tribal areas.</p> <p>Tensions continue in Kashmir; Islamic pro-Pakistan Kashmiri militants train alongside Taliban, al Qaeda, and other mujahideen in camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.</p> <p>Taliban contingents take control of the Swat Valley in the NWFP.</p> <p>War nearly breaks out between Pakistan and India in Kashmir, but is averted.</p>	<p>The international community becomes concerned about nuclear proliferation from Pakistan's A.Q. Kahn Laboratories. Evidence uncovered that Pakistani designs and materials are making their way to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Kahn operation busted upon the interception of the BBC China bound for Libya. Kahn apologizes and absolves the Pakistani government of all responsibility.</p> <p>As the American-led war in Iraq continues with ever decreasing prospects for a 'total victory,' support for the war wanes, both in America and abroad.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2002 - 2006	<p>Benazir Bhutto becomes active in politics from exile, preparing for a return to invigorate a PPP challenge to Musharaff's PML-Q party in the scheduled 2007 Parliamentary elections. Her husband is released from jail and a return is planned. Bhutto begins to make overtures to Musharraf beginning in 2005, suggesting the possibility of a coalition government</p>		
2007	<p>In an effort to ward off constitutional challenges to his candidacy for President, Musharraf dismisses Supreme Court Chief Justice Chaudhry, unleashing a nation-wide protest movement comprised of lawyers and middle-class professionals. Chaudhry is ultimately restored to his position by the Court.</p> <p>On Musharraf's orders, Pakistani military and police forces lay siege to the Red Mosque in Islamabad, resulting in a protracted battle that kills and wounds many Islamists who vow revenge.</p> <p>Nawaz Sharif attempts to return from exile; is promptly deported upon landing in Pakistan in September.</p>	<p>Taliban groups continue their infiltration of Pakistan's frontier areas.</p> <p>The Indian government supports the return of Benazir Bhutto, whom it hopes will stabilize Pakistan. Others in India see Bhutto as a crutch for Musharraf in his bid to hold on to power.</p> <p>Musharraf's government makes deals with Taliban groups on the Afghan-Pakistani border, promising them sanctuary if they cease suicide bombings and other attacks inside Pakistan. US is enraged at the duplicity.</p>	<p>US continues to support Musharraf despite his constitutional abuses, and his double-dealing with Taliban militants inside Pakistan. A code word is used for Musharraf in American foreign policy circles: TINA (There is No Alternative).</p> <p>In the United States, the sub-prime mortgage crisis leads to an economic recession; this combined with waning support for the war in Iraq leads to general dissatisfaction with Bush administration policies and increasing debate surrounding the future trajectory of US foreign policy.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2007	<p>Benazir Bhutto announces she will return in October 2007, a move made possible by Musharraf's pardons on her corruption charges. Despite this, negotiations on power-sharing with Musharraf subside and she decides to mount a full-fledged challenge to his leadership in Parliamentary elections scheduled for 2008.</p> <p>Musharraf wins early October 2007 Presidential Elections handily. Yet, the Supreme Court delays official recognition of his victory pending a decision about the legitimacy of his candidacy, conducted in military uniform. A battle between Musharraf and the judiciary heats up amidst more protests by lawyers and subsequent crack-downs by government and military forces.</p> <p>Benazir Bhutto returns home to enthusiastic supporters on October 18. Several bombs explode during her homecoming rally, killing over a hundred people but leaving Bhutto unharmed.</p>		

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2007	<p>In November, Musharraf declares Emergency Rule, suspending the Constitution on the grounds that Islamic militants and judicial activists threaten the country. A court ruling on his Presidency still pending, Musharraf sacks the judges. Bhutto is placed under house arrest, ostensibly for her own protection. Media outlets are shut down; many opposition activists are detained.</p> <p>Musharraf pardons Nawaz Sharif and allows for his return to the country in an effort to dilute opposition support that has begun to amass for Benazir Bhutto. Competition increases among the three parties – the PPP, the PML-N, and Musharaff’s party the PML-Q in advance of Parliamentary elections in 2008.</p>		

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2007	<p>In late November, Musharraf resigns from the military, handing control to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, a respected soldier and member of an important Pakistani family. This paves the way for him to formally transition the country to civilian rule and consolidate power under his now-legitimized Presidency. He is then officially sworn in as President of the civilian government and begins his 5-year term amidst controversy over how the October vote was handled.</p> <p>On December 27, 2007, Benazir Bhutto is assassinated while campaigning for the PPP in advance of the 2008 Parliamentary Elections in which she hoped to be elected Prime Minister. The inquiry into her death suggested it had been an act of Islamic militants; others blamed Musharraf and the military for failing to protect her and cited numerous irregularities in the forensic investigation.</p>		

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2007	<p>Bhutto's son Bilawal (age 19) is named ceremonial head of the PPP; his father, controversial figure Asif Ali Zadari is designated official party chairman, and will run the party until Bilawal finishes his studies at Oxford.</p>		
2008	<p>The 2008 Parliamentary Elections are postponed until February to allow the PPP to regroup.</p> <p>The February 18 elections hand Musharraf's party a resounding defeat at the hands of the PPP and PML-N. Reflecting the PPP majority that was elected in the Parliament, PPP loyalist Yousaf Raza Gillani chosen to be Prime Minister in what many believe to be a placeholder position for Bhutto's widower Asif Ali Zadari, who is not eligible at this time to be Prime Minister. There is speculation that if Zadari became a Member of Parliament, Gillani would step aside.</p>	<p>Situation in tribal areas continues to deteriorate. Taliban installments in Pakistan are fortified as US-NATO forces face resurgent militants in Afghanistan. Peace deals made between Musharraf and the militants largely deteriorate.</p> <p>US and India sign trade agreements as well as negotiate the exchange of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes in an end run against India's failure to sign the NPT. Pakistan gets no such offer.</p> <p>Tensions flare in Kashmir over a disputed land grant; violence breaks out in a weeks-long siege of the Indian-held Kashmir city of Sringar.</p> <p>Afghan President Karzai welcomes Musharraf's resignation, but joins India in worrying that a power vacuum may benefit radical groups in Pakistan.</p>	<p>Elections observed by EU and numerous international NGO's and determined to be largely "free and fair" with some irregularities.</p> <p>The US struggles with its increasingly problematic relationship with Pakistan. The Bush Administration begins to express its dissatisfaction with the US-funded Pakistani effort to root out militants in tribal areas.</p> <p>The Bush Administration threatens to conduct unilateral air strikes on militant training camps located inside Pakistan and is rebuffed by an indignant Musharraf and Gillani.</p> <p>US reacts to Musharraf's resignation by affirming support for the country after his departure. Bilateral talks with PM Gillani result in mixed success.</p>

Date	Pakistan	Greater South Asia	International Community
2008	<p>The MMA and Islamists fare poorly, losing most of their seats in the national and provincial legislatures.</p> <p>Credit given General Kayani for staying out of the fray and promising to pull military personnel from civilian positions.</p> <p>From house arrest, A.Q. Kahn releases statements recanting his earlier mea culpa in nuclear weapons exchanges with Libya, North Korea, and Iran. Also reverses his earlier comments by indicating that the Pakistani military was involved in the delivery of centrifuges to North Korea.</p> <p>Despite tensions between them in establishing a coalition government, Sharif and Zardari announce that they will launch impeachment procedures against Musharraf.</p> <p>Musharraf resigns the Presidency on August 18; a new President must be chosen by electors from the National and Provincial Assemblies within 30 days.</p> <p>Zardari wins the Presidency, with 481 out of 702 parliamentary votes.</p>		

Pakistan: Internal Players

Pakistani Leaders at a Glance
Pakistan's Main Political Parties
Pakistan's Political System
Demography and Provincial Dynamics
The Economy
The Military
The Education System
Islamists
Pakistan's Nuclear Program



Zardari: Photo courtesy of Muhammad Shahid Nawaz. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share-Alike 3.0 License
Gillani: Photo courtesy of World Economic Forum. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License.

Pakistani Leaders At a Glance

Current Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani

- A Pakistani People's Party (PPP) member chosen to be Prime Minister after the Parliamentary elections of February 2008 that brought to power a governing coalition made up of the PPP and Pakistani Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N).
- Hails from a wealthy land-owning Punjab family; often considered part of the feudal establishment.
- Considered a place-holder for the son of the late Benazir Bhutto; thought to defer much decision-making to functional PPP leader Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto's widower.
- Recently had an awkward, yet cordial official state visit with President Bush.

Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani

- Appointed by Musharraf to succeed him when he resigned from the army in November, thereby removing Musharraf's primary barrier to assuming the office of the President as a civilian.
- Hails from a prominent Punjab military family. Graduate of the US Army College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- Formerly served as Head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). First ISI head to become Army Chief.
- Credited with deftly handling the investigation of assassination attempts on Musharraf by Islamist

extremist groups in 2003. Also considered key in negotiations that kept India and Pakistan from going to war in Kashmir in 2002-2003.

- Promised to get the army out of politics and diminish its role in the economy by turning over several army-held companies to the state.

Current President Asif Ali Zardari

- Current President of Pakistan and PPP chairman. Widower of Benazir Bhutto.
- Hails from Karachi in the Sindh province.
- Enjoyed lucrative business arrangements during the tenure of his wife as Prime Minister in the 1990s, earning him the moniker Mr. 10% for his alleged involvement in kick-back schemes.
- Has spent a total of ten years in jail on various corruption charges and also faced a murder charge in the death of his wife's brother. Although he was not convicted, his late brother-in-law's family continues to blame him and his late wife for the death of Murtaza Bhutto, and have vowed to challenge his leadership of the PPP.
- Recently joined with rival Nawaz Sharif to form a coalition government following a PPP – PML-N victory in 2008 Parliamentary elections. Despite personal animosity between Zardari and Sharif, the two joined together in August to force the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf. However, the

coalition quickly fell apart following the resignation of Musharraf.

Bilawal Bhutto Zardari

- Nineteen-year old son of Benazir Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari. Currently co-chairs the PPP with his father after his mother's assassination.
- Has almost always lived outside Pakistan by choice or in exile with his mother. Attends Oxford University in the United Kingdom.
- Presumptive future head of the PPP. Would need to be elected to a Parliamentary seat before he could assume the position of Prime Minister.

Benazir Bhutto

- Daughter of PPP founder Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
- Hails from the powerful landowning Bhutto clan of the Sindh province.
- Educated at Harvard and Oxford, had close ties with the West.
- Returned to Pakistan in 1986 to take over the PPP. Elected the first female Prime Minister in the Muslim world after Zia's death in plane crash in 1988. Served two years before being removed on corruption charges.
- Helped the Taliban come to power in Afghanistan and supported the militants throughout her tenure. Also was instrumental in funding militants in Kashmir.
- Elected again in 1993, removed again on similar charges in 1996 and went into exile in the United Arab Emirates.
- Both times was replaced by Nawaz Sharif.
- Returned to Pakistan upon an amnesty deal on all charges in October 2007 and was nearly killed at a rally celebrating her arrival. Rejected a power-sharing deal with Musharraf and continued to campaign for Prime Minister despite death threats.
- Assassinated at a rally in Rawalpindi in December 2008, thought to be on the orders of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud.
- Left leadership of the PPP in her will to her widower and son. In letters found after her death, is said to

blame Musharraf for not protecting her if she were to be killed.

- Left legacy in a book published posthumously in which she makes a case for reconciliation between Islam and the West, debunking perceptions of Islam as a radical religion and rebutting Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory.

Nawaz Sharif

- Currently leader of the PML-N and part of the governing coalition brought to power in Parliamentary elections in February 2008.
- Hails from a wealthy industrialist family in the Punjabi city of Lahore.
- Was brought into the government as an advisor to General Zia ul-Haq. Elected Prime Minister in 1990, but removed in 1993 on corruption charges. Elected again in 1997. Both times he replaced Benazir Bhutto. Deposed in a bloodless coup in 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf after considerable tension with the army, most notably over the aborted Kargil campaign in Kashmir.
- Was subsequently imprisoned for attempted hijacking and treason for not letting Musharraf's plane land during the coup. Charges were eventually dropped and he was banned for life from Pakistani politics and exiled to Saudi Arabia.
- Was instrumental in splitting the Pakistan Muslim League into factions loyal to him (PML-N) and those loyal to Musharraf (PML-Q).
- Attempted to return twice in fall 2007, successfully brokering a deal to stay in the country and run in 2008 Parliamentary elections.
- Formed a power-sharing government with Zardari's PPP, yet later quit his leadership position in protest over Zardari's failure to reinstate judges removed by Musharraf.
- Joined with Zardari in August to force the resignation of Musharraf.

Former President Pervez Musharraf

- Recently resigned as President of Pakistan after coming to power in a 1999 coup from which he consolidated his power in a 2002 referendum and

- 2007 election. Like most of the Pakistani military leadership, hails from the Punjab province.
- Received his military training in Pakistan and the UK.
 - Appointed Army Chief by Nawaz Sharif whom he later deposed in a coup in the late 1990s.
 - Enjoyed strong credentials within Pakistan with respect to dealing with India after leading the Kargil campaign in Kashmir.
 - Credited with creating a pro-business atmosphere in Pakistan until internal instability shook the confidence of foreign investors. Undertook some education reform and improvement of women's rights.
 - Remained closely linked to the military and ISI, as well as Islamist groups known as the “mosque-military” alliance. Thought to have played these groups off of each other and off of the United States to maintain his “indispensability” to the country and the international community.
 - Sometimes referred to in the West by his code name TINA (There Is No Alternative).
 - At risk of losing his office over Constitutional provisions related to his tenure and military affiliation in 2007, Musharraf sacked the Supreme Court, declared Emergency Rule, and ultimately resigned from the army. His party the PML-Q lost Parliamentary Elections in February 2008, hastening his unpopularity and leading to his resignation, despite having four years left in his term. By resigning, he avoided what many thought would be a successful effort by the PPP and PLM-N to impeach him.

Pakistan's Main Political Parties

PPP – Pakistan People's Party

- Founded in 1967 in the Sindh province by wealthy landowner Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who became Pakistan's first elected Prime Minister in 1971.
- Rewrote Pakistan's Constitution in the 1970s; attempted liberal and socialist reforms under the banner "Bread, Clothing, Shelter."
- Reinvigorated by Bhutto's daughter, Western-educated Benazir, when she returned to Pakistan upon his execution in the late 1970s.
- Alternated being in power with the Muslim League throughout the 1990s.
- Declined in late 1990s when Benazir Bhutto was removed as Prime Minister for a second time and sent into exile on corruption charges.
- Came back into power following Bhutto's return and assassination. Formed a ruling coalition with the PML-N after the 2008 Parliamentary Elections.
- Currently co-chaired by Mrs. Bhutto's widower Asif Ali Zardari and college-age son Bilawal.
- Often seen as more effective in opposition than in government.

The Pakistan Muslim League – PML-N and PML-Q

- Split in 2002 into two factions, one headed by Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) and one headed by Pervez Musharraf who was in power at the time (PML-Q).

- The PML-Q lost the majority of seats in Parliament in 2008 elections to a coalition of the PPP and PML-N.
- PML-N is seen as the party of industry and business, and has favored the reinstatement of judges dismissed by Musharraf in 2007 during Emergency Rule.

Nationalist, Ethnic, and Religious Parties

- The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) is a party founded originally by Muslim Indian migrants to Pakistan following partition called Mohajirs. It is consolidated in the Sindh province and is often co-opted by mainstream parties.
- The Awami National Party (ANP) is a party active in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and is opposed to the radicalization of the region by Islamic parties and militants. The party contested seats held by Islamist factions after 2002 elections and won them in 2008. Seen as a bulwark of Pashtun rights and interests. Typically does not advocate for Pashtun separatism.
- Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) is an umbrella organization comprising different anti-modern Islamist parties who advocate making Pakistan officially an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law. Clerics gained seats in the NWFP and Balochistan in 2002 and are thought to sympathize with and support the Taliban in Afghanistan. The MMA lost seats in the wake of sectarian violence in 2008, and the party is currently considered in chaos and decline.

It is subject to “mullah fatigue” as Pakistan’s Islamic identity ebbs and flows.

Pakistan's Political System

“There are many problems ahead. Pakistan stands on the verge of disaster, but also on the verge of opportunity and we have to seize the opportunity for democracy and stability.” Asif Ali Zardari, February 2008

Many experts agree that Pakistan's government has long faced two central issues: the place of the military in politics, and the place of religion in politics. These have remained key debates as Pakistan's style of government has evolved and devolved, and as its democracy has ebbed and flowed over the past 60 years. Even more complex issues underlie these key considerations: a hot and cold rivalry with India, chronically low economic development, ethnic/sectarian fragmentation, central/local governance disconnects, a problematic and complex relationship with a troubled Afghanistan, and what has been described as a love-hate relationship with the United States. All of these issues are at the forefront of what is transpiring today in the critical juncture following President Pervez Musharraf's recent resignation, and each is discussed throughout this edition of Monitor. Below is an overview of the political dynamics that inform all these concerns.

Circuitous History

In its 60 years, Pakistan's government has alternated between civilian, military, and hybrid leadership in a succession characterized by radical and incremental reform as well as the contraction of democratic ideals. Originally founded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a secular republic for Indian Muslims, Pakistan has been constantly reconceived

by leaders of various ideological bents over its relatively short history. Today, it is technically classified as a Federal Parliamentary Democracy in which the President and the Prime Minister share executive power. Both national and provincial legislative bodies exist to represent the interests of the people and political parties. However, this arrangement is inherently tenuous because the President has the vested right to dismiss Parliament at his discretion. This has occurred many times over the past decades, leading *The Economist* to term the Pakistani government “a quasi-dictatorship.” Many note that the government of the country has essentially advanced from true military dictatorship to civilian quasi-dictatorship, and from military coup to constitutional coup. Although elections have been held at various intervals since 1970, experts contend that a true durable democracy has never really existed.

Brookings Institution expert Stephen Cohen perhaps best captures the opinion of many when he asserts that Pakistan is, and has always been, a functional oligarchy, ruled by what he has termed “The Establishment,” a “triad existing of the army, bureaucracy, and feudal land lords.” In the view of most, “The Establishment's” interests have largely prevailed, regardless of which leader is in power or what the Constitution reads.

The list of government administrations over the years is often misleading because there have been occasions when civilians served as Prime Minister when the office had little functional power. (See the ‘Annotated Timeline’ for a simplified version of events.) The general narrative is

this: there have been four periods of what can be loosely considered civilian rule. The first dates from independence in 1947 to General Ayub Kahn's coup in 1958. The second begins with the 1971 election of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as Prime Minister after the country's first democratic elections (and the subsequent secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), and ends with Bhutto's imprisonment and execution following a coup by General Zia ul-Haq in 1977. The year 1988 brought the suspicious death of Zia and the restoration of civilian rule under Bhutto's daughter, Benazir. From 1988-1999, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif played musical chairs as each was elected, removed, and reelected Prime Minister twice throughout the course of the decade. A 1999 coup led by Army Chief Pervez Musharraf ended civilian rule; in 2007, Musharraf was elected President, soon after removing his military uniform, ostensibly returning the country to a managed form of civilian rule. Musharraf recently resigned in order to avoid impeachment, and on September 6, 2008, Benazir Bhutto's widow Asif Ali Zardari, was elected to the Presidency.

It is important to note that two critical trends underlie this tumultuous journey. First, even when Army Generals did not occupy the top government position, the influence of the military on policy-making continued to be pervasive. (See 'The Military' Section in Internal Players for more details.) Secondly, it is largely accepted that, in the words of a writer for Muslim World Journal, when compared with military rule, "civilian governments turned out to be no more enlightened (especially with regard to the poor), even more corrupt, and certainly ineffective."

Musharraf's Rule

The journey of Pervez Musharraf, from his bloodless coup against Nawaz Sharif in 1999 to his resignation as President in 2008, provides a striking example of the challenges Pakistan faces in establishing a true democracy and effective central government. In 1999, tensions accelerated between Sharif and the army when the international community pressured Sharif to order Pakistani military forces to retreat from the Kargil area of Kashmir, where they were engaging Indian forces. The Army Chief and commander of the Kargil operations was General Pervez Musharraf, whose popularity grew upon his return home. Charges abounded that Sharif had disgraced the nation by acting as a puppet

of the West; these were raised amidst growing general discontent with the Sharif Administration, which had long been dogged by corruption charges. With the support of the army, Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup; he proceeded to rule on a military mandate until a 2002 referendum on his assumption of power, by which time he enjoyed the considerable support of the US and West in the Global War on Terror. In what many believe was a rigged process, he consolidated his power and effectively bypassed the constitution, issuing a directive that extended his term as President for five years.

Musharraf was technically not allowed to run in the 2007 Presidential elections due to constitutional term limits and his leadership position in the military. A series of crises developed as he sought to get around these restrictions while his popularity waned. William Dalrymple has written, "for Pakistan's liberals, 2007 was one of the worst years in their country's history." Anticipating opposition to his candidacy by the Pakistani Supreme Court, Musharraf made a preemptive attack, suspending Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and consequently drawing the ire of lawyers and judges throughout the country. Historically, Pakistani courts had not often challenged executive power; instead they simply endorsed or upheld any measures or actions taken by heads of state. However, under Musharraf's tenure, the judiciary had been staking out a more independent role for itself, and had begun issuing rulings on cases of government abuse and excess, while also advocating for reform of army land deals. Chaudhry himself had been vociferously campaigning for an investigation into the "disappearance" of numerous illegally-detained prisoners of the government, many of whom were Musharraf opponents. Chaudhry's suspension in March sparked mass protests and riots among lawyers throughout the country, who were ultimately joined by factions of Pakistan's growing pro-democratic middle class (consisting of teachers, professionals, and university students).

The images of professionals in suits being subject to army and police tear gas and batons were shocking to the world; yet the Bush Administration and others continued to back Musharraf. In July, the Supreme Court reinstated Chaudhry while Musharraf was engaged in another crisis after ordering troops to shut down the Red Mosque. This led to a month-long violent standoff with Islamists who

would later take revenge by launching suicide bomb attacks in Islamabad and Karachi. Tribal militants were also gaining strength in Pakistani strongholds from which they mounted ever more vigorous attacks on US-NATO forces in Afghanistan. As a result, the US pressured Musharraf to resolve his domestic disputes and redirect his focus to eliminating terrorist threats within Pakistan.

In fall of 2007, as both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were making arrangements to return from exile in order to run in January Parliamentary elections, Musharraf was elected as President despite concerns over his eligibility to serve. The Bush Administration attempted to strengthen his position by brokering power-sharing talks with the Bhutto camp in London. Finally, the opposition pressure reached a breaking point. Musharraf declared Emergency Rule in November in a bid to prevent constitutional challenges to his Presidency, and also to ostensibly curb the wave of Islamist and Taliban violence that was sweeping the country. As part of Emergency Rule, Musharraf suspended the Constitution and sacked all Supreme Court judges, including Chaudhry, as well as representatives of the media who were critical of his administration. Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan in October amidst a near-fatal suicide bombing attack, was placed under house arrest. Musharraf reconstituted the Court with his loyalists, and imprisoned former justices who refused to swear allegiance to him. He went on to mandate several Constitutional amendments that would hinder future opposition to his recent election.

On November 28, Musharraf officially resigned from the army, appointing to its head General Ashfaq Kayani, who supported Musharraf but would not necessarily be unduly swayed by him. Musharraf officially assumed the office of civilian President, and went on to lift Emergency Rule on December 15, though the movements of Bhutto and Sharif were still restricted as they campaigned in rallies and in the press. It was expected that Musharraf's party, the PML-Q would suffer in the January Parliamentary Elections. Then, on December 28, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated as she campaigned near army headquarters in Rawalpindi. The Bhutto camp and many in the international community questioned whether Musharraf had sufficiently protected her motorcade with adequate police and cell-phone jamming measures. The crime scene was immediately cleaned up,

reportedly on Musharraf's own orders, and subsequent investigations into her death have been inconclusive. Most believe that she was killed by Islamic extremists who were responsible for over 700 other deaths in 2007, but there are some who are said to suspect a conspiracy involving Musharraf and/or the Pakistani army and ISI.

Parliamentary elections were postponed until February and campaigning continued amidst growing violence and fears of vote rigging. Bhutto's husband Asif Ali Zadari (himself under investigation for corruption charges) and her 19-year old son Bilawal were appointed to lead Bhutto's party, the PPP. The *New York Times* reported that the candidates and electorate faced threats, intimidation, bribery, and even kidnapping in the run-up to the elections. Sheila Fruman of the National Democratic Institute remarked that any one of those transgressions "would have been enough to stop elections in the West." Despite this, General Kayani largely upheld his word to ensure that the political process was free from military interference, and he forbade anyone in uniform from politicking in the months preceding the election. Pakistan and USAID election monitors fanned out across the country on February 18; most experts agreed that the voting was as "free and fair" as could reasonably be expected, and much of the blatant rigging that had characterized previous elections was notably absent. It is significant to note that turnout was low.

The results were a blow for Musharraf's PML-Q and for Islamist parties that had gained seats in 2002. The PPP (Bhutto's party) and PML-N (Nawaz Sharif's party) enjoyed a joint victory in the National Assembly and the Awami National Party (ANP) won seats in the Northwest Frontier Province that had previously been held by Islamists. The vote was seen as a referendum on Musharraf's leadership, as almost all PML-Q seats were lost, including high-level positions. The electorate seemed to be protesting his constitutional abuses, as well as his failure to guide the country out of a growing economic slowdown and increasing sectarian violence. It was also seen in many circles as a protest against his close relationship with the Bush Administration, which had backed him unconditionally through the crises of 2007. Most agree that a sympathy vote for the PPP's assassinated leader was also a factor. The PPP's relatively untested Yousaf Raza Gillani was elected to assume the office of Prime Minister; however,

many see Bhutto's widow Zardari and other Bhutto camp personalities as the real power behind the office.

Despite these factors, many saw the vote as a triumph for democracy and a repudiation of strong-man military-influenced leadership. Most would agree though that challenges lie ahead. Neither the PPP nor the PML-N received a majority, making it necessary for the two parties to build a coalition government that will transcend years of rivalry between the two parties, as well as with Musharraf, who remained President. In a dispatch for PBS Frontline World, reporter Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy quoted a Karachi professional as saying, "Imagine Asif Ali Zardari sharing power with Sharif. We are doomed. Everyone knows that will fall apart before the year is over." The two leaders have disagreed on fundamental issues that must be resolved before the country can move on, such as the reinstatement of the sacked judges (Zardari is opposed, many believe because of fears that he will come under prosecution for outstanding corruption and money laundering charges). In addition, neither man is widely well-regarded; both suffer from credibility and corruption issues, and are haunted by the ineffectiveness of previous PPP and PML-N governments.

In August 2008, shortly after forcing Musharraf's resignation, Sharif and the PML-N pulled out of the Coalition government in protest over the failure to reinstate the judges; Sharif said his party would not officially sit in opposition to the PPP. Rather, cabinet positions vacated by PML-N officials would sit empty as the PPP and Sharif further negotiated the future of the coalition. Meanwhile NATO reported a 40% increase in cross-border attacks on troops in Afghanistan. In early August, as Sharif and Zardari agreed to jointly pursue impeachment of Musharraf, Musharraf's popularity was at an all-time low; even the United States was beginning to express its dissatisfaction with his leadership in the campaign against terrorist strongholds in Pakistan's tribal regions.

Musharraf's Resignation

Finally, on August 18, Musharraf resigned rather than put the country through a protracted battle, saying, "Whether I win or lose the impeachment, the country will lose." He was quoted as saying that the coalition had tried to "turn lies in to truths," but that he would put Pakistan's national

interest over "personal bravado." A new President must be chosen by special electors drawn from the Parliament and four provincial assemblies within 30 days of Musharraf's resignation. Among the options is Zardari, despite his animosity with Sharif. The BBC has reported that Sharif's party might allow this if the office was stripped of everything but ceremonial power.

As of this writing in the days following Musharraf's resignation, reactions are mixed. Relief at avoiding a nasty impeachment fight that could have theoretically split the army and further destabilized the nation is palpable. Yet, people's hopes for the governing coalition remain guarded. Many think Pakistan is likely to enter a recession, despite the positive reaction of the Karachi Stock Exchange to Musharraf's resignation. The new administration faces inflation, unemployment, high food and fuel prices, electricity shortages, crumbling and inadequate infrastructure, restive provinces, a continuing crisis in the judiciary, the uncertainty of the military's allegiance, a damaged constitution, and a growing Taliban insurgency in the tribal areas that is spreading to Pakistan's interior. This is in addition to a recent flaring of hostilities with India in Kashmir and the dissatisfaction of Pakistan's American ally.

The Bush Administration was conspicuously silent following Monday's announcement, although Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a statement affirming that the US would "continue to work with the Pakistani government and political leaders and urge them to redouble their focus on Pakistan's future and its most urgent needs, including stemming the growth of extremism, addressing food and energy shortages, and improving economic stability. The US will help with these efforts to see Pakistan reach its goal of becoming a stable, prosperous, democratic, modern, Muslim nation."

Speaking of Democracy...

What does all this mean for Pakistan's prospects for democracy? As we discussed in the August edition of the World Savvy Monitor, true democracy must have both electoral and liberal components – it must choose its leaders by free and fair elections; it must guarantee democratic outcomes through rule of law and the protection of civil liberties such as those contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Major indices measuring

the quality of democracy worldwide such as The Freedom House system have never certified Pakistan as a true democracy, and there are many experts who do not believe it has the capacity to become one in the near future. See the August edition of the Monitor and compare Pakistan to the internal and external factors thought to make a country conducive to quality democratic governance. You will find that, in the opinion of many, the cards are stacked against Pakistan. As Musharraf himself told Carlotta Gall of the New York Times in November of 2007, when his country was under Emergency Rule:

There is an unrealistic or even impractical obsession with your form of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties, which you have taken centuries to acquire and which you expect us to adopt in a few years, in a few months. We want democracy; I am for democracy. We want human rights, we want civil liberties, but we will do it our way, as we understand our society, our environment, better than anyone in the West.

It is undeniable that, even measured against Pakistan's largely anti-democratic history, Musharraf's Emergency Rule represented a significant low point as the judiciary, civil society, and press were subject to restrictions and a hollowing-out from which they are still recovering. But, by ultimately taking off his military uniform, Musharraf may have started Pakistan down the road toward a healthier relationship between civil institutions and the army. Stephen Cohen said in 2004 that what Pakistan needed to improve its prospects for democracy was "a 'staged' transfer of power and authority." He defined "staged" in terms of a "timed schedule and a theatrical event" in which "both the symbolic and substantive accoutrements of power" are shifted from the armed forces to the political parties. Many hope that this is what has begun.

However, in a country with weak civil institutions and an inadequate education system, many believe that the population may not possess the capacity for quality democratic participation. Musharraf's attacks on the middle class, typically an important agent of democratic reform, during his battle with the lawyers harmed Pakistan's democratic prospects. Many hope that his resignation will allow for the resolution of the judicial crisis and will bring middle class professionals back into government processes, or at least provide them with the space to effectively oppose


and reform it. However, as the economy falters and Islamic extremists are able to win supporters who are discontented with the government's handling of the population's basic needs, many fear that the majority of Pakistani citizens may not have the time, will, or inclination to participate in democratic reform. Peshawar newspaper The Frontier Post predicted in January that the government "will have a polity deeply disturbed, utterly despondent, completely frustrated, and demoralized. And worse, caught up in an intricate web of crises that have sapped away all their spirits and vitalities away from them." Many worry that within this vacuum, Islamist forces will be able to consolidate power.

The United States has made democracy a central focus of its Freedom Agenda to combat terrorism in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Many have found this to be hypocritical, given the Bush Administration's unconditional support of Musharraf as he rolled back political and civil liberties in 2007. However, this perceived hypocrisy has a long history. Former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani estimates that within the period 1954-2007, the US gave \$17.7 billion dollars in aid to military rulers and only \$3.4 billion to civilian rulers in Pakistan. This discrepancy certainly reflects different US interests at different times, and many see the failure to sustain aid during times of diminished military imperative in the region as a fatal error on the part of America.

The International Crisis Group warned in January that the US would have to facilitate the departure of Musharraf. In a report titled "A Way Forward for Pakistan," they wrote, "By continuing to back him, Western governments might not just lose the battle for Pakistani hearts and minds, but could also be faced with the nightmare of a nuclear-armed, Muslim majority country of 165 million descending into violent internal conflict from which only extremists would gain." Many experts have pointed out that the US has largely benefited from dealing with non-democratic leaders in Pakistan, from Zia to Musharraf, who have been able to quickly marshal Pakistani military and intelligence resources to serve US aims without the debate and negotiation that democracy requires.

How the US works with the new leadership dynamics in Pakistan will impact both the success of US counterterrorism efforts in the region as well as the long-term viability of the Pakistani government. A current

bill in Congress that would vastly increase civilian and development aid to Pakistan is an indicator that the US may be ready to change its strategy of unconditional military support to dictators; it is considered by many to be the measure most likely to move Pakistan's democracy forward. However, as the United States learned with the success of Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, democracy is a gamble, and there is no guarantee that democracy will produce a US ally in Pakistan. In fact, Anatol Lieven of The New America Foundation has said, "Trying to produce governments that both uncritically accept US security requests and also pass our democracy litmus test is hopeless given the fact that the overwhelming majority of voters in Pakistan are hostile to US strategy in the region." This will be something to watch over the next few months.



Demography and Provincial Dynamics

Pakistan's population of 167 million is a diverse mix of tribes, ethnicities, and language groups. The majority are Punjabis (44%), followed by Pashtuns (15%) and Sindhis (14%). Others include Seraikis, Muhajirs, and Balochis. Nearly all (97%) are Muslim, and most Muslims are Sunni (77%). Urdu is the official language, yet numerous local dialects are spoken throughout the country. Pakistan is also home to over 1 million Afghan refugees. With one of the highest population growth rates in the world (primarily due to high fertility), Pakistan's population is expected to grow to 205 million by 2015, which would make it the fifth most populous nation in the world (behind China, India, the US, and Indonesia). It currently hosts a disproportionately young population, with a youth bulge (age 15-24) making up nearly 60% of the citizenry. A youth bulge, especially in developing countries, is often seen as a destabilizing force when there are inadequate education and employment opportunities.

Pakistan is a developing country, with a full quarter of its population living on \$1 per day and nearly three-quarters below \$2 per day. The CIA World Factbook estimates the per capita GDP (PPP) to be at \$2600, putting Pakistan at 169 out of 229 countries and territories ranked. By comparison, the United States ranks 8 at \$45,800. Pakistan's peer countries Turkey and Iran rank 83 (\$12,900) and 97 (\$10,600) respectively. Other peer countries India and Bangladesh rank 167 (\$2700) and 198 (\$1300) respectively.

The Human Development Index, or HDI, is used by the UN Development Program to capture a wide range of indicators

to measure quality of life such as health and longevity, access to education, and general living standards. On the HDI, Pakistan ranks 136 out of 177 countries, placing it well below South Asian averages and the lowest in the world outside Sub-Saharan Africa.

Pakistan's Provinces and Territories

Pakistan's population lives in four provinces and two territories, in addition to two more territories located in Kashmir. There is often rivalry among the different regions; separatist tensions have flared frequently over Pakistan's 60-year history (especially after the loss of East Pakistan – Bangladesh – in 1971). Separatist tensions are usually highest in areas where indigenous groups have cultural and ethnic ties with groups in neighboring countries, most notably in the Pashtun areas bordering Afghanistan and the Baloch areas bordering Iran.

Punjab

Punjab is Pakistan's most populous province, enjoying the most dependable water supply in a country largely made up of desert and even arctic areas. Sixty-five percent of the population, and the majority of those employed in military and civilian bureaucracies, hail from the Punjab province, long seen as Pakistan's dominant region. It is also home to a large class of "feudals" or land-owning elite, as well as much of the agriculture and industrial sectors of the economy. The capital city of Punjab, Lahore, is often seen as the cultural capital of the country.

Sindh

The Sindh Province is also home to a large landowning elite class, including the Bhutto family. A rivalry exists between Sindh and Punjab over influence in the country; this region has also been home to tensions between Indian Muslim migrants known as Muhajirs and native Sindhis since the partition in 1947. The capital of Sindh is Karachi, a large and populous port city with enormous slums coexisting alongside cosmopolitan attractions. Much like New York City is to the United States, Karachi is considered Pakistan's business capital and is home to the national stock exchange.

Balochistan

Balochistan is Pakistan's largest province in terms of land area (42% of the country) but is home to only 14% of the population. Much of it is uninhabitable desert, but it is thought to contain untapped natural gas and other mineral reserves. More secular than much of Pakistan, Balochistan suffers from wide-scale poverty and has some of the highest illiteracy rates in the world. It has long been a restive area with a vibrant separatist movement and has been home to five major insurgencies over the past 60 years. The capital city of Quetta is increasingly becoming radicalized by the influx of Pashtun Islamist militants fleeing from Afghanistan. Some experts see it as a major regrouping station for Mujahideen operating in the region. Balochistan is home to the rapidly developing port of Gwadar, a Chinese-financed mega-project designed to receive oil tankers from the Gulf states and transfer the supplies via overland routes through Central Asia to China. This is viewed as a major interest of the Chinese in an effort to avoid having to ship oil through US-controlled choke points around the Indian subcontinent. Much pipeline, road, and rail infrastructure is being built as part of this endeavor.

The Northwest Frontier Province

The Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP consists of two different regions: the settled area consisting largely of farms, and the tribal areas consisting of nomadic populations. Along with the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA – see below), the NWFP borders Afghanistan and has long been considered a center for militant activity. In the area are Pashtun nationalists who seek secession to join with Pashtun populations over the Afghanistan border

to form an independent Pashtunistan. Other militant groups sympathetic to and often allied with the Taliban in Afghanistan can be found here. The capital city of Peshawar and surrounding areas were critical staging grounds for the US-financed battle against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. These areas are now home to Taliban and al Qaeda groups involved in the insurgency against US-NATO forces and the Karzai Administration over the border. Many militant training camps are located in this highly under-developed area where warlords vie with the Provincial government for authority. The NWFP contains the strategic Khyber Pass, the volatile, mountainous route into Afghanistan and Central Asia. It also contains the Swat Valley, a major Taliban recruitment and training area. See PBS Frontline reporting by David Montero on the ongoing battle for control of this critical area and the increasing infiltration by terrorist groups.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA

FATA is distinct from NWFP, but suffers from many of the same problems. Its population is also largely Pashtun, dominated by warlords and militant groups, and extremely impoverished. It was also a strategic pipeline for Mujahideen fighters, CIA money, and weapons during the Soviet campaign. Those same pipelines are now wreaking havoc on US-NATO operations in Afghanistan. FATA is home to many militant and terrorist training camps and has become a destination for global mujahideen from throughout the Middle East and Central Asia.

Seven tribal agencies make up FATA: Mohmand, Khyber, Bajur, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. The area is often referred to as Pakistan's tribal belt. Loyalties here are much more aligned with Pashtun nationalism and militant Islam than with Pakistani identity. There is a great deal of factionalism and lawlessness among various clan leaders, the Taliban, and al Qaeda radicals; anti-modern, pro-Sharia ideologies have become entrenched among the population. FATA residents do not enjoy most of the rights of Pakistani citizenship, and are instead subject to an arcane and draconian form of special administrative law known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation. As Islamabad has failed to bring this region under its control with respect

to security or development, local populations often turn to terrorist networks to do this.

The US was enormously frustrated by efforts to pressure Musharraf to crack down on this safe haven for Taliban insurgents fighting US-NATO troops in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military presence in FATA and NWFP is strong (over 100,000 troops) and is complemented by another nearly 100,000 Frontier Corps paramilitary installments. Yet success against Taliban leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud has been limited. There are many who speculate that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) even covertly supports and protects these militants out of Pashtun allegiances and anti-American sentiment. In addition, terrorists from around the world appear to be flocking to these tribal areas to join in universal jihad against the West in Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid has described the region as a “multilayered terrorist cake,” comprised of Pakistan and Afghan Taliban fighters, militants from Central Asia, Chechnya, Africa, China, and Kashmir, and Arab militants with sworn loyalty to Osama Bin Laden. He goes on to say, “almost all latter day al Qaeda terrorist plots around the world have had a FATA connection.”

The US has threatened on numerous occasions to undertake unilateral strikes on the region (an option Islamabad has vehemently forbidden); most experts believe that the War in Afghanistan cannot be won until this Pakistani lifeline (providing recruits, money, and weapons) to the militants is addressed. In addition, these groups are increasingly threatening Pakistan itself, carrying out suicide attacks and other violence in Pakistan’s cities. In response to the growing domestic security problem posed by these militants and their Islamist allies in other parts of the country, Musharraf undertook a series of unilateral peace negotiations with tribal leaders in recent years. He promised to cease Pakistani military attacks on tribal training camps in return for peace in Pakistan’s cities. The US saw this as an egregious betrayal of US-NATO aims in the region, and evidence of Musharraf’s double-dealing. The peace agreements were widely condemned by the West, and ultimately undermined by the failure of tribal leaders to respect them. US military aid to Pakistan, provided to fight these militants groups, has been known to end up in the hands of the militants, funneled through rogue Pakistani generals, the ISI, or Frontier Corps members. Western

economic development aid for FATA has often met the same fate.

Experts have noted that an alternative approach is to turn tribal leaders in the area against each other and exploit their divisiveness to subdue the region. Most believe Islamabad will not attempt this and risk further destabilization of this ethnically diverse country. Further, there is virtually no one who believes Americans have the knowledge or trust to undertake such a complicated endeavor. Another strategy would be for Islamabad to formally incorporate FATA into Pakistan and attempt to extend Pakistani jurisdiction over the tribal areas. Interestingly, most experts, including Carnegie’s Emmet Lasheed, believe this also will not happen because FATA currently provides Pakistan with an element of “plausible deniability” as far as militant activity is concerned. As has been discussed, Pashtun loyalties of the ISI, combined with anti-Americanism throughout the country often make the rebels and terrorists of FATA appear heroic. Letting lawlessness prevail as these groups make gains against Western forces is not entirely a bad deal for Pakistan, especially when those militants have the potential to be used in Kashmir someday.

Islamabad – Special Capital Territory

Islamabad is a special capital territory of Pakistan, much like Washington, DC is of the United States, and houses the central government bureaucracy. Margaret Warner of the PBS NewsHour remarked upon her journey there that the city feels a lot like Washington – a political town with a burgeoning arts and culture scene. The army is headquartered close by in Rawalpindi, a city in Punjab Province.

Kashmir Territories

Pakistani Kashmir north of the LOC makes up Pakistan’s final two territories: Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. Kashmir’s prize, the disputed Kashmir Valley, is split by the LOC, with the important Indian stronghold of Srinagar just over the border in Indian Kashmir. See the ‘India’ section in External Players for a more thorough discussion of ongoing violence in the Kashmir region, which has long been host to numerous insurgencies and separatist movements and is the main issue of contention in Indo-Pakistani relations.



The Pakistani Economy

Pakistan is not blessed with vast mineral reserves or arable land, and its greatest economic asset may in fact be its location. It is in an area of great strategic concern to wealthy countries such as the United States (in the Cold War and Global War on Terror), and is a critical transit point from the Middle East to Central Asia. These considerations have led to billions in Western foreign aid and significant investment by China as it seeks alternate ways to move energy sources from the Gulf to its ever-expanding economy. As journalist Nancy Amelia Collins has summarized, the past decade has seen annual growth in the 6-8% range, largely due to US aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), and remittances from Pakistani workers abroad.

However, this may not always be the case. As Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution has noted, if Pakistan's geostrategic location ceases to be so strategic in the eyes of the world, aid might be distributed on a more conditional basis. Currently, Pakistan is far from qualifying for aid that is conditioned on good governance and other standards related to the health of its economy and political discourse (such as Millennium Challenge Accounts). As far as foreign investment is concerned, Pakistan is already seeing a dramatic pullback in the wake of political instability and terrorist-related violence.

In terms of domestic production, the situation is even more troubling and will certainly become more so if investment and aid continue to diminish as expected. Pakistan has limited manufacturing capability, especially when compared with its Asian competitors. What manufacturing it does

have is relatively basic, primarily textiles. Pakistan's textile industry is increasingly unable to compete with cheap Chinese apparel and no significant high technology sector exists as it does in neighboring India. Poor investment in infrastructure has hurt economic development, as has a lack of investment in Pakistan's human resources through education, health care, and social welfare services. The country's economy is also seen as suffering from a lack of planning and policy-driven fiscal decision-making.

In short, Pakistan's growth has, as Jan Vandermoortele, Senior Advisor on Policy at UNICEF told the Carnegie Foundation, produced "growth without development" due to structural faultlines running throughout the economy that keep gains from reaching all income groups. The annual GDP per capita (PPP) as estimated by the International Monetary Fund using 2006 numbers is \$2700, ranking Pakistan low on the scale at 132 out of 179 countries.

Currently the economy is in deep trouble as ordinary citizens suffer from currency devaluation and inflation in the form of soaring food and fuel prices. These were recently exacerbated by the removal of government subsidies for these products. In July, journalist Fouad Pervez interviewed Pakistanis in Karachi on their household finances, and found that people unanimously said, "this was the worst economic crunch they could recall." The *New York Times* reported that riots broke out at the Karachi Stock Exchange in mid-July when the benchmark fell for the 15th consecutive day; it was the worst losing run in 18 years and

was largely due to mismanagement and the flight of foreign capital.

Complicating Factors: Indo-Pakistani Relations and the Growth of the Military

The long-standing Indo-Pakistani rivalry has taken its toll on Pakistan's economy in numerous ways. First, enormous amounts of money have been and continue to be directed to the country's military, justified by the perceived need to counter an Indian threat. These expenditures have bankrupted the country's infrastructure, education, and social welfare systems, as well as turning the military into a major investor and player in Pakistani economics and politics.

Ayesha Sidiqa has estimated that the military-industrial complex in Pakistan was worth \$20 billion in 2007. Not only does it manage a defense budget of \$4.6 billion, the army actually owns 12 million acres of land, as well as five major business groups. As Owen Bennett Jones has summarized, these are:

- The largest conglomerate in the country, the Fauji Foundation, a tax exempt organization that owns and manages everything from factories to energy to hospitals.
- The Army Welfare Trust (AWT) a holding company including real estate, industries, and banks.
- The Frontier Works Organization (FWO) that oversees road construction.
- The Special Communications Organization responsible for all telecommunications linking Pakistani Kashmir to Pakistan proper.
- The National Logistics Cell, a major player in the transportation business, maintaining roadways and fleets of cars.

Large parts of the civilian economy are thus under the control of the military, and are often run by ex-officers with little business training. This economic power brings with it enormous political power. Corruption has also been known to run rampant as army officers use political leverage to obtain preferential treatment in real estate and other transactions. Bad investment decisions are often offset by government bail outs and subsidies, leading a prominent Pakistani physicist to remark that "all countries have armies,

but in Pakistan, things are reversed. Here it is the army that has a country."

Another way in which the Indo-Pakistani rivalry takes its toll is through the expensive nuclear program Pakistan has developed over the years. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reportedly said that Pakistan "would eat grass" if that is what it took to get an "Islamic bomb," and there have been enormous expenditures in order to develop Pakistan's nuclear capacity. This has not only been expensive in terms of money spent, but also in terms of foreign aid that was lost for over a decade because of sanctions resulting from Pakistan's nuclear proliferation.

Finally, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry continues to impoverish Pakistan because of its obstruction of regional economic and trade cooperation. In a globalized economy, regional coordination makes countries stronger. Together India and Pakistan make up a vital trade route, but their failure to allow products to move unimpeded across their borders has hurt them both. Additionally, because much of India's growth has been in the high technology sector using "virtual" and telecommunication lines, Pakistan has suffered disproportionately in this regard.

General Political Instability

Pakistan's political turmoil over the years has not been conducive to economic development. Extreme factionalism, the multiple failures of democracy and civilian rule, and increasing terrorist-related violence, such as the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, have taken a toll on investor confidence. At the same time they have interfered with the development of coherent economic policies and planning. It has been a roller coaster ride that continues today. From 2001-2007, the economy has grown at an average of 7% per year. There have been years where Pakistan was considered a high yield, if high risk emerging market by foreign investors; in 2005, the World Bank ranked Pakistan the top reformer in the region. While the Karachi-based stock market had some great years, even as other regions were seeing declines, this has not been sustained amidst the political crises of the past year.

As the Kaleej Times has reported, by the summer of 2008, for the first time in years, all three markets (currency, capital, and real estate) were in decline. Inflation, crushing international debt, high interest rates, and general disrepair

of basic infrastructure (such as electricity) exacerbated diminished investor confidence in the wake of Musharraf's constitutional abuses and growing sectarian and political violence in Pakistan's cities. The crisis led one market analyst to report to Reuters that Pakistan's current political climate represented the "worst possible scenario for foreign investment," although it was noted that China and the Middle East will likely continue to take the risk. The markets got some relief on August 18 when Musharraf stepped down, but Pakistan's investor ratings remain shaky as uncertainty about the government prevail. Economic warnings are dire in the Western and International press, and many fear that a recession would further open the door for Islamists to capitalize on public discontent.

Asset Ownership and Tax Policies

Pakistan's economy has significant structural hurdles as well. Throughout its history, various economic experiments have been undertaken. Most notably, this includes a trend toward socialism or nationalization of key industries and land during various civilian and military administrations. Political vendettas and corruption often drove nationalization decisions (such as the seizure of industries belonging to rival Nawaz Sharif by the landowning Bhuttos). When the pendulum swung back, toward privatization, corruption was again a factor as asset values were lost and gained in the transactions, or assets sometimes simply went missing. Political allies usually received preferential treatment as property passed to individual hands.

In addition, Pakistan has a powerful and wealthy landed, feudal aristocracy. Literally referred to as the "feudals," this elite is dominant in Punjab and Sindh where large tracts of land have been preserved in families for generations despite some attempts at land reform. The "feudals" are closely tied to the military and civilian bureaucracies and wield significant political influence. Owen Bennett Jones has written, "there are few countries, and no successful ones, where local landlords wield such power." There is no tax collected on these holdings, and the government is under tremendous pressure to keep it that way.

In fact, there is very little taxation in Pakistan at all, which is a major reason for the country's crippling debt and dependence on foreign aid. The Pakistan newspaper Dawn reported that the Central Board of Revenue expected to

receive 1.75 million income tax returns in 2007, out of 2.28 million taxpayers. This is in a country of 167 million, 30 million of who are considered middle class by Pakistani standards (those earning up to \$10,000/year). Only 1.5% of Pakistanis pay taxes, compared to 2.7% in India, 14.5% in Argentina, 58% in France, 70% in the United States, and 87% in Canada. The reasons include: poorly developed or non-existent tax legislation, corruption, few penalties for tax evasion, and a lack of capacity to collect taxes that are due. This is seen as a major area of badly needed reform, especially where wealthy landowners and industrialists are concerned.

The Informal Economy

Like all developing nations, especially those with access to the narcotics trade located in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan has a thriving informal economy that includes illegal smuggling, sanctions-running, and weapons sales, among other criminalized activities. In addition to these illicit activities, the informal economy includes the provision of health care, food, education, and services through clan networks. None of this informal economic activity is accounted for in the country's economic statistics, nor is it factored into indicators of the economy's health. A major reform initiative is to bring more entrepreneurial activity into the formalized economy so as to broaden the potential tax base.



The Military

“Regardless of what may be desirable, the army will continue to set limits on what is possible in Pakistan.”

Brookings Institution Pakistan Expert Stephen Cohen

“The army is by far Pakistan’s most important institution - a source of cohesion and national identity, but also of dissonance, internal violence, inequality, and constitutional failure.”

Pakistan Expert Steve Coll

The Pakistani military has long been considered the country’s dominant institution. There have been four major periods of military rule in the country’s 60 years (comprising over half its history), and even during times of civilian rule the military’s influence has been pervasive throughout society. Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah envisioned a civilian-led republic-style government for the country in 1947, although he did not advocate a true democracy during the country’s early existence. In 1958, General Ayub Kahn came to power in the country’s first military coup. Following him was General Yahya Kahn in 1969, General Zia ul-Haq in 1977, and General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Each period of military rule was interspersed with largely ineffective civilian governments; each time, the army leaders invoked a sense of emergency or need to rescue the country from inept leadership as justifications for their actions. Pakistan’s

military establishment is closely linked to the country’s myriad intelligence services, most famously the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency or ISI, but also including the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Military Intelligence (MI). It draws largely on the Punjabi population for its officers and soldiers, and is seen by some as an agent of Punjabi influence against other ethnic groups.

The Pakistani military is highly involved in economic, political, and social welfare policies. The army itself owns and operates five large business ventures that blur the lines between the public and private sectors, including the country’s largest conglomerate responsible for everything from factories to hospitals to banking. The military also owns considerable land in Pakistan, operating farms and industries, and buying and selling real estate on the open market. The military operating budget of over \$4 billion supports 650,000 troops, as well as retired officers who are also often guaranteed civil service sector jobs upon leaving active duty (See the ‘Economy’ section in Internal Players for more details). During the Cold War and now the Global War on Terror, the military has been the primary recipient of much of Pakistan’s foreign aid. Except for the period 1989-2001 in which Pakistan fell under a variety of international sanctions related to its nuclear program, constitutional crises, and state sponsorship of terrorism, this aid has largely kept the country afloat.

In sum, the army exerts tremendous pressure through its political leverage, its economic holdings, and its vaunted place as defender of Pakistan against a range of

perceived Judeo-Christian-Hindu threats in the region. The military generally sees itself as more qualified than civilian governments to govern, an assumption that has not been challenged by the history of various inept civilian governments.

It was largely the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, which developed immediately upon partition, that catapulted the military to its prominence. Convinced of the threat of war with India and focused on establishing a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan, Pakistan's civilian and military rulers diverted large sums of money to train and equip the army and ISI. The army itself functions largely as a meritocracy, with potential recruits scouted and promoted through a rigorous process. It is generally seen as a professional, if often corrupt body; any leader who fails to garner its support does so at his or her peril. Pakistan military scholar Hasan Askari Rizvi has written that there are certain matters that absolutely do not get discussed without military oversight. These include Kashmir, Pakistan's nuclear program, foreign policy, defense spending, perks for military officers, and international military decisions. Compare this with other countries such as the US where the Departments of State and Defense, or the diplomats and the armed forces, are subject to different command structures; they operate in concert, but with autonomy from each other. Throughout Pakistan's history, these issues dominated most others, and the military has generally controlled decision-making to the point of removing civilian leaders who do not conform to the military's wishes. The military and intelligence services not only extend their influence directly within and beyond Pakistan's borders, but also act through proxy agents: from insurgent groups in Kashmir to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Brookings Institution expert Stephen Cohen has written that there have been three generations of Pakistani generals and foot soldiers. First, there were the highly British-influenced forces inherited by Pakistan upon partition in 1947. Then came the generation that was heavily-American influenced during the Cold War when Pakistan was embraced by the West as a hedge against Communist and, later, Soviet-occupied, Afghanistan. The third is what has been called the Pakistani generation, coming of age during the "betrayal" and abandonment of Pakistan by the West in the years between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001. All have been anti-Indian, educated that way during

training and inculcated with a sense of lifelong rivalry with Muslim Pakistan's Hindu neighbor. All have fought wars against India at one point or another – in Kashmir or in Bangladesh. Great debate exists about the Islamist leanings of the military leadership as well as the rank and file. Although the Zia years did see an increasing radical Islamic strain in the army, most believe the average Pakistani soldier to be a moderate Muslim, albeit one who is being asked to risk his life for a greater goal than even Pakistan. The symbolic importance of a Muslim army fighting Western powers and proxies is alive and well.

The current generation will soon transition and the world will watch with great interest to determine the nature of the new Pakistani military. Musharraf's successor General Kayani is thought to be a moderate, who has been in charge of the armed forces since Musharraf removed his uniform to assume the mantle of a civilian leader in late 2007. He has pledged to remove military influences from politics, which he largely delivered on during the Parliamentary elections that swept Musharraf's opposition in to power. Many hoped that Indo-Pakistani tensions would diminish after the failed invasion of Kargil in Kashmir in 1999 and the increasingly obvious benefits that would come with improved trade connections with India. These hopes have been largely dashed in recent months as the insurgency in Kashmir has escalated with ISI support.

Finally, many hoped that Musharraf and Kayani would commit themselves to ousting al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries and agents located in Pakistan. This has been the most disappointing aspect of the US-Pakistani military relationship. Since 2001, it is estimated that Pakistan has received between \$10 and \$12 billion dollars in overt US aid to combat militants and terror networks along the Afghan-Pakistani border (and many more billions in covert aid). Yet, 2008 has seen a resurgence of Taliban forces reentering Afghanistan after receiving support and safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas. Moreover, these Pakistani territories (FATA and the NWFP) have become terrorist hotbeds, attracting Mujahideen from around the world planning attacks on Western targets in Central Asia, the Middle East, and even Europe.

Outside analysts and observers are often at odds about why the American funded Pakistani army is not having more success in pursuing American interests in the region,

namely in the eradication of Taliban support. Some say that it is a question of competence and capacity: the Pakistani military has been trained for a land war with India, not counter-insurgency against elusive guerilla militants. They are a fairly low-tech operation, largely due to funds tied up in Pakistan's unused nuclear arsenal and the low-grade nature of the Pakistani education system in general. Furthermore, nearly all acknowledge that some form of conflicted loyalty comes in to play when Pashtuns are asked to fire upon Pashtuns.

Increasingly, however, many experts see more of an official policy at work: a new kind of state sponsorship of terrorism characterized by lackluster efforts to combat militants. Others believe the support is more direct in the form of covert aid funneled through ISI contacts. Regardless, the clandestine nature of what some call outright "double-dealing" allows the Pakistani military a measure of deniability when it comes to accusations from its American sponsors regarding the resurgence of the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Pakistan. Tensions between the Americans and Pakistani military and intelligence establishment became more reciprocal in June when American airstrikes on Taliban installments in FATA (launched from the Afghan side of the border) killed at least 11 Pakistani Frontier Corps paramilitaries (whom many suspect are aiding Taliban groups in the area). As reported in *The Economist*, Pakistan issued a condemnation of the attacks saying they "hit at the very basis of cooperation and sacrifice with which Pakistani soldiers are supporting the coalition in the war against terror."

Prospects for the Future

Musharraf's former allies in the military establishment did not rally to prevent his resignation, which many experts interpreted as a positive sign. Musharraf may deserve credit for resigning rather than subjecting the country to an impeachment process in which the army might have split from the civilian governing coalition to support him. Kayani's credibility, for now, is intact on his promises to get the military out of politics. However, it is certain that the new civilian government will need the support of the military going forward and will need to choose its new President wisely.

Pakistan is in need of broad reforms in its economic and civilian bureaucracies, as well as in its military alliance with the United States. This relationship is becoming more contentious every day that Taliban insurgents gain strength in the tribal regions. Growing choruses of defense analysts from all along the American political spectrum are currently considering changing the nature of US military support, noting that many of the funds have been used to buy F-16s and other heavy airpower that is of no use in counterinsurgency operations (but would be immensely helpful against India). Most believe the US cannot abandon the Pakistani military, to which Malou Innocent of the Cato Institute has said Washington has "outsourced" its fight against Islamic insurgents on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The American-Pakistani relationship is in need of mending and reevaluating on both sides. This cannot be accomplished without the involvement of military leaders. As tensions continue to heat up in Kashmir, the military will only become stronger in its aura of indispensability for the Pakistani Muslim people it exists to protect. Conversely, many have wondered what impact peace with India and in Afghanistan would have on the Pakistani military's future. It has been said by several experts that a major concern would be keeping them busy; they are not likely to be diminished in strength or numbers by future governments, given the history and psychology of Pakistan. One option would be to engage the army in more international, multi-lateral peacekeeping missions. Pakistan already contributes the most of any nation, currently 10,000 troops, to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions around the world who are largely seen as serving with distinction. Another important endeavor would be to use the army as a development corps within Pakistan, helping with infrastructure and domestic community and nation-building efforts.

See the External Player sections for more on the Pakistani military with regard to India, Afghanistan, and the United States. In the Internal Players section, see the 'Nuclear Program' section for a discussion of the military's nuclear capabilities and the 'Economy' section for examination of the military's economic interests.



The Education System in Pakistan

Pakistan's demographics contain enormous implications for the future of the nation. Whether the country's large youth bulge can be harnessed to modernize Pakistan, or whether these youth will become increasingly radicalized, discontent, and dangerous, largely depends on the quality of the education they receive – at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. The stakes could not be higher, in the view of Brookings Institution Pakistan expert Stephen Cohen, who writes that Pakistan's education system must be “of high enough caliber to help bridge the cultural and civilizational divides that already exist without producing new divisions, and in addition produce a trained cadre of future leaders able to navigate a nuclear armed Pakistan through a rapidly-changing global and regional environment.” Nearly all experts agree that the Pakistani education system is not up to this task.

It is well-known that Pakistan's education system has been neglected historically. From partition to present day, the priorities of the struggling state have been primarily in the military-intelligence sector. It has been estimated that military to education spending in Pakistan is 16:1, and Pakistan is one of only 12 countries in the world that spend less than 2% of GNP on education. The World Bank reports that the average Pakistani boy receives just five years of education, and the average girl only two and one-half years. US Agency for International Aid (USAID) reports indicate that just two-thirds of all children age 5-9 ever enroll in school, and only one-third complete fifth grade. Overall adult literacy (the percent of the population over age 15

that can read) hovers around 40-50%, and varies widely by gender and region. Rates for males in Punjab reach 81%, while rates for females in some areas of Balochistan reach only 1%. Official UN statistics put the gender disparity in literacy at an average of 2:1. The number of illiterate people in Pakistan has doubled over the past 50 years, now comprising a full 25% of the Pakistani workforce. The UN Development Program, which conducts research on all quality of life indicators in countries throughout the world, has found that Pakistan has the lowest combined education index of any country outside Africa. Oxfam has estimated that Pakistan will soon be home to 40% of all South Asian children not attending school.

Enrollment in higher education and the quality of these institutions are particularly critical in today's globalized, information-driven economy, yet Pakistan lags well behind its peers in this realm. Stephen Cohen presents comparative research in his 2004 book that shows the staggering disparity between Pakistan and its neighbors, many of them fellow Muslim nations. The most damning statistics are from the UNESCO education database that show the number of students enrolled in college or university. These figures are most enlightening when compared with the total population of the countries. Pakistan has only 100,000 students in higher education, while Iran and Turkey, with less than half of Pakistan's total population, have 700,000 and 1.6 million, respectively. Even Bangladesh, with roughly the same population as Pakistan, has 878,388 students in higher education. Most strikingly, Pakistan's

rival India, with whom it shares colonial roots, has 9.4 million students in institutions of higher learning – over 90 times more students than Pakistan even though its population is only 7 times that of Pakistan. The quality of Pakistan's institutions of higher learning is also considered highly inferior to its global counterparts, with unprepared students and teachers, and documented false credentialing. Some Pakistani students manage to study abroad, but of this small number of students, most hail from elite families, and not all are able to succeed, given often inferior secondary school experiences.

Primary and Secondary Education

It is largely accepted that reform must begin with primary and secondary education, but the overriding problem is Pakistan's lack of a coherent, systematic approach to K-12 education. Enrollment procedures, teacher training, facilities, curriculum, and pedagogy vary depending on the type of school and region.

Government Schools

Pakistan's government schools have long been an area of concern. They are a patchwork of rural, urban, and village schools of varying physical and pedagogical quality; they are overseen by a decentralized, often corrupt and inept administration apparatus, and lacking in any real quality assessment procedures. Donors, government and NGO-based, have tried to intervene over the years to improve both access and quality. One case study is particularly instructive.

Beginning in 1987, USAID funded a research effort headed by Harvard University, which later culminated in the Pakistan Education Development Program (PED), aimed at improving the quality of education and increasing the numbers of children, especially girls, enrolled in school. Focusing on the low literacy states of Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, PED undertook a needs assessment to determine the state of education in the rural provinces. The results helped shape the innovations that PED began implementing. The team found overcrowded classrooms, high dropout rates, and programs based almost entirely on rote memorization. There was little connection among the federally mandated learning objectives, instructional materials, training, and testing. Consequently

the majority of students failed promotional exams and many left the system.

Low enrollments were due in large part to parents who did not see the advantages to school or to the costs associated with lost child labor or incidentals such as materials. Also many areas had no accessible schools or the children had to walk long distances to school. In these conservative regions, the costs and distances often made parents more fearful of sending girls, especially after they reached puberty around third grade. Attendance was poor and teachers were frequently absent. There was little supervision of rural teachers. Facilities were often in poor repair and inadequate for the numbers of children who enrolled at the lowest grades. Perhaps what was most disturbing was the poor quality of the academic program. The emphasis was almost exclusively on rote learning and memorization, often of material that was not systematically geared to teaching basic academic skills. Little attention was given to creative learning or the development of critical thinking skills. There was little or no English instruction – a skill important for gaining better employment opportunities. Teachers with the requisite preservice training had students who performed no better than teachers with no training. An enormous amount of graft and corruption further complicated matters. Large numbers of schools and teachers appeared in budgets but existed only on paper and not in reality. Supervisors visited urban schools but lacked the money to visit rural schools. Many simply stayed at home or showed up in district offices to drink tea.

The PED team worked with Pakistani educators for four years developing curriculum and materials for schools in Pakistan's rural hinterlands. They worked to produce quality instructional materials in the form of textbooks, step by step pedagogically sound lesson formats for teachers, and Radio English equipment and programming so that spoken English could be taught and practiced in the classrooms.

Designed as a 10 year program, in its first two years, the PED was on its way to compiling valuable statistical information, developing quality curriculum and classroom materials, engaging local leaders in problem-solving on the ground, building the capacity of Pakistani officials and teachers to make reforms, and garnering the participation of parents in sustaining and deepening structural and pedagogical reforms. Their efforts were a drop in the

bucket, to be sure, but put PED on its way to developing replicable models for expansion. However, when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan however and there seemed no further need for supporting the US ally Pakistan, Congress applied the Pressler Amendment which prohibited aid to countries with nuclear weapons capacities and the program was shut down. It is ironic and tragic that the Pashtun areas where PED attempted critical reforms in the 1990s are now the very areas of Pakistan that have become the most radicalized and dangerous. Those children whose school reform was abandoned have now come of age.

Nearly 20 years later, the situation is not much improved. Most of the same issues encountered by the PED team remain in government schools. Other types of schools have sprung up and flourished in the educational vacuum. These include informal schools started by parents in isolated rural areas (that are often not recognized by the state system), private schools, and schools created by NGOs such as Greg Mortenson's Central Asia Institute. Curriculum standardization and quality remains a problem, and little effort is made to monitor or evaluate what children are learning. Moreover, the unequal quality among these different types of schools only serves to reinforce larger class, ethnic, and regional divisions in Pakistani society.

Madrassa Schools (Madaris)

Besides government, missionary, informal, private, and NGO-funded schools, the other main sector of Pakistan's fragmented education system are the madrassas or madaris schools run by Islamist clerics. Pakistan expert Owen Bennett Jones has reported that there were about 250 madrassas in the country upon independence in 1947. Their numbers swelled considerably over the following decades, especially as these schools played a key role in educating and training the Mujahideen who were engaged by the CIA and others to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. By 1989, they had increased ten-fold and were turning out 30,000 graduates a year. By 2001, they numbered up to 8000 and graduated between 600,000 and 700,000 students per year. Madrassas are primarily run by proponents of the Deobandi sect of radical Islam and their syllabi are often exclusively religious in nature. Ancient texts are used, including the Koran. The emphasis is on memorization and indoctrination into radical ideologies and interpretations of Islam. Many madrassa schools are innocuous, serving

the function of Sunday School in the West, but others have more radical aims.

The growth of radical-style madrassas is of great concern not only to the West, but also to many secularists and moderate Muslims in Pakistan and around the world. They are seen as a driving force behind the growth of radical Islam in and outside of Pakistan, and are the recipients of funding from Islamic charities globally (especially from Saudi Arabia). See the 'Islamists' section in Internal Players and 'Global Terror Networks' section in External Players for a detailed explanation of the role these schools serve as training grounds for Mujahideen in nearby Afghanistan and beyond. Most believe the danger of radical madrassas is several-fold. First, they serve as acceleration chambers for radical ideologies, capitalizing on and feeding the discontent of Pakistan's large youth population. Second, they appeal to those who might not, given other choices, be attracted to their message. Many madrassa schools are full-service operations, providing housing, meals, and community when it is often not otherwise available to large portions of the population. Finally, by failing to educate for a secular existence or employment in the globalized economy, they limit Pakistan's development potential. They are often seen as inherently anti-modern in a world that increasingly requires that students have a modern education to be successful.

Prospects for the Future

The prospects for the future of Pakistan's education system and, by extension, for the future of the nation are fairly bleak. Massive amounts of money are needed; equally important is how this money is spent, as the experience of the PED in the 1990s demonstrated. Pakistani education officials and local leaders have a history of taking even the best-intentioned outside funding from countries and NGOs and making poor use of it. Most believe that the focus must be on outcomes for the students, not merely on the construction of schools or the enhancing of education budgets. There is currently little capacity in Pakistan to rigorously monitor such outcomes; what testing does exist often has little relation to the objectives of the Pakistani government or to any recognizable standards for primary skill development.

A particularly critical issue concerns the prevailing gender disparity in education. Not only is education for girls less valued in society than education for boys, but growing radical influences are often also hostile to girls' education on religious and cultural grounds. This means that a large portion of the population in some areas is not being educated, or educated in unequal and substandard ways. The world is becoming aware of the importance of girls' education in contributing to improvements in social and economic indicators in a country. Most development experts feel investment in girls' education has higher payoffs than boys' education. Educated women are more likely to send their own children to school, to demonstrate knowledge of better health practices, and to contribute to the economic well-being of their families and communities. The results of microfinance programs in places like nearby Bangladesh that focus on empowering women have borne this out. Similarly, education for women generally has the effect of lowering birthrates, another positive human development indicator. Pakistan currently has one of the highest fertility rates in the world, a distinction that does not bode well for its already high poverty levels. The education of women in parity with that of men would bring unquestionable positive benefits for Pakistani society on many fronts. Yet the nation presently ranks 152 out of 156 countries on the UN Gender Disparity Index when compared with their overall Human Development score; it ranks 82 out of 93 countries in the world on the UN Gender Empowerment Measure, which seeks to capture the level of women's involvement in community and society.

Islamists in Pakistan

Brookings Institution scholar Steven Cohen has constructed an excellent definition of the different terms related to the practice of Islam. Adapting from the work of Daniel Pipes of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Cohen's linguistic road map quoted in his 2004 book *The Idea of Pakistan* is as follows:

A 'Muslim state' refers to a state whose citizens are entirely or predominantly Muslim; 'Islamic' refers to the belief that a Muslim state can be made to follow Islamic guidelines, however defined. 'Islamist' refers to the groups that advocate an Islamic state, and 'Islamism' is an Islamic-flavored version of totalitarianism, seeking to impose a sustained program of various Islamic practices on a society. 'Secular' is used to describe the belief that Muslim states can borrow from other cultures and societies, especially the West, and reduce Islam to the private sphere.

As previously mentioned, a central tension within Pakistani history and society is the debate over whether it is a country for Muslims or an Islamic state. Islamist factions within Pakistan have generally advocated for the latter, and operate through mosques, madrassa schools, political parties, and connections with Islamist groups in other countries. Pakistan's Islamists are heterogeneous, and their different objectives exist along a spectrum; they vary in the degree to which they hope to influence Pakistan from within the system or in violent opposition to it, and the degree to which they identify with other Islamic movements globally. It is a long road from advocating Sharia law and a pure

Islamic state to violent jihad, and most Pakistani Islamists lie somewhere in between. It is a gross misconception that all Pakistani Islamists support terrorism as a tactic. Some are undoubtedly affiliated with radical groups that do so (the Taliban, al Qaeda, e.g.), but the majority prefer to work within Pakistan's political system to effect change.

Islamists and The State

The government of Pakistan has throughout history alternately accommodated, co-opted, used, openly supported, and half-heartedly fought Islamist groups. It was General Zia ul-Haq who perhaps most overtly espoused Islamist aims for the state, and provided the most state support for embedding Islamist ideologies in Pakistan's civil and military institutions. Other leaders, including Musharraf, employed a range of strategies whereby Islamist groups were indulged in an effort to keep them appeased, while concurrently using them to consolidate Pakistan's sense of unique identity and connection with the rest of the Muslim world.

Stephen Cohen has remarked that Pakistan's more secular-leaning leaders such as the Bhuttos and Nawaz Sharif supported Islamists primarily by "what they did not do," namely adequately provide for the well-being and education of Pakistan's masses. It has been said by numerous experts that Islamists always benefit from a vacuum, be it political, social, or educational. By failing to invest in public welfare, particularly in the public education system, many of Pakistan's leaders have left ordinary Pakistanis with little

choice but to turn to what the Islamists are eager to provide. This includes not only madrassa schools and social welfare programs (see the ‘Education System’ section in *Internal Players* for a discussion of Pakistan madrassa schools or madaris), but also a sense of community in an increasingly fragmented society. In this way, Pakistani Islamists enjoy the support of not only fellow Muslim countries located in the Middle East, but also from the Islamic diasporas around the world, from moderates to universal mujahideen.

Islamists and the Political Process

Most Islamists in Pakistan do not seek to overthrow the government by coup or conquest, such as happened with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Instead they would rather wield their influence through participation and competition in the political system. Since Pakistan’s founding, there have been numerous Islamist parties that have done so. The most prominent is the Jama’at-i-Islami or (JI) Party, though other “Ulema” parties exist that espouse the ideals of particular brands of Islam, such as the Deobandi sect. Today, these parties wield influence together in an umbrella party called the Muttahida Majilis-e-Amal, or MMA, which has successfully competed with mainstream Pakistani political parties in elections in the 21st Century. Most notably, the MMA captured 17% of seats in the 2002 Parliamentary Elections and formed an influential opposition group in the government. Moreover, in 2002 the MMA took a majority of seats in the provincial governments of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, and attempted to extend Sharia-based policies on the populations of these areas. The appeal of this party substantially diminished in the 2007 elections, largely because in 2002 they were capitalizing on mass discontent with the Musharraf government and its new alliance with the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The MMA was largely routed in both national and provincial seats by the secular Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League (PML), and Awami National Party (ANP). Many experts blamed this on the Party’s failure to deliver on its promises in 2002 and increasing fragmentation among its ranks.

There are some experts who believe that the best way to check the growth of Islamist parties is to, ironically, let them come to power. As the experience of Hamas in Palestine has shown, it is much easier to oppose a government

than it is to run one. To the extent that Islamist parties are seen as impediments to US and Western aims in the region, many believe that the best thing the US could do to counter their power is to stay quiet and let the law of natural consequences kick in. Anti-American sentiment is an extraordinary recruiting tool for mainstream and radical Islamists, and thus open US opposition to the parties only bolsters their popularity. (See the ‘Global Terror Networks’ section in *External Players* for a discussion of connections between Pakistani Islamists and global terror networks operating regionally and worldwide.)

Common Misperceptions of Islamists

It is commonly accepted that radical Islamists have posed and continue to pose problems for the domestic stability of Pakistan, and for its alliance with the secular West. More ideologically extreme factions see a Judeo-Christian-Hindu conspiracy to rob Muslims of their purity and destiny. The growth of these groups is very troubling, not only in the tribal areas but throughout Pakistan, as evidenced by the Red Mosque incident in Islamabad. It must be noted, however, that most Pakistani Muslims, even most Islamists, do not fall into this group. Cultural, ethnic, tribal, and linguistic loyalties are often more powerful than religious ones. The majority are devout and certainly patriotic, yet seek to work within Pakistan’s institutions to meet their goals. It is when these institutions fail in meeting people’s basic needs that the appeal of more radical forms of Islamism grows.



Pakistan's Nuclear Program

A host of fascinating books have been written on Pakistan's nuclear program. The story unfolds like a work of international fictional intrigue. See Referenced Resources as well as the World Savvy Salon Guide for titles on the subject. For the purposes of this edition of the Monitor, we will provide only the basic narrative and issues, and hope to address nuclear proliferation as an upcoming Issue in Focus.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is said to have remarked that the country would “eat grass” if that is what it took to finance an “Islamic bomb” in Pakistan. He and all his successors enjoyed support from the Chinese as well as Saudis and other wealthy Muslim regimes. They went on to devote enormous resources to developing Pakistan's nuclear capacities, in line with rival India's timetable. The fact that Pakistan accomplished this by the 1990s is significant. There are technically only seven acknowledged nuclear powers in the world: the US, UK, France, China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. Israel is considered an unacknowledged member of this club with a policy of nuclear “opacity” or “ambiguity,” and North Korea and Iran are seen as being on their way to joining the official list. The fact that Pakistan joined the club at such an early date is remarkable, given that it is home to so many of the world's poor. This accomplishment was due largely to the efforts of one man, the notorious Pakistani scientist and businessman A. Q. Kahn.

The Pakistani program that began in 1972 was significantly enhanced after India's first test of fissile material in 1974. Canada and France were both approached by Pakistan for help in developing the technology and securing the

materials, ostensibly for “peaceful purposes.” These deals ultimately fell through because of the international scrutiny these powers would have faced. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, or PAEC, continued the work with Chinese help. Meanwhile, Zulfikar Bhutto turned to A. Q. Kahn, a Pakistani national living and working in the nuclear industry in Europe. Kahn ultimately returned to Pakistan with “stolen” blueprints from his European employer, and set about pursuing his own program at the Kahuta Plant. This plant would ultimately bear his name in the years to come.

The PAEC and Kahn became somewhat competitive, yet progress moved ahead much to the dismay of the West. The West subsequently tried to use the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various embargoes to shut down the Indian and Pakistani operations. In the mid-1970s, the US passed a series of laws mandating sanctions on countries that pursued nuclear weapons programs; these were not applied to Pakistan until after the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. When the Soviets were defeated by a covert CIA-Pakistani-Afghan operation in 1979, Washington came down on Pakistan for its violations of international nuclear non-proliferation treaties. All aid and loans were suspended (see “The United States' section in External Players for more details). Yet Pakistan made the gamble that the bomb was worth it, and received considerable help from the Saudis to mitigate the crushing economic blows. This was especially important after the May 1998 tests that put both India and Pakistan

in the center of Western punitive sanctions. The Pakistanis went on to receive technical help from North Korea in developing missiles that could reach India and beyond. Pakistan is now an officially acknowledged nuclear power, albeit one that continues to operate outside the NPT. India does as well, but was recently the beneficiary of US nuclear material exchange trade deals that essentially allow them to circumvent NPT restrictions. Pakistan has not, as of yet, been offered the same deal, which has caused tension and resentment.

Why Pakistan's Nukes Matter

The fact that nuclear weapons are in the hands of rivals India and Pakistan is enormously troubling to the international community, for reasons that go beyond the two nations' historic animosity and the tendency for this hostility to erupt in conflict in Kashmir. Experts also worry about the presumed lack of adequate early warning systems, rock-solid command and control procedures, and "hotlines" or measures that could prevent an accidental nuclear exchange, such as those that existed between the US and USSR. They also worry about the safety and security of the nuclear arsenals themselves, and the potential for the weapons to fall in to the wrong hands, the wrong hands being radical Islamic terrorist groups operating in the region. It was reported that A. Q. Kahn met multiple times with both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the last time right before September 11, 2001.

Outside the regional implications, the international community has cause for concern about Pakistan's potential role in nuclear proliferation around the world. A.Q. Kahn made a fortune developing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and it is commonly believed that he became enormously wealthy selling pieces and blueprints of it to other nuclear-aspirant countries. Experts report that designs and components have turned up in Libya, Iran, and North Korea bearing the signature style of the European nuclear system on which Kahn based Pakistan's weapons. Under pressure from the US and others, Musharraf was forced to remove Kahn from Pakistan's official employment in 2002. He was given an honorary advisory position in Pakistan's nuclear industry, and continued his lucrative private trade in nuclear materials without much interference from the government. He was finally "caught" at the end of an enormous global

dragnet operation involving multiple countries in 2003. The *BBC China*, a ship containing a "turn-key" nuclear weapons program, was intercepted en route to Libya from Kahn's operations. No outside countries were allowed to participate in the ensuing investigation, and Kahn ultimately made a rueful and chagrined admission of his proliferation efforts over the previous 15 years, absolving the Pakistani government from any responsibility for his actions.

To this day, Kahn remains under house arrest in Islamabad, safe from international atomic agencies' questions. In a bizarre recent development, Kahn made an announcement in June 2008 recanting his admission and accusing France, Germany, and South Africa of providing Tehran and Tripoli with nuclear designs, claiming he played only a small advisory role. He also told the *New York Times* in early July 2008 that the Pakistani government did, in fact, have full knowledge of his illegal nuclear weapons trading program, and that centrifuges had been shipped to North Korea with Pakistani army supervision in 2000. Musharraf immediately dismissed the revelation as "all lies and false statements."

Prospects for the Future

Nuclear proliferation remains a major concern of the international community. Numerous bodies exist within and alongside the UN system to monitor, certify, and investigate nuclear programs worldwide for energy-producing, peaceful purposes. Experts generally maintain that while turning a peaceful nuclear program into a weapons program is exceedingly difficult, it is feasible. With the black market trade in materials and weapon delivery systems alive and well, nuclear programs are no longer only the purview of wealthy states or of states at all. The rise of what William Langeweische has called "the nuclear poor" is especially worrisome. The ultimate fear is that these weapons will end up in the hands of suicidal, radical terrorist groups who seek to wreak havoc on the West. Pakistan is seen as a major frontline state for potential nuclear proliferation with its close ties to militants in the region and its connections with Middle Eastern Islamist groups.

The nuclear threat coming from Pakistan could take a more traditional trajectory as well, in the form of direct war with India (also a nuclear power) or retaliation for an attack on another Muslim ally such as Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are

watching their nemesis Iran closely as it comes close to developing nuclear weapons capacities. While the Saudis themselves are not thought to possess atomic bombs, they are considered by many to be covered under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella; thus Pakistan could be drawn into a conflict in that region as well. Add to this the concern that a nuclear conflagration in Central Asia could develop from a miscalculation in an area where ethnic and national tensions are high and weapons systems are not considered by all to be completely secure.

Pakistan is highly nationalistic about its nuclear weapons. They are a source of pride and security for the country in the region and internationally. Pakistan has resisted all international pressure to scale back its program, and has refused US and Western help in securing its arsenal. The weapons are thought to be held diffusely around the country in case of Western or Indian attack on installations; any US pressure to inspect their safety has only led to further diffusion. Fresh concerns were raised about the security of Pakistan's bombs in the wake of Musharraf's resignation in August 2008. This led former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Hassan Haqqani to state emphatically at an event in Washington the following day that this is absolutely not an issue.

External Players

India
Afghanistan
The United States
Bangladesh
Global Terror Networks
Other External Players



India

“Pakistan’s continuing paranoia about India just gets more dangerous and more dangerous the more power that India acquires.”

- Pakistan Expert Thomas Donnelly

It is impossible to understand Pakistan without addressing its relationship with India. The two nations began their history as part of the same entity – British colonial India. Modern Pakistan and India emerged as independent states within one day of each other in 1947, and their identities and histories have been intertwined, and often at odds, ever since. Pakistan’s relationship with India has over the years contained enormous tangible and opportunity costs for the Muslim nation. Tangible costs have come in the form of money, lives, and international goodwill lost, while opportunity costs have included resources and energy that could have been spent elsewhere and in other ways. Consequently, what would appear on the surface to be a foreign relations issue has intimately shaped the development of Pakistan’s own domestic institutions and dynamics.

Historical Background

Upon independence in 1947, Pakistan was carved out of Britain’s Indian colonies as a state for India’s Muslim populations to coexist alongside the Hindu-dominated independent state of India. Prior to this, the entire Indian subcontinent (modern day Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh)

had been ruled, first as a possession of the British East India Company, and then by Great Britain itself. In the late 1800’s, Britain consolidated its control over the Indian territories in response to the stirrings of independence movements among India’s educated and elite classes, comprised of both Hindu and Muslim populations. The Indian National Congress (INC) was formed in 1885 to advocate for self-rule, but tensions between Hindu and Muslim pro-independence factions led to the creation of a separate Muslim League in 1906. Muslims and Hindus united briefly in nonviolent protests against the British under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi throughout the 1920s; by the 1930s, the British had allowed a measure of electoral provincial autonomy for the colonies. This move only served to intensify INC-Muslim League rivalry over representation issues in the new local governments.

A Two Nation Movement quickly gathered momentum, resulting in the Lahore Resolution of 1940, which proposed a plan for partition upon future independence of the colony. After WWII, with Jawaharlal Nehru as leader of the Indian National Congress and Mohammed Ali Jinnah as leader of the Muslim League, the British set about establishing boundaries that would divide the two new nations. Opting for expediency, British colonial officials hastily drew up maps that trapped some Hindu populations in the proposed Muslim state, and vice versa. The semi-independent princely states throughout the continent, whose populations were often mixed, were generally given a choice of which nation to join upon partition in 1947. On August 14th

and August 15th, respectively, the independent nations of Pakistan and India were proclaimed.

Partition: Violence and Betrayal

The seemingly innocuous term partition belies the true nature of what transpired on the Indian subcontinent in 1947. First, there was violence and mass dislocation: with little preparation or lead time, communities that had existed for generations were abruptly uprooted and forced to flee for the new appropriate country as defined by their religion. Many were forced to abandon their land, possessions, and neighbors to whom they had cultural, ethnic, and familial ties. The photographs of the millions on the move are astounding, as families were packed onto trains amidst the confusion and ensuing violence. It is estimated that up to two million people died in what has been called the largest mass migration of the 20th Century.

In addition to people, resources had to be divided between the two independent and increasingly hostile nations; these included among other things, civil service jobs, water rights, industries, and army regiments. It was widely perceived that India received preferential treatment by British officials charged with the distribution of assets. The lion's share of India's nascent manufacturing capacity existed largely in territories allocated to the Hindu state, along with much of the ex-colony's civil service and military infrastructure. To make matters worse, Pakistan's territory was divided between West and East Pakistan, with over one thousand miles of Indian land between the two. What has been called a "territorial absurdity" resulted with grave consequences for the future of Pakistan and of Pakistani-Indian relations.

A developing popular sentiment held that Pakistan's potential was compromised from the beginning. To illustrate this point, following the partition, the only viable sector of the Muslim state's economy was agriculture, and primarily the cultivation of cotton and jute. However, the textile mills required to process these products were left in Indian hands or in regions that were separated from Pakistani farms by Indian territory. Commerce between Pakistan's two regions was nearly impossible, as was effective governance of multiple regions comprised of different languages and cultures. Pakistan's founding was riddled with challenges and many systems had to be created from scratch. While India used its advantageous

geography, relative homogeneity, common languages, and British-bequeathed institutions to begin modernizing upon independence, Pakistan's origins included traumatized refugee populations, a protracted battle over choosing a national language that ultimately only 10% of Pakistanis spoke, and a diffuse network of provincial feudal warlords reluctant to cede authority to a central government.

India bore little responsibility for these beginnings, but quickly became a symbol of the betrayal and widespread resentment that many Pakistanis felt. When Pakistan's founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah died within a year of the nation's birth, many Pakistanis found themselves adrift and confused about the identity of the new Muslim state. As a result, identity formation focused upon characterizations of what Pakistan was not, and what it stood in opposition to: India. Thus, from very early on, Pakistan identified itself as a sanctuary or homeland for India's Muslims, and anti-Indian sentiment has often been the default amidst larger identity confusion.

Kashmir

If Pakistanis were predisposed to believe that India was the enemy, they were summarily given a concrete justification for this position. Upon independence, British colonial officials issued a missive to the hundreds of princely states that had enjoyed defacto autonomy under the Crown: pick a country. Most did so without much intrigue, yet there were a few states where the decision was not an obvious one. Kashmir was one such princely state, where a Hindu Maharaja presided over a predominantly Muslim population. Moreover, its geographic location made Kashmir a prize as it contained valuable headwaters that controlled much of the water supply for the subcontinent, and was positioned strategically near two other giants of the region, China and Russia. In the face of pressure from both sides, the Maharaja equivocated, leaving the door open to militant groups to enter the fray in an effort to influence the outcome. Pakistani militants from tribes bordering Kashmir infiltrated the region to join with Kashmiri Muslims in a rebellion against the Hindu leader. This tipped the prince into India's camp; in a quid pro quo, he promised accession to India in return for help from India's military in expelling the militants and suppressing the revolt. So it came to be that in the first year of their existence as independent

nations, India and Pakistan went to war in Kashmir, in one of the first of many battles that would ensue over the next 60 years in the region.

In 1949, the newly formed United Nations intervened to establish a ceasefire line that split Kashmir in a distribution that favored India, with India receiving 2/3 and Pakistan 1/3; today China also claims a small piece of Kashmir. The UN decreed that it would ultimately be up to the people of Kashmir to decide their own fate at some point in the future through a plebiscite or referendum process. This has not yet come to pass, and several Indo-Pakistani wars and near misses later, the two nations are still at a stalemate. The central point of contention is what has become known as the Line of Control, or LOC, which divides the region. Formal wars were fought over the region again in 1965 and 1999, and many skirmishes have threatened to escalate into war, including those in 2002-2003, and most recently, in the summer of 2008. India and Pakistan have also repeatedly engaged in military endeavors over a glacial area in the Kashmir region; China and India have also fought over portions of Kashmir. India and Pakistan have attempted resolution of the issue numerous times, most notably in the 1972 Simla Accords. However, none to date has had any measure of success in resolving this conflict.

Because India and Pakistan are both nuclear powers, in the view of many experts, Kashmir is today one of the most dangerous places on earth. Conflict has generally followed a pattern: Pakistani militants and paramilitary agents infiltrate the region, join with Kashmiri Muslim insurgents, and together provoke conflict with Indian military forces stationed at the border. In 1988, Pakistani-Kashmiri militants formally launched a protracted insurgency not unlike the Palestinian Intifada that continues intermittently to this day. Indian and Pakistani estimates of lives lost through this campaign differ wildly, ranging from 20,000 to 60,000. Pakistani militants in the Kashmir region have been known to receive their training alongside other radical groups in the tribal areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Although Pakistan does often engage India in Kashmir through its proxies, the Pakistani army has also been known to engage directly, as seen in the failed 1999 Kargil invasion spearheaded by then Army Chief Pervez Musharraf. Throughout the bloodshed, which has claimed Pakistani,

Indian, and Kashmiri military and civilian lives, the status quo has not changed significantly and the LOC today corresponds closely to the 1949 ceasefire line.

Kashmir as a Flashpoint for Larger Tensions with India

After India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty in the 1960s, resolving many of the legitimate water concerns relating to the Kashmir dispute, tensions in the region were not diminished. Rather, the issue of Kashmir has come to take on a mythical quality in the narrative of Indo-Pakistani relations. Although the region is prized for its physical beauty, agricultural products such as almonds, and the potential for tourism, its value for both nations is largely symbolic. As many experts have noted, it is particularly concerning that generations of Pakistanis have come of age feeling that Pakistan's mission to be a homeland for South Asian Muslims cannot be fulfilled as long as Kashmir remains beyond its grasp.

Ironically, the Kashmiri people themselves have long expressed a desire to join neither nation, but rather to be granted independence. Kashmiris today are tired of the constant state of war, as are many Indians and Pakistanis. Yet, any attempt at compromise or negotiation over the region has produced violent backlash in nations, and especially in Pakistan, which views itself as the underdog in a larger epic struggle against its South Asian rival. Pakistan pursues hostility over the Kashmir region, or turns a blind eye to militants who do so on its behalf, at great international cost. Islamabad has consistently suffered more than New Delhi in terms of international opinion over the Kashmir conflict, and the issue contributes to the image of Pakistan as an aggressive and unstable country.

India's Role in the Further Partition of Pakistan and Loss of Influence in the Region

Although Kashmir is the primary flashpoint of conflict between India and Pakistan, there have been other significant fronts to this struggle. Most notably, Pakistanis commonly hold India responsible for the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Although tensions between the West and East wings of the country (divided by 1000 miles of Indian territory), had been brewing for decades, the strain reached a breaking point following the establishment of a

new Pakistan Constitution in 1970 and the first democratic elections in the country's history. West Pakistani leader Zulfikar Bhutto and East Pakistani leader Mujahir Rahman became engaged in a power struggle for the position of Prime Minister, leading Rahman to declare independence of the Eastern Bengali regions of the country. India was quick to enter the fray, supporting the creation of an independent Bangladesh. India even went as far as allowing a government in exile to be established in the nearby Indian city of Calcutta while war raged on between West and East Pakistani forces. The civil war in Pakistan evolved into the Third Indo-Pakistani War, resulting in a resounding defeat for West Pakistan. With the peace agreement and official declaration of independent Bangladesh, Pakistan summarily lost a full half of its territory and a significant portion of its population, only feeding Pakistani perception that India had yet again been complicit in the downfall of the Muslim state.

India and Pakistan also compete in the region for influence, especially in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's location has always granted it considerable strategic value with both India and Pakistan. Most importantly in the context of Indo-Pakistani tensions, an Indo-Afghani alliance would be tantamount to an encirclement of Pakistan by hostile neighbors with numerous potential battlefronts that Pakistan could not possibly defend at once. With the establishment of the Taliban's power in Afghanistan in 1996, Pakistan felt it had acquired an important Muslim ally on its borders and worked to support the Islamist regime until the events of September 11, 2001 caused it to switch allegiances. After the US-NATO invasion of Afghanistan and the ouster of the Taliban, both Pakistan and India competed to influence the reconstruction of the country. To date, Indian aid has outstripped Pakistani aid, and Pakistan is increasingly under fire for failing to contain the resurgence of Taliban forces in its tribal belt. It is thought that Pakistan will go to great lengths to prevent significant Indo-Afghani cooperation. Currently, Islamabad has a policy of preventing any commerce between the two nations from passing through Pakistani territory.

Finally, India and Pakistan compete mightily for influence with the United States, a major international player in the region. In short, US-Pakistani relations are complex and increasingly strained as Washington comes to question Islamabad's commitment to the Global War on Terror. In

contrast, US-Indian relations are increasingly close, driven largely by economic ties and by India's potential as a regional hedge against growing Chinese power. There is much talk in policy circles that perhaps the US has been backing the wrong horse in the region, and that it might make sense to engage India in US-led initiatives there. Needless to say, the thought of India receiving large amounts of US military aid panics Pakistanis, and the threat of that alone might induce Islamabad to be more aggressive in its cooperation with US anti-terror activities. The Bush Administration has also recently signed an agreement allowing the exchange of nuclear materials between the US and India for peaceful purposes, even though such an exchange is technically prohibited by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which India is not a signatory. That Pakistan has been offered no such deal with regard to their nuclear program is a source of considerable tension. (For a more thorough discussion of the Pakistan-US relationship see 'The United States' section in External Players.)

Purposes Served by Indo-Pakistani Conflict in Pakistan

The existence of India as a plausible and convenient nemesis for Pakistan has served a variety of purposes, many of them seen by outsiders and insiders alike as being perverse. On one hand, fear of India has been a powerful uniting force for the young, troubled country, and many believe that Pakistani politicians and dictators alike have turned to fear-mongering as an expedient way to consolidate power and justify poorly-conceived policies. As Pakistan has struggled with its identity over its history as a homeland for Muslims or as an Islamist society, anti-India sentiment has both distracted and bonded disparate groups. In general, many feel that this threat is helping to hold together the fragile confederation of ethnicities, ideologies, and cultures that make up modern Pakistan. Without it, a key rationale for many of Islamabad's policies is diminished.

On the other hand, Indo-Pakistani conflict has served to exacerbate other tensions threatening Pakistan's domestic stability. At its very root, Pakistan's existence as a state is predicated on the belief that Muslims and Hindus cannot live together. It is relatively simple to extend these origins into an epic struggle between cultures and civilizations; Kashmir provides a prime example of such a struggle. In

this way, many experts believe that the demonization of India has bolstered the growth of radical Islam as factions of Pakistani society espouse an extreme brand of Muslim superiority and destiny relative to non-Islamic cultures. If Pakistan's identity is largely upon the concept that it is "not India," or that it serves as a Muslim bulwark against Hindu oppression, then a logical expression of this negative identity is an extreme expression of Islam and/or nationalism. Both of these trends have been alternately encouraged, indulged, or ignored by Pakistan's leaders, according to political expediency; these are now the trends that threaten to tear the country apart and alienate it from the rest of the world.

Indo-Pakistani rivalry has served other masters in Pakistani society as well. As has been noted, the military in Pakistan holds a much vaulted and influential position in society. Many experts believe this has been cultivated primarily in the context of an Indian menace, both real and perceived. Having a presumed hostile neighbor across the border has been used to justify enormous military expenditures and imbue the armed forces with great influence on Pakistani politics and society. Numerous military dictatorships have come to power on promises to protect the Muslim state from Judeo-Christian-Hindu interference and aggression. Even during civilian administrations, the military in Pakistan wields power derived from its revered position as the force standing between Indian designs and the Pakistani people. It must be remembered that the Pakistani military not only benefits from defense spending, but is also a major agent in the Pakistani economy; it owns and manages much industry and real estate with little oversight or regulation. Without the Indian threat, the Pakistani military would undoubtedly be subject to more scrutiny, both in terms of its internal operations and its influence on other institutions.

The military is not the only body in Pakistan that has made use of the antagonism that exists with India. Numerous politicians, including Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Pervez Musharraf, have used tensions with India to justify the consolidation of power and to unite the Pakistani population behind them in the wake of criticism. The integrity of the democratic process, when this process exists at all, is often seen as another casualty of Indo-Pakistani conflict as voters are easily swayed by appeals to anti-Indian sentiment.

Yet another cost of the India threat involves nuclear weapons programs, endeavors in which both civilian and military leaders in Pakistan have been enthusiastically involved. Pakistan is a largely impoverished and illiterate country, but has spent billions to acquire and develop nuclear weapon capacities; it has lost untold billions more in aid and investment during periods in which the West has imposed sanctions on the country for its pursuit of nuclear proliferation. The expenses of keeping up with India in a nuclear arms race have been far more damaging to Pakistan than to India, which has a larger and healthier economy. Zulfikar Bhutto is reported to have said that his country would "eat grass" if that is what it took to finance bombs to match those of India. In a sense, this is what has happened as Pakistan's military and nuclear spending has driven it further down the development ladder.

This brings us to the opportunity costs of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Not only has it been terribly expensive in terms of cash, internal politics, and international goodwill, but Pakistan's obsession with India's threat has also been inordinately damaging in terms of what it has been distracted from doing throughout its history. All of the money spent on nuclear weapon development could have been spent on Pakistan's economic development or on its social and educational programs. Furthermore, in the absence of its nuclear competition with India, Pakistan could have received far more foreign aid and investment. As a final factor, Pakistan has spent the last 60 years training its military for a conventional land war with India, and now finds itself losing a guerilla war with Afghan militants for which it is ill-prepared to fight.

Psychologically, many believe all this energy could have been spent developing a more positive identity for the country, one that could have perhaps forestalled the resentful Islamic extremism that has developed amidst poverty and corruption. In addition, the opportunity costs of regional conflict are seen in the lack of regional cooperation. In an era where economic cooperation confers enormous benefits in terms of supply chains and trade zones, India and Pakistan are largely left isolated from each other, while at the same time, larger Asian regional bodies are compromised by their reciprocal animosity. India and Pakistan are both net energy importers and occupy tremendously important locations in supplies of oil moved

from the Middle East. Cooperation on port and pipeline construction would enhance energy security and at the same time India and Pakistan could both profit handsomely from moving energy supplies to Asia. Instead, Pakistan has built a Chinese-financed port in Gwadar, while India has built an Iranian-financed port on its shores; these compete, as do pipelines constructed on the subcontinent. Cynically, perhaps, the rest of the world stands to benefit competitively from the illogical commercial relationships that develop around their enmity, while both countries remain home to some of the most impoverished regions of the world.

Prospects for the Future

As of this writing in August 2008, the prospects for Indo-Pakistani rapprochement are not good. Kashmiri tensions are said to be at their highest point in five years after months of protests, riots, and strikes stemming from a disputed land grant involving a Hindu Shrine. Throughout the summer there have been incursions over the LOC resulting in military and civilian deaths and. Experts predict that global climate change resulting in the melting of Himalayan glacial regions will only create more disputed land over which the two countries will be motivated to fight.

Moreover, the resurgence of fighting in Afghanistan and in border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan has further eroded Indo-Pakistani relations as both transpose their struggle on the chaos of that war. India has been said to be using the Global War on Terror to seek international support for its struggle against Kashmiri militants, pointing out that Pakistani militants operating in Kashmir often train alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda networks in Pakistan's tribal belt, the same forces against whom US and NATO are fighting. In turn, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has reported that many Pakistanis view Indian consulates in Afghanistan as covers for anti-Pakistani Indian groups seeking to encircle the Muslim nation. In fact, The New York Times recently reported that the United States CIA is in possession of information tying the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to a July 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. If Indo-Pakistani tensions continue to be swept up in the confusion of the war in Afghanistan, most experts predict a continued deterioration of a nascent peace process that has been nurtured between Pakistan and India over the past few years.

Despite this, there are others who present a case for optimism going forward. The Brookings Institution recently hosted an event with Indian and Pakistani experts exploring the merits of a new approach for Kashmir introduced by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2008. Referring to the intractability of the dispute over the location of the LOC, Singh is reported to have said, "if borders cannot be changed, they can be made irrelevant." This pragmatic approach includes a new flexibility at the international border, including easement of travel restrictions between the two sides, government-facilitated travel through improved roads and bus lines, and increased commerce in the region. Supported by the Kashmiri business community as well as residents living near the LOC and proponents of the tourist industry, these measures are intended to diminish hostilities by improving communication over the LOC, essentially moving toward a policy of "soft borders" or "people to people" diplomacy. In addition to commercial and cultural interactions, this approach to peace in Kashmir would involve a great deal of general development and humanitarian aid to the region, as well as improved public administration of water and land issues and disaster relief. Supporters of the "irrelevancy of borders" approach point to breakthroughs made in disaster relief during the 2004 earthquake that caused significant damage in both Indian and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Multiple points along the LOC were opened and the precedent was set for meaningful cooperation.

Beyond Kashmir, there are experts who see positive signs for a general warming of relations between India and Pakistan. The toll of their mutual animosity is becoming increasingly apparent as much of the developing world moves past them on a variety of indicators. These lost opportunities are coming in to view as the international community tires of the conflict and becomes more willing to invest in confidence building measures (CBMs) between the two rivals. Increasingly it seems that in order to prove to the US and the West that it is serious about efforts to defeat militants, Pakistan will need to show more diligence in the wars in the tribal belt and in Afghanistan; the financial rewards at stake will undoubtedly factor into the course of action that is taken. The calculus suggests that the Pakistani army cannot increase these efforts while remaining committed to the defeat of India in Kashmir and elsewhere.

Nuclear weapons are always a key consideration when experts take stock of the prospects for Indo-Pakistani relations. Some believe the fact that both countries possess nuclear capabilities acts as a deterrent to conflict and thus a promoter of peace. Others worry that the lack of sophisticated early warning systems in both countries and the often unclear chain of control of the weapons create conditions ripe for miscalculation – it is entirely possible, in this view, that India and Pakistan could “blunder” their way into nuclear war.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to Indo-Pakistani peace harkens back to the purpose the rivalry has served over the past 60 years. An entire industrial military-intelligence-nuclear complex exists in both countries based on this mutual antagonism. It employs many hardliners, fattens the wallets of others, and is even used by leaders against their own civilians – based primarily on the threat of full-scale war between the South Asian rivals. Present and future leaders of Pakistan will likely carefully weigh the prudence of warming relations with their rival on the subcontinent.

Ironically, despite the criticism associated with Pervez Musharraf’s domestic position in Pakistan, many believe that if he had been willing to take the risk, he had the best chance in a generation of pursuing peace. Musharraf has solid army credentials, some of them earned fighting India in Kashmir during the Kargil campaign of 1999, and would thus not have been vulnerable to criticism of being “soft” on India in the way a civilian leader might have been. Manmohan Singh, the current prime minister of India, is seen as occupying a less favorable position on this point – hailing from the India National Congress Party (INC), he is vulnerable to criticism from his opposition in the more nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a party with a more assertive history of Kashmiri defense.

However, a durable peace between the two nations has, in some ways, never been completely up to its leaders. Numerous proxy armies and militias with their own agendas and leaders are vested in Indo-Pakistani hostility in Kashmir and elsewhere. In this way, non-state actors have the potential to act as spoilers in the same way they frustrate peace efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. A redirection of India policy would also require a comprehensive redesign of the training of conventional military forces in Pakistan, where

officers currently undergo intense propagandistic anti-Indian indoctrination programs.

Similarly, other regional and international powers would need to be supportive of such rapprochement. India and Pakistan have served as pawns in larger chess games before, most notably in their Cold War loyalties (Pakistan to the US; India as a “non-aligned” ally of the USSR). China is currently an ally of Pakistan and a rival of India; the US tends to court both rivals in the form of a security relationship with Pakistan and a booming economic relationship with India. Japan’s and Russia’s needs are often mixed. Realism dictates that all these players, and more, would want a seat at any peace table, with their own interests in the perpetuation of conflict considered. Some have wryly pointed out that both countries have only themselves to blame for the international intrigue that swirls around them. Especially Pakistan, who has made it a policy to seek outside protectors on the rationale that it is perpetually threatened by larger, wealthier, better-armed India. Pakistan may not be able to expect its protectors to abandon their interests in the conflict on the same timetable.

Finally, beyond the security, economic, legal, ethnic, and political faces of Indo-Pakistani peace in Kashmir and beyond, there lies the often seemingly impenetrable barrier of psychology. This is a fundamental question of trust, between leaders and their constituencies, as well as between the leaders of the two countries. On this, the cultural and historical record is not confidence-inspiring. It seems that whenever India or Pakistan face threats, they see each other’s hands behind the menace.

What many feel is needed is the development of a regional identity to soften nationalism; a South Asian Marshall Plan that would invigorate economic cooperation and the building of regional alliances – and provide something more compelling than the benefits of hating each other. Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations has remarked that, “nothing could transform Pakistan’s long-term potential for stability, wealth, and democratic rule more than normalization of its relations with India.” From economic linkages to India’s “massive growth engine,” to cultural and educational exchanges that would benefit Pakistan’s dangerous demographic youth bulge, Pakistan’s future may ultimately lie in resuming the ties that its own creation in 1947 severed.



Afghanistan

History

Afghanistan's and Pakistan's histories and ethnicities are closely intertwined. Throughout the 1800s and early 1900s, Afghanistan was the center of what came to be known as "The Great Game," in which Britain and Russia vied for control of the kingdom while its independence waxed and waned. In 1863, the Durand Line was drawn, separating British India (including what would ultimately become Pakistan) and Afghanistan. As was the case with many colonial boundaries, this demarcation was made with little regard for the ethnic composition of the region. Ethnic Pashtuns dominated the area on both sides of the Durand line and chose to ignore the international boundary and preserve the cultural and functional unity of their community. This powerful Pashtun community ultimately found itself divided into different nations upon Afghanistan's independence in 1919 and the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 and has caused generations of conflict in the region since.

In the 1950s, tensions developed between the new state of Pakistan and the kingdom of Afghanistan, largely over possession of Pashtun areas. Afghanistan initiated an alliance with the Soviet Union and the monarchy fell prey to a myriad of internal tensions that culminated in a series of coups in the 1970s. In 1978, Communist leaders in Afghanistan ran afoul of religious clerics and the government began to falter, leading the Soviet Union to invade and occupy the country in 1979 in order to prop up the Communist regime. When the USSR took Kabul

early in the war, Pakistan found itself in the center of the world stage as the Cold War darling of the US and West and the last best hope for the liberation of its erstwhile rival, Afghanistan. General Zia ul-Haq saw an opening to establish a Muslim ally on Pakistan's borders, subvert cooperation between India and Afghanistan, and reap large sums of American aid in the process.

Charlie Wilson's War and the Failure of Nation-Building in Afghanistan

US and Western covert aid poured into Pakistan. The Zia government was charged with purchasing Soviet-discarded weapons on the international arms market and funneling them to Muslim insurgents fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. With the help of Israel, Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia, the Pakistani intelligence services and conventional military used American funds to train and arm the Mujahideen, or Islamic Freedom Fighters (including Saudi exile Osama Bin Laden) in their struggle against the Soviets. Billions of dollars later, the Soviets were defeated and pulled out under a UN-facilitated withdrawal in 1989 as the USSR itself was disintegrating.

The Mujahideen, emboldened by their victory and still armed with Western weapons, continued their struggle against domestic Communist factions within Afghanistan, even as US aid dried up. In 1990s, the Taliban, a radical Pashtun Islamist faction began making gains throughout the country. The Taliban was supported by successive Pakistani administrations. In 1996, the Taliban took Kabul

and established an extremist Islamic state in Afghanistan with Pakistan's blessing. Pakistan recognized the new government and supported Taliban forces in their struggle to take control of the rest of the country from the Northern Alliance. Pashtun areas on either side of the Afghan-Pakistani border continued to host militant training camps to support Islamist groups; by 1999, the Taliban controlled 90% of Afghan territory, and with its Pakistani allies, much of the semi-autonomous border regions as well. Jihadists from throughout the Muslim world gravitated to the region. Though their presence became alarming to the West following the al Qaeda bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the USS Cole in Yemen, no major efforts were undertaken to counter their influence in the region. Meanwhile, Pakistan alternately supported and turned a blind eye to the build-up of Islamist groups in the border region, allowing the development of what William Dalrymple has called a "jihadist playground" in the tribal areas and in Kashmir. Following Pervez Musharraf's coup in 1999, Pakistan was largely cut off from the West by multiple layers of sanctions and was considered an international pariah worthy of little engagement.

Everything changed on September 11, 2001 when it was revealed that al Qaeda terrorist networks operating in and around Afghanistan were responsible for the attacks on Washington and New York. In a replay of 1979, Pakistan was again the overnight darling of the West against enemies in neighboring Afghanistan. Musharraf publicly renounced his loyalty to the Taliban regime, and Pakistan became a critical ally of the US and NATO as they invaded Afghanistan, ousted the Taliban, and sought the capture of Osama Bin Laden (their former Mujahideen ally).

But things are rarely as simple as they seem. While Musharraf's about-face made inordinate sense in terms of the US aid that cash-strapped Pakistan would receive, changing the loyalty of the Pakistani people would prove to be much more difficult. This was particularly true in the Pashtun regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Area and the Northwest Frontier Province, where nation-state loyalties have long been secondary to ethnic allegiances. This is also true with respect to intelligence and military personnel, who had spent entire careers aiding the same militants now designated as Pakistan's enemies.

Pakistan's Relations with Post-Taliban Afghanistan

From 2001 to 2008, the story has not been as much about relations between Afghan President Hamid Karzai (installed upon the US-NATO defeat of the Taliban in 2001) and Pakistani President Musharraf as it has been about what is now Ground Zero in the Global War on Terror – the Pashtun boundary regions between the two countries where Taliban and al Qaeda militants have fled and are now regrouping. Lines have become blurred between Pakistani and Afghan Taliban fighters; the tribal areas on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line are becoming increasingly radicalized and outside the control of the government of Pakistan. As Senator Joe Biden wrote in March of 2008, "The border remains a freeway of fundamentalism: the Taliban and Al Qaeda find sanctuary in Pakistan, while Pakistani suicide bombers wreak havoc in Afghanistan." All this occurs along the historic trajectory of a movement toward an independent "Pashtunistan" between the two countries. In the eyes of many experts it is impossible to understand Afghan-Pakistani relations without considering this increasingly troublesome reality.

As the chaos of the war in Afghanistan engulfs these border regions, civilian populations have become targets of both Taliban violence and largesse. As the US-NATO reputation among these groups continues to sour amidst the protracted conflict, many civilians are turning to radical groups to meet their most basic needs. The civilian populations of FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province have been subjected to generations of warfare, crushing poverty, and instability. Education has largely been nonexistent and many are illiterate and at the whim of charismatic radical leaders. In addition to war-related violence, crime and drug trafficking are soaring. Christian Science Monitor reporter David Montero's report for PBS on the Swat Valley describes Taliban leader Fazlullah's incredible sway over the traumatized civilian population, employing restless youth and using Sharia law to fill gaps in the crime-ridden judicial system. Radical militants often receive aid from civilian populations in attacking supply convoys from Pakistan to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass, just as they did during the US-financed war against the Soviets in the 1980s.

This is an enormous problem for Pakistan; US and NATO troops, once victorious in Afghanistan, are coming under

increasing attack by resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda forces who have been allowed to regroup on Pakistani soil. The situation worsens as foreign jihadists are drawn to the area and are even joined by Pakistani citizens, who have themselves been educated in radical madaris (See the 'Education System' section in Internal Players for more information on these schools). In order to keep lucrative American aid (estimated to be over \$12 billion in overt and covert funds), Pakistan must be seen as aggressively combating the "Talibanization" of their tribal belt.

However, experts report that anti-American sentiment is on the rise in the region, largely due to the protracted war that has claimed civilian lives in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Musharraf walked a fine line, appeasing Islamist groups in his own country who are sympathetic with Taliban militants, while simultaneously pursuing a war against these militants (many of whom enjoy protection and support from his own intelligence agencies). Over one-quarter of the Pakistani armed forces are ethnic Pashtuns, and many believe they are subject to conflicted loyalties when asked to mount attacks on their brethren. It is important to remember that, as far as much of the Pakistani army is concerned, India was supposed to be the enemy. For a multitude of reasons, the Pakistani military is having limited success in addressing the threat posed by militants in the tribal belt to US-NATO forces; this is despite having nearly 200,000 troops in the tribal area, who receive supplemental support from the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps. A Taliban fighter interviewed by Newsweek in the fall of 2007 perhaps said it best when he said, "Pakistan is like your shoulder that supports your RPG... Thank God Pakistan is not against us."

In the past several years, reports showed that radical groups in the tribal belt turned their attention to Pakistan itself in an effort to force Musharraf's hand. There have been numerous instances of suicide bombings and violence in Pakistan proper (outside the tribal areas and into the Pakistani interior), including the attack that claimed the life of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and multiple attempts on Musharraf's life. These attacks are thought by many to be coordinated by tribal area leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud; Musharraf, however, had little success ferreting out the perpetrators amidst the complex web of clan and ethnic power structures in the mountainous region. Instead, he

employed a highly controversial strategy of signing peace accords with militant leaders in the hinterlands, entering into quid pro quo deals that promised the cessation of Pakistani military attacks against tribal radical strongholds in return for the cessation of attacks by these radicals inside Pakistan, particularly in urban areas such as Karachi and Islamabad.

Pakistan's Western allies, most notably the United States, reacted very negatively to these accords. They cite the potential that US-NATO efforts in the region would be undercut and pointed out that the radical militants had never unconditionally honored such agreements before. These deals are the primary cause of Western suspicion that Pakistan is actually using US aid in ways that endanger US troops and undermine US objectives in the region. Moreover, they do not seem to be very effective and attacks on Pakistani targets continue. The region is generally considered to be lawless in many respects, with multiple warlords competing and often terrorizing the civilian populations. Even if these agreements are made in good faith, there is no guarantee that tribal leaders can enforce them.

In response to this and other indications that Pakistan is not sufficiently addressing the sanctuary provided for militias in the border regions, the US has proposed unilateral American strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the tribal belt. This proposal has been met with virulent opposition among Pakistanis who see such military maneuvers as a violation of their sovereignty. Moreover, there is little civilian support for US infiltration of the disputed Pashtun areas; many worry that US aggression would only drive Pakistani and Afghan civilians into the arms of the militants. Further, the difficulty of such an endeavor is immense in a hostile mountainous region. A recent Atlantic Magazine survey of foreign policy experts revealed little agreement as to whether the US should do what the Pakistanis either will not, or cannot do, and any believe that the US "has neither the will nor capability" for such an offensive. Other, less controversial options on the table include US-sponsored training of Pakistani military and Frontier Corpsmen in the area. Former Director of CIA Counterterrorism Robert L. Grenier has said that \$75 million was planned for this effort in 2008, a figure that could reach \$400 million in the next few years. Grenier

speaks for many in saying that the new Pakistani Army Chief Kayani should proceed with this cautiously, as a “high profile US presence in FATA would be the kiss of death” for the effort.



The United States

Pakistan has a complex and often contradictory relationship with the United States. To understand it, we must consider the unique history of the two countries' interactions in the last several decades, beginning in the Cold War era and extending to the present-day Global War on Terror. From 1954 to the present day, Pakistani expert and Former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani has estimated that Pakistan has received \$22 billion in direct US aid, and likely more in covert aid and line items in other foreign policy agenda budgets. During this period, US aid has ebbed and flowed, and even ceased when Pakistan was subject to international sanctions. Pakistan has therefore alternately assumed the role of close American ally and vilified pariah. US-Pakistani relations are generally viewed as having progressed through four distinct stages, with common themes underlying the larger trajectory.

Common Patterns in US-Pakistani Relations

In the view of multiple experts from across the international political spectrum, one of the most important dynamics over the past half century influencing Pakistan's relationship with the United States has been the US view that Pakistan is "a means to an end, not so important in and of itself, but as a way to get other things done," in the words of Council of Foreign Relations expert Daniel Markey. The US has never had what could be characterized as a coherent Pakistan policy. Instead, the US has used the strategically-located Central Asian country to facilitate US foreign policy

agendas regarding other nations and entities in the region. Proxy is a word commonly used to describe the way in which Pakistan has been, and continues to be, engaged by the US: as a proxy against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and again against the Taliban in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. Today, Pakistan continues to serve as a proxy for fighting the larger myriad Mujahideen forces of global terror networks coalescing along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Such a proxy policy creates what many experts have called a "juggling act" or a "love-hate relationship" between Pakistan and its powerful and fickle patron. This is especially true because the Pakistanis generally approach the relationship in similarly nation-centric terms. Pakistan can also be said to be using the US to promote its interests. Expert Ahmed Rashid outlined these interests as the following: to obtain badly needed foreign financial assistance, to check India's power in the region, to promote the Muslim Kashmiri cause, to protect and develop its nuclear weapon program, and to promote a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. Until the US-Pakistani alliance is grounded in larger shared visions, values, and ideologies, it is generally accepted that it will contain dangerous fault lines. Both countries pursue limited aims with regard to their largely opportunistic interactions, with each doing only enough to satisfy the other's most basic requirements. Most experts point out that what is missing is a durable commitment to the promotion of their reciprocal welfare or common interests, regionally and internationally.

Another common theme in US-Pakistani relations historically is the manner in which they pivot around individuals and personalities, rather than institutions or overarching policy. Numerous experts have pointed out that the US has a tendency to cultivate individual Pakistani leaders, rather than building trust and connections with Pakistani institutions or even Pakistani people. This led to the creation of a ‘Zia policy’ and a ‘Bhutto policy’, and most significantly, a ‘Musharraf’ policy. These leaders came to be seen as indispensable to US strategic aims in the region, and for that reason have generally been forgiven a multitude of domestic and foreign policy sins by American administrations. It is a widely held view that these Pakistani leaders have been for the most part dictators, or at least demagogues, and this compromises US positions on democracy and human rights around the world. Put simply, Pakistan’s leaders have been allowed to get away with things the Americans would not tolerate from other, less strategic allies. In the process, they have been paid handsomely by the US, and propped up by American aid when their own incompetence, corruption, or unpopularity might otherwise have spelled their natural demise.

As a result, it is not surprising that American aid to Pakistan in the Cold War and Global War on Terror has often bred anti-Americanism in the region. A vicious cycle has developed: Pakistan’s leaders become dependent upon American aid for ancillary aims (largely in neighboring Afghanistan); this alliance and aid lead the Pakistani people to perceive their leaders as being puppets of the Americans; and subsequently, their popularity plummets domestically, causing them to need more American aid in order to stay in power. This cycle repeats and often spins out of control, as extremist opponents to the status quo in Pakistan, such as Islamic militants, punish their own leaders for their US connections. This in turn disrupts the very stability the US sought when providing the aid. Dr. Mooed Pirzada, writing for the *Khaleej Times*, wrote of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination that she died “fighting her way to power through the maze of contradictions that is American foreign policy” in a “dangerous tango” whereby Pakistani leaders are forced to “advance American interests often against their own.”

Generally, it is widely acknowledged that the US has difficulty operating in the gray areas of foreign policy

and appreciating the local, ethnic, and tribal loyalties and contradictions that exist on the ground in ally or enemy countries. The US tends instead to speak in terms of good and evil, and to react with similar bipolarity; Pakistan is seen as a prime example of this. Pakistan has bounced on and off State Department watch lists for nuclear proliferation and sponsorship of terrorism, largely depending on its usefulness to American foreign policy aims at the time. This does not breed great confidence in the US-Pakistan relationship among Pakistani leaders or people. The result is that Pakistan has tended, since it was summarily dropped and sanctioned by the US after the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989, to engage in what many see as justified double-dealing, keeping one foot in the US camp and one foot in the camp of other powers in the region. The other powers are often groups whom the US is paying Pakistani forces to fight.

Phase I: US-Pakistani Relations during the Cold War

Beginning in the 1950s as the US became concerned about Communist influence in Central Asia, it began to support Pakistan as a Cold War ally in the region. Having always viewed Islam as inimical to atheist Communism, the US saw Pakistan (along with its Muslim allies and sponsors in Saudi Arabia) as an important counterbalance to the rising influence of the USSR in neighboring India and Afghanistan. As is now well documented, this aid increased exponentially upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. With Israeli, Saudi, and Egyptian help, US covert funds were channeled through the CIA to the Pakistani military and Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), who then used the money to arm and train Islamic freedom fighters or Mujahideen in Afghanistan who were fighting the Soviet military occupation. Over the ten-year period culminating in the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan (and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union itself), it is estimated that the US routed at least \$2 billion through the ISI for this purpose.

US policy at the time was very narrowly focused: the ISI was to use whatever means necessary, and fund whoever was willing to do the fighting, regardless of their own radical proclivities (of which the Mujahideen had many). A covert operation by design, Americans worked to disassociate

themselves from arms transfers and training. With an unelected Islamic ideologue in charge of the army and the country, Pakistan ran the show without obstructions. In the process, Pakistan reaped significant rewards in the form of cash and military assistance; this would swell the importance and dominance of the army and intelligence services in Pakistan itself, fatten the coffers of many Pakistani generals, and the fund enhanced conventional and nuclear arsenals aimed at India.

When the Soviets withdrew at the end of the decade, the region was in shambles. Despite this, the US summarily departed, having achieved its Cold War aims. This left sophisticated weaponry in the hands of the Mujahideen, but cut off aid that could have been used for reconstruction.

Phase II: “The Historic Betrayal”

There were those in the United States foreign policy establishment who saw the dangers inherent in abruptly abandoning Pakistan and Afghanistan, but they were not to prevail. The crisis was over and the Americans turned their attention elsewhere, leaving a hotbed of destruction, arms, drugs, refugees, and disaffected Mujahideen and Afghan civilians in their wake. The Saudis, however, continued their support, seeing the potential for former Mujahideen becoming jihadists for a wider global Islamic insurgency. Pakistani and Afghan former freedom fighters found sanctuary and support in the religious madrasa schools springing up throughout the region, many of them inside Pakistan. Afghanistan descended into a violent civil war between warlords and Islamic militants. Pakistan's economy, once flush with US aid, struggled along as civilian rule returned to the country after Zia's death. Hoping to lure back American funds by maintaining civilian and auspiciously democratic rule, Pakistan was soundly disappointed.

By most accounts, the US was aware of Pakistan's growing nuclear aspirations since Benazir Bhutto's father had announced the country's intentions to build an “Islamic Bomb” in the 1970s. American policymakers had long turned a blind eye to the Pakistani program, run under the auspices of the state-funded A. Q. Kahn operation. Once Pakistan was not essential in the Afghanistan front, the Pakistanis almost immediately came under fire for their nuclear ambitions. The US Pressler Amendment mandating

sanctions for any country engaged in the purchase or development of nuclear fissile material was invoked, and Pakistan was not only cut off from US funds, but was faced with punitive sanctions. This halted military assistance in addition to critical education and social welfare aid. Pakistan became isolated from Western influence and support at the same time that Islamic militants (most of them alumni of the Afghanistan war) were gaining strength in the region and winning the loyalties of the long-suffering civilian populations in Afghanistan's and in Pakistan's tribal areas.

A brief respite occurred in 1997-1998 and some American aid programs resumed, only to be shut down again upon Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998. Both India and Pakistan conducted test explosions of their new atomic weapons in May 1998 and both suffered immediate international sanctions for their activities. However, these sanctions were much more devastating to Pakistan's economy than India's more modern, dynamic economy. Pakistan thus reached out to the Muslim Middle East for assistance and found like-minded anti-American allies. Another brief respite occurred when sanctions were softened in late 1998, but these were reintroduced in 1999 upon Musharraf's coup, which took down Pakistan's civilian government and reinstated military rule.

Meanwhile, radical ex-Mujahideen in Afghanistan now known as the Taliban were making gains in that country's civil war, especially in the semi-autonomous Pashtun areas on either side of the Pakistani-Afghanistan border. From there, they spread north to take Kandahar in 1994 and Kabul in 1996, and were recognized by Pakistan's Bhutto Administration (as well as Saudi Arabia and the UAE) as the official government of Afghanistan. Pakistan provided significant logistical and military assistance to the Taliban, and regularly celebrated them as allies in establishing an Islamic bulwark in Central Asia. The ISI was particularly intimately involved with the Taliban regime, even as it came under the influence of al Qaeda militants such as Osama Bin Laden. Numerous UN and US resolutions were passed seeking to contain Pakistan's support for the Taliban itself, and for ISI-led Islamic militants within Pakistan that were providing material and logistical aid to the Taliban regime. Despite this pressure, Pakistan remained firmly

in the Taliban camp, to the point of threatening to kill UN monitors if they entered the border areas.

Thus, during the period 1999-2001, Pakistan found itself buried under three layers of international sanctions: for its nuclear weapons program, for its suspension of democracy, and for its support of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Moreover, a critical check and balance on its military had been removed. The two previous generations of military leadership, first the British and then the Americans, had exerted considerable influence on the Pakistani military establishment through training and military education exchanges. With the isolation of the 1990s, a new generation of young military leaders came of age with no Western training or values. Instead their education consisted of extreme anti-Indian and anti-American rhetoric, a curriculum that would come to haunt US-Pakistani relations in the future. In the absence of foreign assistance like that offered during the Cold War years, the Pakistani economy was on the verge of bankruptcy, and on the eve of September 11, 2001, Pakistan was an impoverished, increasingly radical and isolated country situated on the borders of an Islamist country harboring numerous global terrorist networks.

Phase III: Post 9-11 and The US-NATO Invasion of Afghanistan

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the Pakistani ISI chief and other diplomats were in Washington attempting to negotiate with US policy makers about the resumption of aid. The main sticking point: Pakistani support for the Taliban regime. As the attacks occurred, some reports hold that the Pakistani contingent defended the Taliban and sought a way around these US concerns.

Post-9/11 saw a sharp shift in negotiations between Pakistani and US officials. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid describes the pre and post-9/11 positions in his recent book *Descent Into Chaos*. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage issued a non-negotiable list of demands from the United States:

- Allow US and Coalition flights over Pakistani airspace and provide landing rights for all US aircraft;
- Give the United States access to naval bases, airports, and borders for the operations against al Qaeda;

- Provide immediate intelligence sharing and cooperation;
- Stop al Qaeda operatives on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and intercept all arms shipments through Pakistan while ending all logistical support for bin Laden;
- Cut all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani fighters from joining the Taliban;
- Publicly condemn the terrorist acts; and
- End support for the Taliban, breaking diplomatic relations with them.

Musharraf had his own list:

- Remove all US sanctions;
- Forgive \$3 billion Pakistani debt to the US;
- Resume shipments of military supplies;
- Immediately disburse loans to Pakistan from the US and World Bank.

The die was cast and Musharraf renounced his loyalty to the Taliban; aid commenced immediately. Pakistan was once again America's best friend in Central Asia, charged with facilitating the US-NATO invasion of neighboring Afghanistan, rooting out Taliban sympathizers in Pashtun border areas, and unquestioningly supporting America in the larger Global War on Terror. This was a tall order for an unelected leader under the best of circumstances, but Musharraf was further compromised by his association with the military and Pakistani intelligence services, who were closely connected with the Taliban. As Rashid reported, this was obvious in Musharraf's speech to the Pakistani people after the deal with the US that marked the nation's dramatic U-turn in foreign policy. The arrangement was vital to Pakistan's interests, Musharraf justified. If Pakistan did not comply, they would be labeled a terrorist state, their nuclear capacities could potentially be attacked, and the US would turn to rival India instead. Rashid notes, "At no point in his speech did Musharraf condemn the Taliban or al Qaeda or blame them for the 9/11 attacks – a clear refusal to accede to one of Washington's demands."

Musharraf was anointed, and the attendant American aid likely saved his regime and his country. First came emergency aid for Pakistan's struggling economy, then massive inflows of military assistance and hardware, debt

restructuring, and lucrative contracts for use of Pakistani bases and services. From 2002-2007 it is estimated that Pakistan received between \$10 and \$12 billion in US aid in various forms. Some put the figure billions above when covert aid is factored in. This is on top of the \$22 billion that was spent in Afghanistan to defeat Taliban and al Qaeda forces, many of whom continued to be supported by Pakistan's ISI.

As in 1979, US-Pakistani relations were a matter of convenience. All sanctions were removed and no more mention made of nukes or democracy. The Bush Administration has subsequently been subject to harsh scrutiny from across the American political spectrum for their failure to, in Husain Haqqani's words, "ask the right questions" before dealing with Musharraf. It has been noted that before the 2000 election, George W. Bush could not name the leader of Pakistan. By 2001, they were often derisively lumped together in the international press as "Busharraf."

The investment paid off, initially. The Taliban was defeated in the course of several months. Coalition forces took Kabul and brought exiled leader (and Musharraf foe) Hamid Karzai in as the leader of a free Afghanistan. A major victory was declared in the Global War on Terror, attributed in large part to Pakistani support. Consolidating this victory was to prove elusive though, as Taliban and al Qaeda forces quickly regrouped in Pakistani territory to mount a counter-offensive.

Phase IV: The Surrender of the Taliban in Afghanistan

As the surrender of the Taliban was being negotiated and carried out in 2002-2003, Pakistan continued to receive generous American support that was to be used to strengthen borders with Afghanistan and prevent the escape of militant forces. The problem was widely reported and vividly captured in Rashid's book and elsewhere: this is not what Pakistani military and ISI forces did with the aid. Instead, there was wide-scale facilitation of such militants' escapes by the thousands, in Pakistani aircraft and by foot, camel, and car through the mountainous passes of the border region. There are even reports of Pakistani forces providing artillery cover for fleeing Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and soldiers as they entered the FATA, Northwest

Province and Balochistan areas inside Pakistan. The ISI set up medical centers in Pakistan to treat wounded Taliban soldiers and militants were welcomed back to madrassa schools and communities throughout the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province.

This happened with American knowledge and was not surprising at the time. US CENTCOM (US Central Command) had long had a faulty sense of the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, and between Afghan and Pakistani Islamist militants. The US was most interested in al Qaeda leaders, and particularly in Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Omar and their henchmen. As long as Pakistan promised to provide intelligence about their potential sanctuaries and to occasionally go after them, US aid and goodwill continued to flow to Pakistan, and the rest was ignored. The US was also making false assumptions about how favorably Pakistan viewed the new Karzai government in Afghanistan, assuming Musharraf and Karzai saw themselves as allies in the region.

In reality, Musharraf (and the military and ISI) worried from the beginning that India would make inroads with the new Afghan government, freezing Pakistan out and potentially jeopardizing Pakistan's security. Pakistan had invested a great deal in the Taliban as a friendly government in Afghanistan and they were loath to capitulate to an uncertain alliance. The Pakistanis also lacked faith in the US to remain and support Karzai's regime. It therefore made sense to Musharraf and his allies to keep ties with Taliban contingents in case they returned to power once the crisis was over and Western powers were gone. Finally, experts agree that the US underestimated the power of tribal, sectarian, and ethnic ties among Pashtuns on both sides of the border. Many Americans are incredulous that no Afghan or Pakistani tribes cashed in on the bounty placed on the heads of Taliban leaders by the US. As Haqqani has said in multiple forums, "\$25 million to \$50 million reward does not mean anything to the tribal people; tribal loyalty does." Pashtun solidarity continued to prevail, and defeated Afghan militants melded with Pakistani border residents and militants in the sanctuary of Pakistan's mountainous regions. It is ironic that the United States both appreciated and manipulated this tribal loyalty to support its covert operations in Afghanistan in the war against the

Soviets. Many wonder why the US thought these strong bonds would be diminished.

The problem was that the Pakistani ISI and military were not only providing sanctuary to Taliban and al Qaeda leaders following the US-NATO victory in Afghanistan; it turns out they were also providing significant support as these militant forces regrouped along the tribal and border regions. Training camps were allowed to spring up on Pakistani soil throughout the area and some even believe that military hardware provided by the US was diverted to militant groups who were now preparing for a counter-offensive against US –NATO troops in Afghanistan. A number of justifications were presented for this logistical and material aid that facilitated the resurgence of the Taliban in Pakistani territory. The Pakistani government from 2003-2005 generally alternated between denying knowledge of the camps, insisting that the Pakistani government could not control them, and justifying their existence because of the presence of Kashmiri militants training alongside other Mujahideen.

The exact nature and extent of direct support provided to Taliban and al Qaeda forces by Pakistan during this time is not widely known or agreed upon. This has been difficult to track because of the circuitous and complex networks of loyalty and patronage among the ISI, the Pakistani military, local tribes and warlords, and militant forces. But, as Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institution Saban Center for Middle Eastern Policy has pointed out, what can be definitively said is that Pakistan has committed sins of “omission,” if not “commission,” as it has failed to address the build-up of militants within its borders. The lackluster effort on the part of Pakistani military, intelligence, and Frontier Corps to root out militant forces, even as they were accepting large amounts of international aid for that very purpose, is to many an equally dangerous form of state sponsorship of terrorism.

Pakistan’s passivity in countering the build-up of terrorist networks in FATA, the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan is often chalked up to either ineptitude or a manifestation of Pakistani Pashtun soldiers’ loyalty to Pashtun militants. Hence, the solution by the US government has been to direct even more funding to build up Pakistani counterterrorism capacity in these areas. Many experts have observed another perverse cycle: the less

success Pakistani forces have, the more US aid they receive. This occurs as the revitalized Taliban and al Qaeda forces are now making significant incursions from their sanctuary and training in Pakistan back into Afghanistan, destabilizing the new US-backed Karzai Administration, and killing US and NATO troops in numbers dwarfing those associated with the original invasion.

The US Bind

Experts describe the US as being in an impossible situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan today, ostensibly funding both sides of a major battlefield of the Global War on Terror. US aid and lives continue to prop up the Coalition effort to defeat and drive the ever-strengthening Taliban back out of Afghanistan. Concurrently, the US provides massive amounts of aid to the Musharraf Administration to garner Pakistani support in this endeavor, yet many of these resources end up diverted to the Taliban. Other funds have simply disappeared. Afghanistan and Pakistan are both at risk for state failure as their border regions become more unmanageable and terrorist activity spreads to the interior cities. Civilians in both countries are increasingly turning to powerful radical groups and warlords to meet basic needs. As the conflict rages on with no end in sight, these civilian populations increasingly blame the US for the protracted violence.

The results of a poll conducted in May 2008 by the Pakistan Institute for Public Opinion and Terror Free Tomorrow are chilling. Sixty percent of Pakistanis responded that the US war on terror “seeks to threaten the Muslim world.” One-third of those polled held positive views of al Qaeda – this was double the percentage of people who held positive views of the United States. A full 44% felt the US provided the greatest threat to safety in the region (archrival India was mentioned only by 14%), while less than 10% saw al Qaeda as a threat. It has become apparent to many US foreign policy analysts that current US-Pakistani relations are a bad bargain for America, and that the risks are increasingly outweighing the benefits.

There are those who believe that America’s bind was both predicted and, quite possibly deserved; and there were many who issued warnings of this exact scenario developing over the last decade.

The Balance Sheet

It is largely accepted that the US has four main goals with respect to Pakistan. It wants Pakistan to stop tolerating, hosting, and/or supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups who are using Pakistani border territories as a staging ground for attacks on US-NATO troops in Afghanistan. It wants Pakistan to secure its nuclear facilities to prevent both overt and rogue proliferation of weapons from the country. It wants Pakistan to make peace with India and contribute to the stability of the subcontinent, especially in Kashmir. Finally, it wants Pakistani moderates to strengthen the country's democratic institutions, prevail against the rising tide of domestic Islamic extremism throughout Pakistan, and serve as a model for democracy in the Muslim world.

However, most experts agree the problem is that current US actions in Pakistan have actually served to undermine all of the above goals, making the US its own worst enemy. Unconditional and loosely monitored US aid and weapons to Pakistan have ended up in the hands of anti-American militant forces in Afghanistan with close ties to the Pakistani Taliban and ISI. When America makes vague threats about "helping" the Pakistanis to secure their nuclear weapons facilities, the US taps into Pakistan's fierce pride and nationalism about their nuclear capabilities. Perversely, American rhetoric here makes these facilities less safe, as the Pakistanis have been known to move weapons stockpiles and nuclear fissile material around to keep them free from American designs. The more they are moved around, the more vulnerable they become to interception. US outreach to India in the past few years, in trade and in nuclear exchanges (ostensibly for peaceful purposes), the failure to bring peace to Afghanistan, combined with America's lack of a coherent Central Asian foreign policy has served to exacerbate, rather than improve regional tensions. The prospects of peace in the region are further compromised by the massive US-financed build-up of Pakistan's military, especially the provision of F-16s which it turns out are no good for counterterrorism but would be great for war with India.

Perhaps most powerfully, US unconditional support of Musharraf in the wake of a rigged referendum, several constitutional crises, the dismissal of the Supreme Court, and the defeat of the ML-Q in recent elections undermined

forces working for democratic change in Pakistan. Of the Bush Administration's decision to continue to back Musharraf in the wake of the tremendous no-confidence vote he received in the February elections, Pakistan Political Science Professor Rasul Bakh Rais has written, "I have never seen such an irrational, impractical move on the part of the United States."

On this last point, experts have differing views. Others think more cynically that US democracy promotion efforts in Pakistan are a sham and that support of Musharraf in forestalling democracy was carefully considered. According to this viewpoint, the US supports Musharraf because truly free and fair elections have been known to bring into power factions hostile to the United States, such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Islamists parties' prevalence in elections is unfavorable to American interests, and so leads to less active democracy promotion in Pakistan. Ironically, the strength of Islamist parties is now seen as having been wildly overestimated, as their weak showing in the February elections went on to reveal. By then however the US' democracy promotion reputation was already damaged.

An overriding goal of the US more widely is to counter rising anti-Americanism in Central Asia and throughout the Muslim world. The US relationship with Musharraf perhaps undermined this goal the most, and was seen by many around the world as a mockery of America's professed Freedom Agenda foreign policy. The US and the Musharraf government were extraordinarily unpopular in the region and were enhanced by their mutual support of each other. Ironically, the more Musharraf became identified with the US, the less popular he became domestically and the more he needed US support to keep him in office. Likewise, the more the US and Pakistani moderates auspiciously work together to combat the forces of radical Islam, often the more support and credibility is given to Islamists for standing up to the reviled leader and his US sponsor. New Mujahideen are created every day from an alliance that doesn't seem to be serving many other US interests.

Finally, Pakistani incentives with respect to US support are skewed by the history of the relationship. It is not lost on anyone that US aid tends to flow in times of regional crisis, and tends to flow more generously to military than civilian endeavors. It has been said that Pakistan actually has a stake

in perpetuating its own current domestic instability and the chaos to which it contributes in Afghanistan. As history has shown, it might just be the only way to keep foreign aid flowing. With little to fall back on in terms of a healthy domestic economy, peace could have bankrupted Pakistan. The fickle nature of US involvement in the region led Musharraf to justify his double-dealing with the Americans and Islamists. Historically the US abandoned the region once conflict subsided, which led Musharraf to keep all possible future alliances open.

American Options

By 2008, the US was showing signs that the above contradictions were being exposed. In March, Secretary Condoleezza Rice made the same statement policy experts had been making for years in comments to the RAND organization: “we need to move from a Musharraf policy to a Pakistan policy.” US intelligence officials, after years of denying that al Qaeda had infiltrated Pakistan beyond the immediate border with Afghanistan, were now reporting openly to Congress that the militants were operating almost solely out of Pakistan. President Bush began to make more overtures to India, as if perhaps laying the groundwork for a new regional alliance, offering lucrative trade deals and Indo-US exchange of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. This end run around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was not offered to Pakistan. Most experts believe a full-scale reevaluation of US strategy in the region is still necessary.

Nation Building

To most experts, the prescription is obvious: focus on nation building in Pakistan and Afghanistan so that their governments can begin to better serve their own people. This would include economic aid, as well as education, health care, and social welfare infrastructure to build up the middle class and prepare future generations of leaders and citizens alike for true democracy. This would include support for building up civil society, a commitment to human rights and the rule of law, and aid for grass-roots political party-building and finance reform. The appeal of radical Islamists would need to be diminished, by providing what they currently promise: a sense of identity, stability, and self-sufficiency. Most believe US largesse should be

contingent, and that a lack of conditionality has been part of the problem all along. Benchmarks should be established that the Pakistan government must meet both in terms of its domestic political situation and its level of cooperation with the US on counterterrorism. Expert Danielle Pletka has said that the US has a right to expect more from its ally, by attaching a clear “purpose,” in addition to accountability measures, to the billions that flow to Pakistan. Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Saban Center has reported that Senator Joe Biden has even proposed the idea of a “democracy bonus” that would increase aid levels “automatically every year the president certifies that Pakistan is a democracy.” In addition, Biden has proposed that a donors’ conference be convened among key “friends of Pakistan” including the US, EU, Saudi Arabia, and China.

If Pakistan’s institutions can be built up and engaged to serve US interests in the region, the US would be able to move away from a destructive pattern of basing policy decisions on individual personalities in Pakistan. As a New York Times editorial recently opined, the current mess in Pakistan is “what you get when policy is centered slavishly on a single, autocratic ruler rather than more broadly on his country.” Many experts point out that this pattern will be difficult for Americans to reverse, even in the wake of Musharraf’s resignation. The US is accustomed to dealing with one authority figure in Pakistan, not with a coalition of parties or rounds of negotiations with different branches of government.

Establishing a more stable Pakistan will take time, as well as a level patience, commitment, and strategic vision. This is a long-term solution, and US-Pakistani relations have historically always been about short-term gains.

Military Options

Although building up Pakistani institutions will be long and difficult, most agree that the other options, particularly the military ones, are worse. When the US posed the possibility of unilateral US air strikes on Pakistan’s troubled border regions, Musharraf and other Pakistani leaders unequivocally stated that this would never be allowed (See the ‘Breaking Headlines’ Section for information on recent developments relating to this position). Proceeding with such attacks on militant training installations in FATA or the Northwest Frontier Province without Pakistani consent

would be considered an act of aggression toward a Muslim ally, a designation the US can hardly afford given its larger standing in the Muslim world. Carnegie expert Ashley Tellis has warned such attacks would be highly counterproductive given the suspicions the Pakistani military, army, and intelligence services already harbor about US aims in the region.

An extreme option would be an invasion of Pakistan itself to preempt state failure and attack the Mujahideen havens that exists throughout the country. Conservative policy analysts such as Frederick Kagan of The American Enterprise Institute have proposed this idea in the American press, citing the Shah's overthrow in Iran by radical Islamists as a cautionary tale and something the US could prevent happening in Pakistan through military action. But generally, in the same breath that this idea is mentioned, it is acknowledged as untenable. As Kagan himself has said, the Pakistani population is six times that of Iraq. He estimates it would take two million US troops to occupy and stabilize the country. The US does not have anywhere near those force numbers even enlisted in the armed forces, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are producing an enormous strain on overall force capabilities. Added to this is the difficulty of transporting US troops and conducting maneuvers in hostile mountainous terrain. This option is simply not viable logistically, or in terms of international laws and norms, especially given the international standing of the US following the Iraq War.

At the very most, experts generally believe that military options are open only to the extent that Pakistan allows US forces in Afghanistan greater access to border areas with Pakistan, and greater intelligence-sharing on a voluntary basis. Similarly, another area where US forces could have an effect is in controlling the flow of Mujahideen to Central Asia from areas like Iraq and the Gulf States. Finally, there could be a role for US forces in anti-drug efforts in the area. It is widely known that drug trafficking and terrorism generally go hand in hand, and the failure to stem the Afghan narcotics trade has been a failure of the Western war effort there so far.

Diplomatic Options

Brookings Institution expert Michael O'Hanlon has asked of the US role in stabilizing Pakistan, "How does the US save

an anti-American country?" The answer is that perhaps it cannot. In addition to comprehensive nation building as described above, it may be that the US needs to cease unilateral negotiations and directives with the Pakistani government. Given history and the rising tide of anti-Americanism in the region and across the Muslim world, this may be a job for the international community under auspices of the UN or an ad hoc global coalition force of advisors, technicians, and peacekeepers. Many believe that the scope of US-Afghan, US-Pakistani, and even US anti-terror efforts has widened. As violence flares in Kashmir again and the tribal areas become the destination for global Mujahideen, Pakistan is increasingly looking like Ground Zero for the Global War on Terror, and many believe it should be treated as such.

The worst option of all, most agree, would be the West's disengagement. As illogical and even disadvantageous as the engagement may seem, the alternatives are almost certainly worse. As Thomas Donnelly said recently at a bipartisan forum on the Pakistani crisis, there is no doubt that a power vacuum would quickly be filled by powers often seen as hostile to Western interests. The neighborhood includes China, Russia, and Iran, and Pakistan has strategic location on its side. Perhaps the most illustrative metaphor out there to describe this dilemma is provided by Pakistan scholar Stephen Phillip Cohen. He has written that Pakistan has a habit of negotiating with the international community with "a gun to its own head" in a "suicide gambit." As things become increasingly unstable, the world extends money, weapons, and friendship in an effort to prevent implosion in a strategically located Muslim nation with nuclear arsenals.

The rationale behind Western support for this questionable ally is more geostrategic than anything, and it is always as a means to an end. These ends include preventing a refugee crisis and potential terrorist haven in a collapsed state, preventing the success of an Islamic Revolution that would shake the world the way the Iranian Revolution did 30 years ago, and preventing global nuclear proliferation. The international community is expected to continue to stumble along on the subcontinent in pursuit of short-term and long-term goals alike. Whether the above strategies can be combined into a coherent Pakistan policy remains to be seen.



Bangladesh

History

Upon the partition of their former Indian colonies into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, British administrators further divided the new Muslim nation into West and East Pakistan, located on either side of India. Pakistan was separated not only by 1000 miles, but by culture and language as well; West Pakistanis spoke primarily Punjabi or Urdu, while East Pakistanis spoke primarily Bengali. Bengal culture in East Pakistan developed with a stronger British-inherited secular bent, while West Pakistan experienced greater influence from Islamic factions. In addition, West Pakistan contained a more diverse population throughout its various provinces, especially along the Afghan border, while Bengali East Pakistan was a more homogenous and coherent entity. East Pakistan was significantly more populous and more impoverished, and became more so after partition dissected the country's jute export economy by locating processing plants in India or in West Pakistan.

The two Pakistans developed differently and failed to construct a strong, common identity. When Urdu was chosen as the Pakistani national language, Bengali groups were put at a great disadvantage, and most of the central government bureaucracy developed in the West. Separatist sentiment evolved over the years in East Pakistan, as it did in other Pakistani regions. In the 1960s, Bengali nationalism found a voice in the charismatic leader Mujibur Rahman.

When democracy finally came to Pakistan in 1970, over 20 years after partition, the fault lines running between the two entities were exposed. In advance of the transition to civilian rule after years of military dictatorships, Pakistan's Constitution was written to mandate proportional representation in Pakistan's elected national legislature upon elections in 1970. Given this system of apportionment, East Pakistan was naturally better positioned to take more seats based on its larger population. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the new Pakistan Peoples Party hailing from the Sindh province of West Pakistan faced Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League in the 1970 election, where the Awami League won a majority of seats. Bhutto then refused to recognize the results or allow the National Assembly to be seated with Rahman as Prime Minister and Bhutto as leader of the opposition. East Pakistani populations revolted and the Pakistan military (comprised mainly of West Pakistanis) moved in to quell the protests.

In 1971, Rahman went on to declare East Pakistan's independence as the new nation of Bangladesh, and immediately sought Indian assistance in what had become a full-fledged civil war. India stood to only benefit from the dissolution of its neighbor and rival; the Indian government therefore not only provided troops to aid the Bengali forces, but also allowed a Bangladeshi government in exile to be established in nearby Calcutta. In two weeks, amidst the displacement of 10 million people, West Pakistan was soundly defeated. The UN declined to intervene, and the

government of independent Bangladesh was set up in the former East Pakistan city of Dhaka.

Bangladesh went on to endure multiple coups as civilian and military governments came and went in succession (much as they did in Pakistan). The country continued to suffer from overpopulation and extreme poverty.

Reconciliation

Pakistan refused to recognize the new nation of Bangladesh, but feared the deepening of Indo-Bangladeshi relations. After holding out for three years, and after most other nations had extended recognition, full relations were established in 1976; Bangladesh today receives aid and trades with both Pakistan and India. Tensions remain over the repatriation of Pakistani refugees who want to return to Pakistan after being displaced by the war in 1971. Some have repatriated, but others have been barred from reentry by the Musharraf government. Bangladesh today is considered a mixed legacy for Pakistan. On one hand, the secession of the populous, impoverished area simplified things for Pakistan's leaders as Pakistan charted its own course throughout the following decades. It also meant one less restive province for the national government to control. However, Bengali independence set a dangerous precedent that continues to haunt Pakistan today as separatist and ethnonationalist movements threaten the very existence of the unified nation. The 1971 war was also extraordinarily deleterious to Indo-Pakistani relations, which were and continue to be strained by Kashmir.

Global Terror Networks

Pakistan expert Mary Anne Weaver has noted that al Qaeda is more than an organization – it is a “political-cultural force... and a state of mind.” It projects influence more as a movement than an entity, based on a sense of “alienation” and opposition to “what is perceived throughout the larger Islamic world as failed and unequal American policies.” In reality, there is very little distinction between actual al Qaeda operatives, members of the Taliban, or other radical militant Islamist groups pursuing terrorist aims in Central Asia.

Central Asia has long hosted al Qaeda-style militant groups, first in Afghanistan, and now Pakistan. Some 25,000 strong and hailing from 30 countries, they fought together as Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s (under US sponsorship). After the war, however, their Western support was withdrawn and they relied more heavily on Arab governments of the Middle East, as well as factions of the Pakistani state. Islamist ideology gained ground in Pakistan during the Zia era, and found sympathetic ears in nearly all Pakistan’s institutions, as a civil war raged over Islamist control of post-Soviet Afghanistan.

In the 1990s, many of these regional groups came together under the umbrella of the Taliban. They assumed leadership of Afghanistan after the US left, following the Soviets’ departure in 1989. The Taliban in Afghanistan had always maintained close ties with their largely Pashtun brethren in Pakistan. These tribal loyalties became institutionalized within Pakistan’s military and intelligence services; even

Pakistan’s brief succession of civilian leaders openly supported the Islamist regime that was fully established over the border by 1996.

The Taliban was partly useful for Pakistan as a potential mercenary force that could be used against India should Indo-Pakistani rivalries accelerate. The goal of establishing “strategic depth” against a potential Indian invasion of Pakistan was pursued through paramilitary and non-state connections. Taliban leaders and foot soldiers had long trained with Pakistani Kashmiri insurgents in camps located along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The various sub-sects and groupings ceased to make much difference; their aims were the same: to establish Islamic leadership of legal and lawless territories alike, and to ultimately spark a worldwide Islamic revolution that would bring about a global caliphate ruled by Sharia law.

When, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, pragmatism forced Pakistan’s leadership to renounce their recognition of and loyalty to the Taliban government in Afghanistan, many were skeptical of the depth of this commitment. Tribal and political loyalties persisted even as Pakistan was engaged by the US as an ally in the Coalition invasion of Afghanistan, which defeated Taliban forces in a matter of months. Once the Taliban surrendered to Coalition forces, Pakistan continued to covertly support Taliban leaders. Reports showed that Pakistan allowed them to escape and find sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas, and even funneled funds through Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) networks. This financing allowed the militants to

regroup and rearm for an insurgency against the new Western-backed Karzai government in Afghanistan. The insurgency gained momentum by 2005 when mujahideen from around the Muslim world gravitated there to fight the US and NATO forces over the border, with Pakistan's implicit consent.

It may seem counterintuitive that Pakistan would continue to support the Taliban even while being handsomely paid by the US to seal its borders and frustrate the insurgency. There were a few reasons for this behavior. First, powerful Pashtun loyalties existed in the tribal areas and among the Pakistani military (which is up to 20% Pashtun). Second, Musharraf worried that the new government of Afghanistan would ally with India and alter the balance of power in the region. Further, he did not trust the Americans to stick around and prop up Karzai, given their actions after the Soviet defeat. If the Americans were likely to abandon the region in the end, Pakistan wanted to remain on good terms with the Taliban, who would likely resume power in Afghanistan. Finally, anti-Americanism was on the rise within Pakistan, and as the government failed to meet the basic needs of the Pakistani people, powerful Islamist voices within the political and military establishment were given more credence. Musharraf needed to appease the Islamists in his own country to avoid being deposed, or having his party defeated in elections. Remaining connected to global mujahideen networks appeased these restive domestic Islamists.

Experts have documented how the leadership of the government, army, and intelligence services began to “double-deal,” promising to help the US capture militant leaders while simultaneously supporting or facilitating the sanctuary of those very leaders. It is accepted by most experts that the 9/11 attacks were in one way a windfall for Pakistan, putting it back on the radar of Western donors after a decade of neglect and sanctions. But serving as a bulwark against militant extremists long after the invasion of Afghanistan likewise proved highly lucrative for the Pakistan government. Most experts believe that the worst thing for Pakistan's economy would be a sound defeat of the mujahideen. Pakistan's “indispensability” to the West would be lost if the forces of Islamic extremism operating in Afghanistan, along Pakistan's own tribal belt, and even within Pakistan proper, were to cease to exist.

Musharraf continued to raise the threat profile of Islamists in his country as a way of getting access to more US counterterrorism funding, while at the same time serving as a lifeline for militants in the region.

Many believe that this strategy ultimately came back to haunt Musharraf. In this view, he underestimated both the zealous anti-Americanism of Islamic factions and their appeal to portions of the Pakistani population. He came under fire himself for his association with the Bush Administration. Most importantly, he began to lose control of the myriad of domestic and global Islamists operating in Pakistan with his tacit approval. Suicide bombings in the Pakistani cities of Karachi and Islamabad dramatically increased. Musharraf was forced to crack down on militant forces barricaded in the Red Mosque in downtown Islamabad. He became the target of multiple assassination attempts and saw Islamist parties achieve electoral victories in Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province.

He and Pakistani military commanders began to make deals with rebel groups in the provinces, promising not to attack their camps at the Americans' behest as long as they ceased suicide and other attacks on Pakistani targets. These agreements, negotiated unilaterally without American or Coalition involvement, were reviled by the West as ineffective appeasement and bad precedent. Pakistan's Western allies, most notably the United States, cited these arrangements' potential to undercut US-NATO efforts in the region. Perhaps more importantly, the West was quick to point out that such agreements have never been unconditionally honored by the radical militants before. They were therefore a primary cause of Western suspicion that Pakistan was actually using US aid in ways that endangered US troops and undermined US objectives in the region. Moreover, they do not seem to be working terribly well, as attacks on Pakistani targets continue. The region is generally considered to be lawless in many respects, with multiple warlords competing and often terrorizing the civilian populations. Even if these agreements are made in good faith, there is no guarantee that tribal leaders themselves can even enforce them.

Prospects for the Future

It is generally acknowledged by experts that al Qaeda-style ideology is alive and well throughout Pakistan today,

from the domestic Islamist parties and interest groups, to the mosques and madrassa schools, and even in the military and intelligence services. Moreover, many radical Islamist groups in Pakistan have close ties with Sunni Islam mujahideen networks in the Middle East, Northern Africa, and throughout Asia. Pakistan is now considered a choice destination for global mujahideen who previously flocked to Iraq to fight Coalition forces. Al Qaeda cells operating in Western Europe, who were responsible for attacks on Madrid and London and the foiled attacks on Frankfurt, are thought to hail from Pakistan's lawless tribal regions. A considerable amount of money continues to flow to Pakistani militants from Saudi organizations and Islamic charities worldwide.

Overall, Pakistan is seen by most as an enormously troubling front in the Global War on Terror, especially as Taliban groups move back and forth between sanctuary in Pakistan and battles with US-NATO forces in Afghanistan. This keeps tensions in Kashmir alive as well, which provokes another regional nuclear power, India. These disparate groups are now said to be "seamless," and to operate officially under the names, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, with near impunity in places like the Swat Valley in Pakistan's NWFP and FATA under leaders like Baitullah Mehsud. As Ahmed Rashid has written, these groups are "now expanding in Pakistan faster than anyone could have imagined... The world's terrorist leaders were already living on the Pakistani side of the border, but with the creation of the Pakistani Taliban, they are now able to expand their influence, base areas, and training camps at will across northern Pakistan." From here, their incursions back into the US-NATO front are often seasonal. They train and regroup in and around the Pakistani cities of Peshawar, Quetta and in the mountainous border villages during the winter and reengage in spring. They have been largely safe from US-NATO forces while in Pakistan because Musharraf refused to allow strikes in his country (See the 'Breaking News' Section for updated information regarding this position).

Occasionally, the Pakistani military will attempt a raid, but no major leaders have been captured or killed by Pakistani counterterrorist forces yet, despite a combined force of nearly 200,000 conventional army and Frontier Corps soldiers operating in the region with US and Western

support. The militants that are captured are often Arab or hail from elsewhere in the region. Pashtun Pakistani soldiers have proven averse to harming their brethren when fighting the Taliban forces. Militant groups generally benefit from the Western powers' limited understanding of their relations to each other. The US in particular has often turned a blind eye to Pakistan's support of the Taliban because it was more interested in al Qaeda, and failed to see that the lines were blurred between those two entities.

Many consider Pakistan's government to be a new type of state sponsor of terrorism (See works by Daniel Byman of the Saban Center for an in depth discussion of this theory). Rather than providing direct support to terrorist groups (although it is thought this continues by the ISI as well), they instead allow unobstructed movement and impunity within national borders. Byman writes that countries such as Pakistan are harder to deal with than overt sponsors of terrorism like Afghanistan under the Taliban "because they often have a more complicated relationship with terrorists" and their inaction "allows the government to claim ignorance or incapacity." Such a passive approach also allows state sponsors such as Pakistan to remain allies with the US in the Global War on Terror, "even as they surreptitiously allow terrorists to operate from their soil."

Byman and other experts advocate overhauling the way the world characterizes state terror sponsorship to broaden the definition, and apply harsh penalties to all types of sponsors. The current "binary system" used by the US, in which a country is either on or off "the list" of state sponsors of terrorism is thought to contain numerous loopholes. In this view, failure to stop terrorist expansion is as criminal as direct support of terrorists, and the certification system should include a spectrum of offenses, penalties, and deterrents. Only by utilizing a broad range of sanctions packaged in a case-sensitive way can the international community hope to contain the spread of global terror networks, which need the sanctuary and/or support of state sponsors to operate. Determining the best way to do this with regard to Pakistan is of utmost importance, and many feel the international community has lacked focus and been distracted by Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs. It is generally thought in these circles that terrorist networks are more likely to obtain nuclear materials from Pakistan than from anywhere else, either by the design, corruption, or

inaction on the part of the Pakistani government and/or ISI. The monstrous success of the A. Q. Kahn nuclear materials proliferation operation is a worrying reminder of how easily this can be done in the modern era. See the Nuclear Program section of Internal Players for more information.

Other External Players

Pakistan's global significance is immense, largely due to its strategic location in what is now considered Ground Zero for the Global War on Terror. Even more than Iraq or Afghanistan, Pakistan is of concern to nations around the world because of its worrying coalescence of Islamic extremism, political instability, strong military identification, and possession of nuclear weapons. We could not possibly hope to cover all of its relations with important External Players in this edition of the Monitor. Besides the detailed discussions of Pakistan's relations with the Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, the United States, and Global Terror Networks, there are a few other nations worth briefly mentioning.

Great Britain

Like many nations around the world, Pakistan is a product of the prolific British colonial empire. As part of colonial British India until independence and partition in 1947, Pakistan is home to a variety of English traditions and legacies. Its founder and its first generation of military leaders, who ended up ruling the government for many years, were British-trained. The republican style of government that was envisioned for Pakistan by Jinnah (but did not take hold as it did in India) was also influenced by British political tradition.

Today, Pakistan's relationship with the UK is complex. Pakistan has several times been expelled from The Commonwealth of Nations, a group of nations made up of former British colonies and current territories of the

UK, most notably for its nuclear program. British military forces make up a large part of the US-NATO Coalition force fighting in neighboring Afghanistan; many British casualties in that war are thought to be caused, in part, by Pakistani support for Taliban groups. Many of Pakistan's political leaders are British trained and the Bhutto-Zardari family has British educational roots as well as significant English real estate holdings.

Britain has also long been a primary destination for immigrants from Pakistan; there are currently estimated to be up to 800,000 people of Pakistani descent living in Britain (a country of only 61 million). In an interview with the PBS Online NewsHour, Pakistani native and professor at the Tufts Fletcher School said, "The immigrant communities are so large, (they) now impact British politics directly," with some of them elected to political office. Although the majority Anglo-Pakistanis have contributed positively to British society, a significant portion of Britain's "home-grown terrorism" problem comes from these immigrants and their children. Nearly all terrorist plots either carried out against or intended for UK targets have been spearheaded by Pakistani nationals or immigrants, a fact that causes significant tension within British society.

The UK is seen by many as perhaps the greatest ally of the United States in the Global War on Terror, and it tends to vote with the US in the United Nations Security Council. When Pakistan has occupied rotating seats on the Security Council, it has been known to vote with China against the West, most notably on recently proposed sanctions against

Sudan over the crisis in Darfur. Nonetheless, the British, like the Americans, are unlikely to abandon Pakistan, and a portion of promised EU aid to Pakistan for 2007-2013 will come from the UK.

China

Pakistan's relationship with China has long focused on one central dynamic – its rivalry with India and its search to find checks on Indian power in the region. China and India went to war in the 1960s, in part over a small area of Kashmir claimed by China; the two Asian giants are often considered hedges against each other. Pakistan also has claims on Kashmir and regularly spars with India there. Many believe that India's role as a common enemy explains at least part of the Sino-Pakistani friendship. If tensions were to develop between the US and China, most believe India and Pakistan would choose different sides leading the conflict to have a second layer of dangerous nuclear implications. However, on its Western border, China also has significant interests in Central Asia in regard to its restive semi-autonomous province of Xinjiang which is home to separatist Uighur Muslims, who have close ties to Central Asian minorities. Many of these separatist groups are thought to train with al Qaeda, Taliban, and Kashmiri militants in the Pakistani camps. This dynamic could push China and Pakistan closer if they perceive that they are fighting the same groups of extremists that threaten to destabilize both countries and diminish their landmasses through secessionist movements. However, this could also work against their alliance in the case of Pakistani covert and overt hosting of militant training camps.

Perhaps the most important development in Sino-Pakistani relations today is the construction of a major Chinese-financed port in the Pakistani coastal city of Gwadar. The Chinese have invested heavily in this port and in the infrastructure (pipelines, roads) to link it by land to China. It is seen as a vital strategic interest because it provides an alternate way to move Middle Eastern oil supplies from the Gulf States to China. This port allows oil supplies to avoid passing through choke points policed by the US Navy. The port project is a major boon for the modernization of both Pakistan's coastline and interior; Pakistan has expressed its appreciation by voting with China when possible in the United Nations. Musharraf visited China in April of

2008 amidst his ongoing political dramas at home, and the Pakistani newspaper The News reported that he was welcomed with open arms by Prime Minister Wen Jibao. The two countries announced plans for developing multiple free trade deals, as well as a railroad linking Gwadar with China that the leaders said would be the “ninth wonder of the world.” At the end of the visit, Wen remarked on the “excellent relations” the countries enjoy with each other, and Musharraf stated, “China remains our time-tested and all-weather friend.” This is important given the increasingly strained relationship between the US and Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia

Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are primarily Sunni Muslim and have long shared a solidarity born of anti-Shia, anti-Iran, and anti-American sentiment; both countries have had intimate and often troubled relations with the US over the years. The Saudis allied with the US CIA, Pakistan, and Afghan Mujahideen in the war to drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan in the 1980s, with the Saudis matching the Americans nearly dollar for dollar for the covert operations. After the war, when the US and West departed the subcontinent and later imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program, the Saudis augmented Pakistan's foreign aid budget to compensate. Much of the aid was funneled to Islamic charities and used to build Wahhabist-influenced madrassa religious schools throughout Pakistan.

When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in the 1990s, Saudi exile and Mujahideen leader Osama bin Laden offered his Islamist forces to repel the invasion. When he was rebuffed and US forces instead took up residence on Saudi soil from where they mounted their campaign in Kuwait, he became a vocal critic of both Saudi Arabia and the US; he subsequently began to wage jihad against the West and the Saudi monarchy from his base in Afghanistan. This obviously complicated relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as some Pakistani militant forces were absorbed into al Qaeda led movements in the tribal areas and were even supported by Pakistani intelligence services.

Saudi-Pakistani relations have long revolved around military cooperation. The Saudis have provided conventional weapons, training, and intelligence to Pakistan's armed forces over the years. But, more importantly, as Bruce Riedel of the Saban Center has pointed out, Saudi Arabia

was a critical factor in the development of Pakistani nuclear capabilities. The Saudis are thought to have provided financial support and played a key role in convincing Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to carry out nuclear tests in 1998 despite the threat of international sanctions. The Saudis provided free oil (up to 50,000 barrels/day) to Pakistan when Western sanctions were imposed; much aid has since flowed to the Central Asian nation from the Saudi state and monarchy, as well as religious institutions. Riedel reports that many believe the Saudis have an implicit arrangement with Pakistan whereby the Kingdom would be “covered” by the Pakistani nuclear umbrella through deterrence of attacks and/or retaliation following an attack by another nuclear power. The Saudis do not yet possess an atomic bomb, but are said to feel comfortable knowing they could have access to Pakistan’s “Islamic bombs” should the need arise.

Saudi Arabia has also played a role in the political drama within Pakistan over the years. Nawaz Sharif took exile there upon his deposition, and later returned from there to serve another non-consecutive term as Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was exiled to Saudi Arabia again on corruption charges upon Musharraf’s 1999 coup, and the Saudis are thought to have orchestrated his return to Pakistan in the fall of 2007 to counter Benazir Bhutto.

Referenced Resources

- Ali, Farhana. "A Post Musharraf Policy," *Washingtonpost.com*, March 7, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702732.html>.
- Ali, Imtiaz. "The Emerging Militancy in Pakistan's Mohmand Agency," *The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis*, January 24, 2008.
- American Enterprise Institute. "*The Crisis in Pakistan and American Policy*," Edited Transcript, January 2, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1628,filter.all/transcript.asp>
- Applebaum, Anne. "Two Benazir Bhuttos," *The Washington Post*, January 1, 2008.
- Asia Society. "A Discussion on Pakistan and Afghanistan," *FORA TV*, December 14, 2007.
- The Associated Press. "Pakistani Says Army Knew Atomic Parts Were Shipped," *The New York Times*, July 5, 2008.
- Bajoria, Jayshree. "US-Pakistan Alliance in Trouble," *CFR Daily Analysis*, June 26, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16637/>
- Barboza, David. "Toll in China Quake Is Worse Than Feared," *The New York Times*. 31 August 2008. Retrieved 4 September 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/>
- BBC News. "Bhutto's Widower Wins Presidency." BBC News. 6 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>
- BBC News. "Profile: Nawaz Sharif," BBC, December 4, 2007. Retrieved April 2008 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6959782.stm.
- BBC News. "US Drones 'Bomb Pakistan Target.'" BBC News. 8 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>
- BBC News. "Zardari Takes Office in Pakistan." BBC News. 9 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>
- BBC News. "Zardari Vows to Fight Militants." BBC News. 9 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>
- Belt, Don. "Struggle for the Soul of Pakistan," *National Geographic*, September 2007.
- Bhutto, Benazir. *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West*. Harper Collins, 2008.
- Biden, Senator Joseph. "Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten." *The New York Times*, March 2, 2008.
- The Brookings Institution. "The Kashmir Dispute: Making Borders Irrelevant," Transcript, June 4, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0604_kashmir.aspx
- Byman, Daniel. "The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism," *Brookings Institution Saban Center for Middle East Policy*, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from

Byman, Daniel. "Listing Our Terror Problems," The National Interest Online, May 2, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0502_terrorism_byman.aspx

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Confronting Pakistan's Economic and Social Challenges," Event, June, 5, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1140&&prog=zgp&proj=zsa,zted>.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Pakistan's New Civilian Government: Managing a Difficult Democratic Transition, Event, May 6, 2008. Retrieved from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1126&&prog=zgp&proj=zec,zted>

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Post-Election Dynamics in the North-West Frontier Province, Event, April 24, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1121&&prog=zgp&proj=zsa>

Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA World Fact Book.

Cohen, Roger. "On America's Watch," The New York Times, December 31, 2007.

Cohen, Stephen. "India's Influence on Pakistan," The Indian Express, November 11, 2007. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0128_saudi_arabia_riedel.aspx

Cohen, Stephen Philip. The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

Cohen, Stephen Philip. "The US-Pakistan Strategic Relationship and Nuclear Safety/Security," US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, June 12, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0612_pakistan_cohen.aspx

Coll, Steve. "Time Bomb: The Death of Benazir Bhutto and the Unraveling of Pakistan," The New Yorker, January 28, 2008.

Collins, Nancy Amelia. "Political Crisis, Inflation, Power Crisis Hurt Pakistan Economy," Voice of America, January 9, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://voanews.com/english/archive/2008-01/2008-01-09-voa15.cfm?CFID=28052208&CFTOKEN=89729507>

Connolly, Kevin. "Pakistan Poses US Policy Headache," BBC News, August 18, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7569071.stm>.

Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report," Center for International and Strategic Studies, May 12, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4486/.

Democracy Now! "Gareth Porter: Bush Administration Ignored Warnings Against Pakistani Air Strikes." Democracy Now! 10 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://www.democracynow.org/>

The Economist. "Cracks in the Coalition," Economist.com, May 13, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11360522

The Economist. "Friendless Fire," The Economist Print Edition, June 12, 2008.

The Economist. "Lost Momentum," The Economist Print Edition, May 22, 2008.

The Economist. "Pointed Guns," The Economist Print Edition, June 19, 2008.

The Economist. "Ruling the Tiger Park." The Economist Print Edition, April 3, 2008.

The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Political Structure," Country Report, April 10, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from <http://www.economist.com/countries/Pakistan/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Political%20Structure>.

Farr, Thomas F. "Diplomacy in the Age of Faith," Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2008.

The Frontier Post. "Editorial," January 1, 2008.

Frontline World. "An Interview with Mary Anne Weaver," PBS Frontline World, November 11 and 21, 2002. Retrieved April 2008 from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/search/etc/weaver.html>

Frontline World. "Interview with the Reporter: David Montero," PBS Frontline World retrieved April 2008 from <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/pakistan703/interview/reporter.html>

- Gall, Carlotta and Perlez, Jane. "Pakistan Votes Amid Fear of Violence, Vote Rigging, and New Political Turmoil," *The New York Times*, February 18, 2008.
- Gall, Carlotta and Rohde, David. "Militants Escape Control of Pakistan, Officials Say," *The New York Times*, January 15, 2008.
- Gall, Carlotta. "Musharraf Defends Actions After Taking Oath." *The New York Times*, November 30, 2007.
- Ganguly, Sumit. "Emperor Musharraf's New Clothes," *Foreign Affairs*, Update, December 5, 2007 retrieved August 2008 from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071205faupdate86678/sumit-ganguly/emperor-musharraf-s-new-clothes.html>
- Goode, Erica and Riyadh Mohammed. "Iraq Signs Oil Deal With China Worth Up to \$3 Billion." *The New York Times*. 28 August 2008. Retrieved 4 September 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/>
- Innocent, Malou. "Hands Off Pakistan," *National Interest Online*, February 21, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9233
- The International Crisis Group. "After Bhutto's Murder: A Way Forward," *Asia Briefing*, January 2, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5246>
- Iqbal, Anwar. "Bush Calls FATA Most Dangerous Region," *Dawn*, Internet Edition, April 13, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from <http://www.dawn.co/2008/04/13/top.1htm>.
- Jacobs, Andrew. "No Voice Is Too Small for a China Still Nervous About Dissent." *The New York Times*. 29 August 2008. Retrieved 4 September 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/>
- Jones, Owen Bennett. *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. Yale University Press, 2002.
- Kagan, Frederick W. and O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Pakistan's Collapse, Our Problem," *The New York Times*, November 18, 2007.
- Kahn, M. Ilyas. "Pakistan Faces Era of Hope and Risk," *BBC News*, August 18, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7568805.stm.
- Khan, Mubarek Zeb. "CBR Expects to Receive \$1.75 Million in Tax Returns," *Dawn*, October 11, 2006. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/11/ebr2.htm>
- Langewiesche, William. *The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor*. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007.
- Lasheed, Emmit. "Carnegie Podcast, Pakistan: The Struggle Between Politics and Extremism," December 14, 2007.
- Levy, Adrian and Scott-Clark, Catherine. *Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. Walker Press, 2007.
- Lieven, Anatol. "Do No Harm," *The National Interest*, March/April 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/do_no_harm_6862
- Markey, Daniel. "A False Choice in Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2007.
- Masood, Salman. "Pakistan Looks Ahead Without Musharraf," *The New York Times*, August 18, 2008.
- McCreary, John. "Musharraf's Last Jam," *Foreign Policy*, January 2008. Web exclusive retrieved April 2008 from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4125
- Mian, Zia. "Pakistan's America Problem," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, July 9, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5357>
- Montero, David. "Pakistan Losing Territory to Radicals," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 29, 2007.
- Montero, David. "Will Iraq Playbook Work in Pakistan?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 15, 2008.
- Moreau, Ron and Hirsch, Michael. "The Most Dangerous Nation in the World Isn't Iraq. It's Pakistan," *Newsweek*, October 29, 2007.
- Morris, Chris. "Pervez Musharraf's Mixed Legacy," *BBC News*, April 18, 2008.
- Dalrymple, William. "A New Deal in Pakistan," *The New York Review of Books*, April 3, 2008.
- Mortenson, Greg and Relin, David Oliver. *Three Cups of Tea*. Viking Press, 2006.

The News. "Musharraf Meets Chinese Premier Wen Jibao," April, 13, 2003. Retrieved April 13, 2008 from <http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=43351>.

Obaid-Chinoy, Sharmeen. "We Routed the Men With Beards," Frontline World Dispatches, February 25, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/blog/2008/02/pakistan_we_rou.html.

The Online NewsHour, "India and Pakistan: 60 Years of Independence," August 14, 2007. Retrieved April 2008 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/partition/timeline/index.html

The Online NewsHour. "Judges Reinstated in Pakistan Ahead of Election." PBS Online NewsHour. 5 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/>

Online News Hour, "Pakistan Faces Political Challenges After Musharraf's Exit" PBS, August 18, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec08/musharraf_08-18.html

Perlez, Jane; Masood, Salman; and Cooper, Helene. "American Embrace of Musharraf Irks Pakistanis," The New York Times, February 29, 2008.

Perlez, Jane and Masood, Salman. "Bhutto's Widower, Viewed as Ally by US, Wins the Pakistani Presidency Handily." The New York Times. 6 September 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/>

Perlez, Jane. "Musharraf Announces His Resignation," The New York Times, August 19, 2008.

Perlez, Jane. "Pakistani Bear Market Has Investors Raging in the Streets," The New York Times, July 18, 2008.

Perlez, Jane. "Unilateral Action by US a Growing Fear in Pakistan," The New York Times, July 22, 2008.

Pervez, Fouad. "The Real Crisis in Pakistan," Foreign Policy in Focus, July 11, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5360>

Pirzada, Moeed. "Bhutto's Elimination: A US Defeat?" Khaleej Times, January 3, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from <http://www.geo.tv/curbsonmedia/>.

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos. Viking Press, 2008.

Reuters. "Pakistan Central Bank Cuts Economic Growth Forecast," Karachi, January 5, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINL0528683520080105>

Riedel, Bruce. "Democracy, Not Weapons, Should Drive US-Pakistan Agenda," Raleigh News and Observer, June 4, 2008.

Riedel, Bruce. "Help Pakistanis Now or Risk Alienation," Bangor Daily News, March 13, 2008. Retrieved August, 2008 from http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0313_pakistan_riedel.aspx

Riedel, Bruce. "Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan," Middle East Progress, January 28, 2008. Retrieved April 2008 from http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0128_saudi_arabia_riedel.aspx

Reynolds, Paul. "The Strongman and the War on Terror," BBC, April 18, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7567662.stm.

Robinson, Simon. "Why Pakistan Matters," Time, January 14, 2008.

Samdani, Mehlaqa; Joshi, Sharad; and Niazi, Tarique. "The Taliban and Pakistan: Strategic Dialogue," Foreign Policy in Focus, June 26, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5325>

Schmindle, Nicholas. "Like the Wild, Wild West. Plus Al-Qaeda." The Washington Post, March 30, 2008.

Schmitt, Eric. "Plan Would Use Antiterror Aid on Pakistani Jets," The New York Times, July 24, 2008.

Schmitt, Eric and Shanker, Thom. "US Plans Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces: A Paramilitary Focus," The New York Times, March 2, 2008.

Shafqat, Saeed. "The Promise of Pakistan," Columbia, Winter, 2007-2008.

Shahzad, Asif. "Pakistan's Ruling Coalition Collapses Amid Dissent." The Associated Press. 25 August 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://www.ap.org/>

Shea, Cecile. "The Problem of Pakistan," Hoover Digest, February, 2008.

Stephenson, Wen. "Ground Zero," PBS Frontline, November, 2002. Retrieved from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/search/etc/weaver.html>.

Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. “Bush Failed to See Musharraf’s Faults, Critics Contend,” *The New York Times*, November 18, 2007.

Tellis, Ashley J. “Pakistan’s New Tack on Fighting Terror,” *Yale Global*, May 9, 2008. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10779>

Terror Free Tomorrow. “Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan,” August, 2007. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf>.

United Nations Development Program. “Human Development Report, 2007/2008,” United Nations Publications, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_PAK.html

Voice of America News. “Pakistan Reinstates 8 Deposed Judges.” *VOA News*. 27 August 2008. Retrieved 10 September 2008 from <http://www.voanews.com/>

Waraich, Omar. “Pakistan’s Accidental Prime Minister,” *Time*, July 27, 2008.

Wong, Edward. “Uighurs on Both Sides of Conflict in China.” *New York Times*. 2 September 2008. Retrieved 4 September 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/>

Yardley, Jim. “After Glow of Games, What Next for China?” *New York Times*. 24 August 2008. Retrieved 4 September 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/>

Yousafzai, Sami and Moreau, Ron. “A Jihad Between Neighbors,” *Newsweek*, June 2, 2008.

Yousafzai, Sami; Moreau, Ron; and Barry, John. “An Assault on Supplies,” *Newsweek*, April 7, 2008.

Yusufzai, Rahimullah. “The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban,” *The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis*, February 7, 2008.

Zakaria, Fareed. “Musharraf’s Last Stand,” *Newsweek*, January 21, 2008.

Zehra, Nasim. “Economic Mayhem Inflates Pakistan’s Share of Problems,” *Khaleej Times Online*, July 26, 2008. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2008/July/opinion_July107.xml§ion=opinion

Ziad, Waleed. “In Pakistan, Islam Needs Democracy,” *The New York Times*, February 16, 2008.

Zisis, Carin and Bajoria, Jayshree. “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” *CFR Backgrounder*, October 26, 2007. Retrieved April 2008 from http://www.cfr.org/publication/11973/pakistans_tribal_areas.html

Visual Sources

Photographic and video imagery can be vital to truly understanding and connecting with unfamiliar issues; it is often through visual imagery that deeper, more emotional aspects of the psyche accessed. The following resources provide viewers with images and video – sometimes beautiful and at times devastating – whose topics include major political events, conflict zones, and everyday life in Pakistan.

Al Jazeera – “Pakistan ‘Bordering on Chaos’ 03-Aug-08” (video) <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhUF5f-6wF8>

Central Asia Institute – Image Gallery
<https://www.ikat.org/media-and-press/image-gallery/>

Human Rights Watch – “Kashmir: Everyone Lives in Fear”
<http://hrw.org/campaigns/kashmir/2006/slideshow/slideshow.htm>

Human Rights Watch – “Pakistan: Destroying Legality”
<http://hrw.org/photos/2007/pakistan1207/index.html>

National Geographic – “Kashmir, Trapped in Conflict”
http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/places/gallery/photos-kashmir_muslim-refugees.html

National Geographic – “Pakistan Photo Gallery”
<http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/09/pakistan/reza-photography>

New York Times – “Elections in Pakistan”
http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2008/02/18/world/0218-ELECT_index.html

New York Times – “Opponents Celebrate Musharraf’s Resignation”
http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2008/08/18/world/0818-PSTAN_index.html?scp=2&sq=pakistan&st=m

Key Foundation Documents

Pakistan's Constitution with Updated Amendments
<http://www.pakistan.org/pakistan/constitution/>

United Nations Development Program – Pakistan
<http://www.undp.org.pk/>

The World Bank – Pakistan
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/PAKISTANEXTN/menuPK:293057~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:293052,00.html>

Freedom House – Pakistan
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=7&ccrpage=31&ccrcountry=138>

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

Treaties

Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 (water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan; largely removed water issues as a source of conflict in Kashmir)
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/,,contentMDK:20320047~pagePK:146736~piPK:583444~theSitePK:223547,00.html>

The Simla Agreement of 1972 (normalized relations between India and Pakistan following the Bangladesh Liberation War)
<http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/SimlaAgreement.html>)

WORLD SAVVY

MONITOR



Classroom Companion

Classroom Companion

This companion document to the Issue in Focus provides educators with guidance to incorporate the content into classroom teaching. This component is geared towards grade 6-12 teachers, with connections across subjects and disciplines.

Contents of this Classroom Companion include:

- Student Readings
- Discussion Questions
- Lesson Ideas/Curriculum
- Additional Resources
- National Standards

Student Readings:

Below are some links to articles and reports at various reading levels that would be appropriate to use with students to learn more about recent political changes in Pakistan in 2008, and especially the election of the new President in September 2008.

Advanced:

“Victory for Democracy” by Ron Moreau and Zahid Hussain, Newsweek

<http://www.newsweek.com/id/157494>

Intermediate:

“Widower of Bhutto Takes Office in Pakistan” by Jane Perlez, The New York Times

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/10/world/asia/10pstan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

“Zardari Sworn in as Pakistan President,” CNN

<http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/09/pakistan.presidential.election/index.html?iref=newssearch>

Beginner:

“Zardari Takes Office in Pakistan,” BBC News

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7605430.stm

Background:

“Pakistan after Musharraf,” BBC News

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7570286.stm

Possible Discussion Questions:

1. What leader in Pakistan resigned in August 2008? How long was he in office, and how did he come to be in office? Why did he resign?
2. Who was sworn in as president of Pakistan in September 2008? Describe him and his political background.
3. What powers does the new president of Pakistan hold as part of his political office?
4. How has the United States responded to recent events in Pakistan? What is the relationship between the US and Pakistani governments?
5. The newly sworn-in president has indicated that the resignation of Musharraf signals a return to

democracy in Pakistan. What is the status of democracy in Pakistan? Compare the governmental structures and rights in Pakistan with the US – how are they similar or different? Do you agree or disagree that developments over the last few months signal that Pakistan is becoming more democratic?

Lesson Ideas/Curriculum

In this portion of the guide are selected suggestions for engaging activities and curriculum to teach students about this issue – across the disciplines. In addition, there are links to recommended curriculum units that are available to download or purchase from the web.

Social Studies/History:

- History of Pakistan – study the recent history of Pakistan, which celebrated its 60th anniversary as an independent country in 2007. Learn about its partition from India in 1947, and why the country was created. How does this influence politics, culture, and society in Pakistan today?
- Religion in Pakistan – what is the role of religion in Pakistan today? What was the role of religion at the partitioning of the country in 1947? Who are the Taliban, and what is their role in politics and culture in Pakistan today? The following National Geographic Magazine article from September 2007 discusses the role of religion in the country in some depth: <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/09/pakistan/don-belt-text>.
- Government of Pakistan – Pakistan is a democratic republic. How is its democratic government similar or different from other democratic countries around the world? Read the Freedom House description for Pakistan's government. Did Freedom House rate the country as free or not free? What events have happened over the last year that have had an impact on this rating and the level of freedom in the country?

Do you agree or disagree with the Freedom House analysis? <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>.

- Women in Pakistan – former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was recently assassinated in Pakistan, in December 2007. Learn about her past and her role in the government and society of Pakistan. Is her story typical of women in Pakistan? What is the role of women in society in Pakistan? The following classroom guide, produced by Concern USA, discusses women's rights, with a focus on Pakistan: http://www.concernusa.org/media/pdf/2007/10/WomenRights_final_WomenRights_Student_06.qxd.pdf.
- Analyzing Foreign Policy – use Pakistan as a case study for analyzing US foreign policy. Pakistan is currently an ally in the Global War on Terror, and a portion of the country is a stronghold for the Taliban, who are waging war in Afghanistan, and against whom NATO forces are fighting. Research US relations with Pakistan during the Musharraf administration – was this foreign policy stance successful in defeating the Taliban? Why or why not? Now that there is a new president in Pakistan, should the US change its foreign policy relationship with Pakistan?
- Geography of Pakistan – Pakistan's strategic positioning in Central Asia makes geography an essential component of the country's history, as well as its place in the world today. Study the geography of Pakistan, and discuss how its geography has played

a factor in current world events and as a strategic partner of the US today.

English/Language Arts:

- Creative writing – either, in conjunction with the literature being read in class or in connection to reading non-fiction texts about Pakistan, students can step into someone else’s shoes through a creative writing project. Such projects could include writing diary or journal entries from a character’s or historical figure’s point of view, a letter to a noted figure or character, or writing a mock interview with a historical or modern figure. In modern Pakistan, in particular, there are many political figures involved in the current government changes – have students step into the roles of these major figures (see ‘Pakistani Leaders at a Glance’ section in *Internal Players*) and write from their perspective.
- Have the class read the memoir, *Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time*. Have students connect details in the book to events going on in Pakistan today. Explore the protagonist, Greg Mortenson, as a heroic figure, and compare him to other heroic figures in literature.
- The press in Pakistan is controlled by the government of Pakistan, and when emergency rule was instituted in 2007, press freedoms were restricted even more. Discuss the role of the press in society. Is it important that the press be independent from the government? Why or why not? What factors influence the freedom of the press?
- Visit the UN Cyberschoolbus website and have students read the daily news from Pakistan. Several different newspapers are listed, and students could be split into groups with each group reading a different newspaper from each region. What are the main stories? Is the newspaper similar or different from newspapers you normally read? Did you learn anything new about Pakistan from reading their newspapers?

Science:

- Pakistan is one of a handful of countries around the globe that possesses nuclear weapons, as does its neighbor, India. This has led to ongoing tensions between the two countries. Use this as a launching

point to teach about nuclear energy in science and then discuss with students the political implications of this particular type of science and technology. Is this an instance of scientific progress, or the opposite? What are other uses for nuclear energy besides weapons? For additional information on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, see: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/>.

- The second largest mountain peak in the world, known as K2, is in Pakistan, and is part of the Himalaya mountain range. Teach about how the famous summits in the Himalayas were formed, the biodiversity and ecology of the Himalaya range, and the climate of the region.
- Teach students about the effects of altitude on the body, and the science of respiration that climbers must factor into their attempts to summit K2 and other mountain peaks. Use excerpts from *Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time* to illustrate the impact of altitude on the lead character and other climbers described in the book.

Mathematics:

- Use information from the readings to review mathematical concepts. For example, go back to the “Did You Know?” page, and look up the male and female literacy rate percentage in Pakistan. Have students look up the population of Pakistan, and then calculate the actual number of male and female citizens who can read.
- Using information from the ‘Economy’ section in *Internal Players*, have students conduct an economic analysis of Pakistan. Have students use information on government spending, imports and exports, GDP, and the primary economic activities within Pakistan to make hypotheses about why the economy is in its current state. How do political factors affect the economy? How does geography affect its economy? What recommendations would students make to improve the economy? As a possible extension have students conduct a similar analysis of a neighboring nation’s economy and make comparisons.
- Using statistics from the Issue in Focus, and with independent research of their own, have students compile a list of major statistics on Pakistan (such

as population, economy, languages, ethnic groups, etc.). Have them create graphs comparing these statistics with the US or another major country. (Recommended websites: CIA World Factbook, and UN Cyberschoolbus)

Recommended Curriculum Units

Indian Independence and the Question of Pakistan

This curriculum set probes the complex, rich history of South Asia. The end of the Second World War was also the beginning of the end for the old colonial empires. India's bid for independence from Great Britain is riveting history. Examining the debate leading up to the partition of India into two states provides insight into the historical dynamics that continue to shape India and Pakistan today and provide the backdrop for the conflict in Kashmir. Includes a teacher guide and student book. www.choices.edu

The Return of the Taliban

After exploring the connection between the Taliban and al Qaeda, and discovering how Pakistani tribal areas have fallen under the control of Taliban militia, students propose solutions to these problems.

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/taliban/lesson.html>

Pakistan: Country and Culture

Pakistan's political situation is an ever-changing landscape. Despite sharing the same religion, the population is divided into many different ethnicities, sects of Islam, and languages. In this lesson, available online from PBS Newshour, students will learn more about Pakistan's society, culture, and geography. The exercise in part 2 will encourage them to think about life as a teenager in Pakistan and try to better understand daily living in a very different part of the world.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/lessonplans/world/pakistan_overview.html

South Asia in Transition

This educational package is divided into six lessons that correspond to the accompanying video that contains historic and current news footage. Lessons include: South Asia: An Overview; Politics and Government; Economics; Population, Health, Environment, and Conflict; South Asian Social and Cultural Issues; and south Asia in World Affairs.

http://www.southerncenter.org/transition_south_asia.html

Negotiate Peace for India and Pakistan

Through research and role-playing, students explore the long wars fought between India and Pakistan regarding ownership of the territory Kashmir and consider the peace talks of 2004 between the leaders of both countries.

http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/educators/history_pakistan.html

India and Pakistan at 60

This lesson plan from PBS NewsHour Extra uses the 60th anniversary of India's and Pakistan's independence from Great Britain to introduce a lesson plan in which students familiarize themselves with key differences and similarities between the two countries, receive an overview of events leading to independence, and analyze the state of the issues facing the subcontinent today.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/lessonplans/world/ip_anniversary.html

Additional Resources

This list of resources is provided if you want to find some more specific and nuanced information about the themes presented in this issue of the World Savvy Monitor. These resources comprise additional books, films, web sites, and multimedia resources that can be used in the classroom. All resources are available from Amazon, unless other sources are noted.

BOOKS

Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West by Benazir Bhutto

Bhutto recounts her final months in Pakistan, offering insights into the complicated history of the relationship between the Middle East and the West and arguing against the belief that democracy and Islam are incompatible.

In the Line of Fire: A Memoir by Pervez Musharraf
Published in 2006, this autobiography of the controversial Pakistani president provides a deeper understanding of the man who has occupied a central role in post-9/11 international politics. Through his discussions, which include the 1999 coup that brought him to power, Pakistan's tense relationship with India, and Musharraf's role as a US ally in the war on terrorism, readers are presented with an image of Musharraf and his country that though often biased, provides valuable insights.

Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

This is the inspirational story of one man's efforts to address poverty, educate girls, and overcome cultural divides. After a failed attempt to climb Pakistan's K2, Greg Mortenson is nursed back to health by an impoverished Pakistani village. After observing the children of the village scratching out school lessons in the dirt, he promises to build the village a school. To date, this promise has resulted in 64 built schools and the establishment of the nonprofit, the Central Asia Institute.

Pakistan in a Nutshell by Amanda Roraback

This 64 page booklet outlines Pakistan's history from the Aryan invasion in 1700 BC to Musharraf's ban on extremist Muslim groups in 2002. Chapters cover the topics: political biographies, the separation of Bangladesh, background information about the Kashmir crisis, foreign relations, religion, nuclear weapons, political parties, and Muslim extremism.

Iqbal: A Novel by Francesco D'Adamo

This book tells the story of Iqbal Masih, a former bonded child laborer in Pakistan who rose to international fame as an advocate for child laborers and was tragically at the age of 13. Iqbal's story is told through the eyes of a fictional coworker who is in servitude alongside Iqbal in a carpet factory.

Shabanu by Suzanne Fisher Staples

This is the story of Shabanu, a strong-willed young girl whose home is the Cholistan Desert of Pakistan. A Newbery Honor Book, *Shabanu* is a coming-of-age novel that follows a young Muslim girl's internal struggle between following her heart and doing what is necessary to uphold her family's honor. Ages 12-up.

The Roses in My Carpets by Rukhsana Khan

A Pakistani refugee camp is the backdrop for this story of a young Arab boy and the carpets that he weaves. Appropriate for Kindergarten – Grade 2.

My Librarian is a Camel: How Books are Brought to Children around the World by Margriet Ruurs

Ruurs visits 13 countries, including Pakistan, to explore the manner in which librarians provide services to patrons using everything from boats and wheelbarrows to elephants. A boxed section provides a map and basic facts about the featured country. Grades 3-5.

FILMS**Long Live Pakistan**

Produced in conjunction with the 60th anniversary of the formation of an independent Pakistan, this well-researched documentary explores the country's brief but turbulent past in order to understand its volatile present. Features the last filmed interview with Benazir Bhutto before her assassination.

The Miseducation of Pakistan

Using in-depth interviews and shocking footage, this documentary from the Choices Program explores the education system of Pakistan and the stark disparities that exist between poor public schools and wealthy private schools. Available through <http://www.choicesvideo.net>.

Silent Waters

Set in a small Pakistani village in 1979, this film tells the story of a widow and her teenage son as their lives are transformed by General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization of Pakistan.

A Mighty Heart

Based on Mariane Pearl's memoir of the same name, this movie tells the story of Daniel Pearl, who was kidnapped and killed by terrorists while in Pakistan researching shoe bomber Richard Reid. Starring Angelina Jolie.

The Rock Star and the Mullahs: Introduction

From the PBS WideAngle series, this episode follows Slaman Ahmed, the charismatic lead guitarist for the popular Pakistani rock group Junoon, as he journeys to the tolerant, ancient city of Lahore and the fundamentalist stronghold of Peshawar to reveal the internal religious and political conflicts of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Available for viewing at <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/the-rock-star-and-the-mullahs/introduction/906/>

Earth

Directed by Deepa Mehta, this is the stirring tale of the religious and civil wars that broke out in India and Pakistan in the 1947 battle to gain independence from the British. Based on the autobiographical novel *Cracking India* by Bapsi Sidhwa, the story is told through the eyes of a little girl, Lenny, who has one leg in a brace. Available through Netflix and Amazon.com

WEBSITES AND MULTIMEDIA**Politics of Pakistan**

This PBS NewsHour website contains an array of articles, interviews, maps, timelines, and profiles.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/pakistan/

PBS Frontline

This program from PBS has produced a number of news reports on Pakistan – most of which can be viewed in full from the website. Recent documentaries include “Pakistan: State of Emergency,” “Disappeared,” “Kashmir: A Troubled Paradise,” “This is your Wife,” and more.

<http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/>

Return of the Taliban

This companion website to the 2006 PBS Frontline program explores the complex web of alliances that has emerged as a result of the war on terrorism and Pakistan's geopolitical

importance. Includes online access to the program, in-depth analysis, maps, interviews, and viewer discussions.

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/>

India and Pakistan: 60 Years of Independence

This PBS website contains background reports, interviews, and a timeline of events chronicling key events in the history of Pakistan and India.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/partition/

Interactive Map: Pakistan

This interactive map offers a region-by-region breakdown of the nation, with information on its geography, people, economy, and government.

<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/junoon/map.html>

Jazbah.org - Women of Pakistan

Jazbah.org takes its name from the Urdu word for dedication or passion for a cause. The site is devoted to Pakistani women who have made significant, positive impacts in their societies and includes profiles of these women, as well as reviews of relevant books and films.

<http://www.jazbah.org/>

Pennies for Peace

This website is targeted to children, and is part of the Three Cups of Tea phenomenon. Students can learn about the issues of education and especially girl's education in Pakistan, and then get involved in a service learning project to raise funds for the Central Asia Institute's school building projects.

<http://www.penniesforpeace.org>

Standards

Activities described in this Classroom Companion correspond to the following national standards from McREL (Mid-Continent Research for Education and Learning).

Social Studies

World History Standards:

Era 9: The 20th Century Since 1945: Promises and Paradoxes

- Understands major global trends since World War II
- Understands the search for community, stability, and peace in an interdependent world

World History Topics:

- Comparative analysis of culture and societies
- International diplomacy and relations
- Tension and conflict in the contemporary world
- Types and systems of government

Historical Understanding:

1. Understand and know how to analyze chronological relationships and patterns
2. Understands the historical perspective

Civics Standards:

What is the relationship of the United States to other nations and to world affairs?

- Understands how the world is organized politically into nation-states, how nation-states interact with one another, and issues surrounding U.S. foreign policy
- Understands the impact of significant political and nonpolitical developments on the United States and other nations

Civics Topics:

- Civic life, politics, and government
- International diplomacy and relations
- International political developments in the United States and in other nations
- Limited and unlimited government
- Political and economic freedoms
- Political parties, campaigns, and elections

Geography

2. Knows the location of places, geographic features, and patterns of the environment
4. Understands the physical and human characteristics of place
6. Understands that culture and experience influence people's perceptions of places and regions
7. Knows the physical processes that shape patterns on Earth's surface

13. Understands the forces of cooperation and conflict that shape the divisions of Earth's surface

English/Language Arts

Writing:

1. Gathers and uses information for research purposes

Reading:

6. Uses reading skills and strategies to understand and interpret a variety of literary texts
7. Uses reading skills and strategies to understand and interpret a variety of informational texts

Media:

10. Understands the characteristics and components of the media

Science

Earth Sciences:

2. Understands Earth's composition and structure

Topics:

- Earth's surface features
- Science, Technology, and Society

Mathematics

3. Uses basic and advanced procedures while performing the processes of computation
6. Understands and applies basic and advanced concepts of statistics and data analysis
9. Understands the general nature and uses of mathematics

WORLD SAVVY

MONITOR



World Savvy Salon Guide

World Savvy Salon Guide

Why Host a World Savvy Salon?

In a world where media tends to focus more on celebrities than on pressing global issues, it is challenging to find reliable sources of quality international news coverage and opportunities to discuss the meaning and impact of global events and trends.

This is ironic, given that we are at a time in which our lives are inexorably connected to the lives of people around the world in ways previously unimaginable. Even so, American mainstream media coverage of international affairs has declined. The result is a public which lacks the capacity to meaningfully discuss world affairs around the dinner table and, by extension, around the negotiating table in halls of power as global problem solvers.

The World Savvy Salon is a forum for individuals to convene and discuss these pressing issues. Salons are book clubs for the 21st Century. World Savvy's Monitor provides you with the content, context and tools to organize a Salon in your school or community. By focusing on one global issue or region each month, the Monitor and Salons are designed for participants to:

- Inform themselves about critical world affairs.
- Gather with a group of curious global citizens to discuss the issues, challenges and solutions on the world stage and in your own backyard.
- Host a dinner party with a purpose: to educate, to inspire, to promote global citizenship.

Salon participants bring diverse perspectives and backgrounds – from history, science, technology, psychology, law, finance, art, education, politics, community action, and parenting – to bear on each conversation. All sides of important global issues can be dissected; films and books are recommended; and future collaborations devised, from work and travel to philanthropy and activism. Salons can spark brainstorming and debate over how to talk to others and our children about the world.

Getting Started

Be part of a new movement: the book club, reinvented. Start a World Savvy Salon today using the World Savvy Monitor:

- Each member of your Salon subscribes online to the World Savvy Monitor. Individual subscriptions are \$75/year. We encourage you to register your Salon with World Savvy so we can provide support and follow progress this year.
- Members receive and read the monthly edition (available monthly from August-November and January-May) and convene for a World Savvy Salon to discuss the latest Monitor issue.
- Use the World Savvy Monitor website for Salon Guides with discussion questions to spark conversation.
- Invite speakers with expertise in various areas relevant to Monitor topics to present to the group – these could be experts, photographers, activists,

or just people who have traveled worldwide or are particularly passionate or well-informed about world affairs.

- Engage in community education, advocacy, volunteerism, activism, and/or philanthropy around the issues raised.
- Find ways to bring your children into the discussion and engage their peers.
- Communicate with your schools and workplaces about how global citizenship can be nurtured and expressed in these settings.

Why the World Savvy Monitor and Salons?

Consider The Following Statistics:

From the 2006 National Geographic Society Geographic Literacy Study Among Americans, Age 18-24

- 6 in 10 could not find Iraq or Saudi Arabia on a map of the Middle East. 9 in 10 could not find Afghanistan. 75% could not find Iran or Israel.
- 75% did not know that Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country; half thought India is predominantly Muslim (suggesting maybe they are mixing up the two?).
- Over half could not put Sudan or Rwanda in Africa.
- Only half knew the Alps are in Europe; just over half knew the Amazon Rain Forest is in South America. 20% could not find the Pacific Ocean and 65% could not find Great Britain.
- They generally had no idea of how the US and China compare: 75% thought English is the most spoken native language in the world (when it is Mandarin); 71% named China, not the US, as the largest exporter of goods and services; and most thought China's population is only double that of the US (when it is actually quadruple).
- Only 25% thought it was important to know where countries in the news are located; only 60% thought knowledge of a foreign language was important.

<http://www.nationalgeographic.com/roper2006/findings.html>

From 2007, 2008 Pew Research People and the Press Among Americans, Age 18-65 (Note: these were multiple choice questions!)

- Only 69% could name the Vice President of the US (down from 74% in 1989).
- Only 36% could name the President of Russia.
- Only 32% could come up with Sunni as the rival Muslim sect of Shia.
- Only 50% could match Hugo Chavez with Venezuela.
- Only 46% knew it was Kosovo that recently declared independence from Serbia.
- Only 28% could estimate the number of US troops killed in Iraq by the fifth anniversary of the invasion in March 2008 when given the choices 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000 (it is 4000).

<http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=319>

Pakistan

1. What predictions can you make about the future of Pakistan? Will Zardari stay in power? Will Pakistan be able to contain rising Islamist militancy? What will be the course of the relationship between the US and Pakistan?
2. How does poverty affect Pakistan socially and politically? Has poverty affected Pakistan differently than other poor nations? Why or why not? How does Pakistan's history differ from that of its immediate neighbors? Why?
3. During the 1990s, Pakistan was subject to three layers of sanctions by the international community. How effective do you think this approach is? Is there a more effective way to entice other nations to make changes?
4. What do you think is the primary cause of Pakistan's failed education system? Realistically, what could be done to improve it?
5. What role do you believe the US should play in aiding Pakistani development? Is it justifiable for the US to only aid Pakistan when it is conducive to US military and political aims? Why or why not?
6. What steps, if any, should the international community take to ensure that Pakistan's nuclear technology is not spread? To what extent is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty effective?
7. Benazir Bhutto was the first female head of state elected in a Muslim nation. What do you think accounts for this? Do you think having a high-profile female leader had any effect on everyday women in Pakistan? Why or why not?
8. How do you think US Presidential elections will affect the US relationship with Pakistan? How do you think Obama and McCain would address the issues in similar and different ways?
9. The next section of the Monitor will cover international development. In Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus has had a great deal of success using microfinance to lift that nation's poorest people, and particularly women, out of poverty. In this system, the poor can qualify for very small loans without the collateral necessary for loans at most banks. Do you believe that such an initiative could be successful in Pakistan? Why or why not?
10. If you were the newly elected President of Pakistan, what would your top three priorities for the nation be and how would you implement them?
11. Things to watch for in the coming year:
 - Will President Zardari be able to maintain his legitimacy, domestically and internationally? Will the Pakistani people and the international community view him as an effective leader? How will previous charges of corruption that have been levied against him affect his Presidency?
 - How will Pakistan respond to the rise in Islamist militant activity within its borders? What will its relationship with the US be in terms of working together to fight the Global War on Terrorism? To what extent will President Zardari be willing to work with US leadership?

- What role will Nawaz Sharif's party, the PML-N, play in the new government? To what extent will it be supportive of Zardari's PPP? To what extent will it oppose PPP initiatives?
- What course will tensions between Pakistan and India take? Will conflict erupt? Will the two nations be able to reach a meaningful peace agreement? How, if at all, will the change in Pakistani leadership affect peace prospects? What course will tensions between Pakistan and India take? Will conflict erupt? Will the two nations be able to reach a meaningful peace agreement? How, if at all, will the change in Pakistani leadership affect peace prospects?

Additional Resources

Books

Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West by Benazir Bhutto

Bhutto recounts her final months in Pakistan, offering insights into the complicated history of the relationship between the Middle East and the West and arguing against the belief that democracy and Islam are incompatible.

Descent Into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid

This new book is a gripping and essential account of what has transpired in Pakistan and Afghanistan over the last decade, and the US role in the abysmal state of nation-building in Central Asia. It is very informative, yet highly readable with vivid detail on diplomatic and military maneuvers.

The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor by William Langewiesche

Based on his reporting for the Atlantic Magazine, Langewiesche vividly recounts the career of notorious Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Kahn and his legacy on the state of nuclear proliferation in the world today.

In the Line of Fire: A Memoir by Pervez Musharraf
Published in 2006, this autobiography of the controversial Pakistani president provides a deeper understanding of the man who has occupied a central role in post-9/11 international politics. Through his discussions, which

include the 1999 coup that brought him to power, Pakistan's tense relationship with India, and Musharraf's role as a US ally in the war on terrorism, readers are presented with an image of Musharraf and his country that though often biased, provides valuable insights.

Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

This is the inspirational story of one man's efforts to address poverty, educate girls, and overcome cultural divides. After a failed attempt to climb Pakistan's K2, Greg Mortenson is nursed back to health by an impoverished Pakistani village. After observing the children of the village scratching out school lessons in the dirt, he promises to build the village a school. To date, this promise has resulted in 64 built schools and the establishment of the nonprofit, the Central Asia Institute.

Pakistan in a Nutshell by Amanda Roraback

This 64 page booklet outlines Pakistan's history from the Aryan invasion in 1700 BC to Musharraf's ban on extremist Muslim groups in 2002. Chapters cover the topics: political biographies, the separation of Bangladesh, background information about the Kashmir crisis, foreign relations, religion, nuclear weapons, political parties, and Muslim extremism.

Iqbal: A Novel by Francesco D'Adamo

This book tells the story of Iqbal Masih, a former bonded child laborer in Pakistan who rose to international fame as an advocate for child laborers and was tragically killed at the age of 13. Iqbal's story is told through the eyes of a fictional coworker who is in servitude alongside Iqbal in a carpet factory.

Shabanu by Suzanne Fisher Staples

This is the story of Shabanu, a strong-willed young girl whose home is the Cholistan Desert of Pakistan. A Newbery Honor Book, Shabanu is a coming-of-age novel that follows a young Muslim girl's internal struggle between following her heart and doing what is necessary to uphold her family's honor. Ages 12-up.

The Roses in My Carpets by Rukhsana Khan

A Pakistani refugee camp is the backdrop for this story of a young Arab boy and the carpets that he weaves. Appropriate for Kindergarten – Grade 2.

My Librarian is a Camel: How Books are Brought to Children around the World by Margriet Ruurs
Ruurs visits 13 countries, including Pakistan, to explore the manner in which librarians provide services to patrons using everything from boats and wheelbarrows to elephants. A boxed section provides a map and basic facts about the featured country. Grades 3-5.

Films**Long Live Pakistan**

Produced in conjunction with the 60th anniversary of the formation of an independent Pakistan, this well-researched documentary explores the country's brief but turbulent past in order to understand its volatile present. It features the last filmed interview with Benazir Bhutto before her assassination. Available through Netflix and Amazon.com.

The Miseducation of Pakistan

Using in-depth interviews and shocking footage, this documentary from the Choices Program explores the education system of Pakistan and the stark disparities that exist between poor public schools and wealthy private schools. Available through <http://www.choicesvideo.net> and Amazon.com.

Silent Waters

Set in a small Pakistani village in 1979, this film tells the story of a widow and her teenage son as their lives are transformed by General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization of Pakistan. Available through Netflix and Amazon.com.

A Mighty Heart

Based on Mariane Pearl's memoir of the same name, this movie tells the story of Daniel Pearl, who was kidnapped and killed by terrorists while in Pakistan researching shoe bomber Richard Reid. Starring Angelina Jolie. Available through Netflix and Amazon.com.

The Rock Star and the Mullahs: Introduction

From the PBS WideAngle series, this episode follows Slaman Ahmed, the charismatic lead guitarist for the popular Pakistani rock group Junoon, as he journeys to the tolerant, ancient city of Lahore and the fundamentalist stronghold of Peshawar to reveal the internal religious and political conflicts of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Available for viewing at <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/the-rock-star-and-the-mullahs/introduction/906/>

Earth

Directed by Deepa Mehta, this is the stirring tale of the religious and civil wars that broke out in India and Pakistan in the 1947 battle to gain independence from the British. Based on the autobiographical novel *Cracking India* by Bapsi Sidhwa, the story is told through the eyes of a little girl, Lenny, who has one leg in a brace. Available through Netflix and Amazon.com

Websites and Multimedia

Politics of Pakistan

This PBS NewsHour website contains an array of articles, interviews, maps, timelines, and profiles.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/pakistan/

Return of the Taliban

This companion website to the 2006 PBS Frontline program explores the complex web of alliances that has emerged as a result of the war on terrorism and Pakistan's geopolitical importance. Includes online access to the program, in-depth analysis, maps, interviews, and viewer discussions.

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/>

India and Pakistan: 60 Years of Independence

This PBS website contains background reports, interviews, and a timeline of events chronicling key events in the history of Pakistan and India.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/partition/

Interactive Map: Pakistan

This interactive map offers a region-by-region breakdown of the nation, with information on its geography, people, economy, and government.

<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/junoon/map.html>

Jazbah.org - Women of Pakistan

Jazbah.org takes its name from the Urdu word for dedication or passion for a cause. The site is devoted to Pakistani women who have made significant, positive impacts in their societies and includes profiles of these women, as well as reviews of relevant books and films.

<http://www.jazbah.org/>

WORLD SAVVY

MONITOR



Update: China

China Update

The 2008 Beijing Olympics were considered by many to be a great success and demonstrated the control and efficiency of which the Chinese government is capable. Stunning, large-scale, and finely tuned opening and closing ceremonies wowed audiences and the Chinese led in the medal standings with 51 gold medals and 100 medals overall. Despite some minor controversies (including the last-minute substitution of a child singing in the opening ceremonies for one deemed 'prettier' and speculation regarding the true age of members of the female Chinese gymnastics team), many viewed the Beijing Olympics as a coming out for China as a political and economic world power.

Environment

Despite widespread fears that air pollution would hinder athletes during the Olympics, China's air pollution met minimum standards. Leading up to the Olympics, Chinese officials introduced several emergency measures to limit air pollution in Beijing, including temporarily closing down polluting factories and limiting traffic on the city's roads. This led to Beijing's cleanest August air in a decade. Some speculate that this experience has raised the expectations of Chinese citizens and believe that as a result, more pressure will be placed on the Chinese government to maintain decreased levels of pollution.

Protests

In an attempt to exhibit openness, Chinese authorities designated protest zones in which protesters would be allowed to air grievances during the Olympics. Despite this, none of the petitions to stage demonstrations were approved, and at least half a dozen of those submitting petitions were arrested. In addition, several foreign pro-Tibet protesters were detained and later deported for their actions.

Conflict

In the first week of August, there were two attacks in Xinjiang, a province in the Northwest of China that is home to many Muslim Uighurs, many of whom wish to create an independent state called East Turkestan. The World Uighur Congress stated that the Chinese government is responsible for these attacks because of what they view as repressive policies in Xinjiang. Despite fears that Muslim Uighur separatists would disrupt the Olympics, there were no major incidences that directly affected the Games.

Natural Disasters

A 6.1 magnitude earthquake hit Sichuan Province on August 30, killing at least 32 people, injuring 230 people, and forcing the evacuation of over 40,000 people. The earthquake, which also damaged highways, reservoirs, bridges, and hundreds of schools, came just months after a

May 12 earthquake devastated the Sichuan Region, killing nearly 70,000 people.

International Trade

In late August, Iraq signed a 22-year oil contract with a Chinese oil company that could be worth up to \$3 billion. This marks the first major oil deal that Iraq has made with a foreign country since 2003. Under the agreement, which is yet to be approved by the Iraqi cabinet, the China National Petroleum Corporation will provide technical advisers, oil workers, and equipment to help develop the Ahdab oil field, which lies southeast of Baghdad. The deal could provide important political capital in the future, as China will be seen by Iraqis as providing needed assistance in the development of oil resources and the contract will likely serve as a key foothold in future dealings with oil-rich Iraq.